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Abstract
In this thesis, we examine stochastic techniques for overcoming game theoretic and
computational issues in the collective decision making process of self-interested individuals.
In particular, we examine truthful, stochastic mechanisms, for settings with a strong budget
balance constraint (i.e. there is no net flow of money into or away from the agents).
Building on past results in AI and computational social choice, we characterise affine-
maximising social choice functions that are implementable in truthful mechanisms for the
setting of heterogeneous item allocation with unit demand agents. We further provide a
characterisation of affine maximisers with the strong budget balance constraint. These
mechanisms reveal impossibility results and poor worst-case performance that motivates
us to examine stochastic solutions.
To adequately compare stochastic mechanisms, we introduce and discuss measures that
capture the behaviour of stochastic mechanisms, based on techniques used in stochastic
algorithm design. When applied to deterministic mechanisms, these measures correspond
directly to existing deterministic measures. While these approaches have more general
applicability, in this work we assess mechanisms based on overall agent utility (efficiency
and social surplus ratio) as well as fairness (envy and envy-freeness).
We observe that mechanisms can (and typically must) achieve truthfulness and strong
budget balance using one of two techniques: labelling a subset of agents as “auctioneers”
who cannot affect the outcome, but collect any surplus; and partitioning agents into disjoint
groups, such that each partition solves a subproblem of the overall decision making process.
Worst-case analysis of random-auctioneer and random-partition stochastic mechanisms
show large improvements over deterministic mechanisms for heterogeneous item allocation.
In addition to this allocation problem, we apply our techniques to envy-freeness in the
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room assignment-rent division problem, for which no truthful deterministic mechanism
is possible. We show how stochastic mechanisms give an improved probability of envy-
freeness and low expected level of envy for a truthful mechanism. The random-auctioneer
technique also improves the worst-case performance of the public good (or public project)
problem.
Communication and computational complexity are two other important concerns of
computational social choice. Both the random-auctioneer and random-partition approaches
offer a flexible trade-off between low complexity of the mechanism, and high overall outcome
quality measured, for example, by total agent utility. They enable truthful and feasible
solutions to be incrementally improved on as the mechanism receives more information and
is allowed more processing time.
The majority of our results are based on optimising worst-case performance, since
this provides guarantees on how a mechanism will perform, regardless of the agents that
use it. To complement these results, we perform empirical, average-case analyses on our
mechanisms. Finally, while strong budget balance is a fixed constraint in our particular
social choice problems, we show empirically that this can improve the overall utility of
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In this work, we examine stochastic techniques for overcoming game theoretic and compu-
tational issues in the collective decision making process of self-interested individuals. We
assess the efficacy of these techniques, with a focus on strongly budget balanced, truthful
mechanisms.
Problems where multiple individuals with their own preferences must come to some
collective decision are ubiquitous. A website displaying advertisements must choose from
different advertisers, each with different values for the location and pages on which those
ads appear. A government licensing bands of the electromagnetic spectrum seeks to pro-
vide licences to bands and locations to companies that value them the most. In political
elections, each citizen has some ordering over each candidate and the electoral system ag-
gregates these preferences to determine who is elected. Each of these problems requires
the elicitation of privately known preferences by some decision making process where indi-
viduals may misreport their preferences if this can improve their outcome. A bidder in an
auction, for example, may be able to pay less by reporting a lower value for the resource
1
being auctioned. Such problems are examined in social choice theory and mechanism
design.
Computational social choice is a field of study combining artificial intelligence and com-
puter science with social choice theory [Chevaleyre et al., 2007; Brandt et al., 2012]. Social
choice theory aggregates a set of individual preferences or utilities in order to make some
sort of collective decision. The goal of the decision making process is, typically, to max-
imise some collective utility of the group of individuals. For example, a utilitarian decision
maker would measure and maximise collective utility as the sum of individual utility, while
an egalitarian decision maker would attempt to maximise the utility of the worst-off agent
in the group. This decision making process may also have other requirements such as
fairness, that may ensure agents have roughly equal utility, or individual rationality, which
makes sure no agent has a lower utility after participating in a decision making process.
Since each individual has private preferences, a common requirement is truthfulness, or
incentive compatibility, whereby an agent is guaranteed to maximise its own utility when
reporting its private preferences truthfully. Social choice also draws from other fields such
as game theory, decision theory and welfare economics.
While social choice theory ignores computational issues, computational social choice
looks at issues such as tractability and complexity to perform the decision making pro-
cess. Such computational costs may be used to provide additional guarantees on a decision
process, which may be theoretically manipulable, but only at some intractably high com-
putational cost. Computational social choice also applies algorithm design and verification
techniques from computer science to the development of social choice systems. Computa-
tional social choice also covers the application of social choice techniques to the interactions
and negotiations between automated agents in artificial intelligence, and in particular mul-
tiagent systems.
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Randomisation and approximation are two tools frequently used in algorithm design.
A randomised (or probabilistic) algorithm makes use of random numbers or bits during
computation. For a single input, the performance and/or output of a random algorithm can
be modelled by a random variable dependent on these random bits, rather than a single,
deterministic value. Randomisation can be used to obtain a higher expected performance
compared to deterministic algorithms, or to provide an ideal solution with some probability,
where a deterministic algorithm is unable to do so for all inputs.
One example of using randomisation and approximation in an algorithm to overcome
impossibility results is in the consensus problem [Pease et al., 1980]. In this problem, a
group of isolated processors each have some private information, but an unknown subset
are faulty. The non-faulty processors must come to some group agreement in the presence
of these faulty processors. While this problem is impossible to solve for several processor
models, randomisation has been used to circumvent these impossibility results [Aspnes,
2003]. In other problems, a correct result may be unachievable deterministically, for all
inputs, given computational or other restrictions. However, randomised algorithms exist
that return a correct answer with some probability, p, or are known to produce an answer
within some approximation factor, α, of the ideal solution. A classic example of this is
the Miller-Rabin primality test [Miller, 1976; Rabin, 1980], to determine whether a given
input is prime or composite. The algorithm’s runtime increases linearly with the choice
of parameter k, while the probability of returning an incorrect input is bounded to be at
most 4−k. These tools are also used to overcome computational complexity issues when a
correct answer is always returned. For example, consider the convex hull problem, which,
given a set of points P , finds the smallest convex set containing P [Chan, 1996]. Based
on an adversarial argument, a deterministic algorithm finding the convex hull of a set of n
points, processed serially, requires Ω(n2) steps in the worst case. Randomisation is able to
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overcome this adversary argument and allows an expected running time of O(n log n) for
this problem [Motwani and Raghavan, 1996].
Randomisation has been used in voting theory to overcome impossibility results regard-
ing manipulation by voters. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that if a voting
method is free from tactical or strategic voting then it must be either dictatorial, have
some candidate that can never win, or be non-deterministic [Gibbard, 1977]. If a vot-
ing method allows tactical voting, then a voter may achieve a more desirable outcome
by stating preferences other than his or her true preferences. A dictatorial voting system
contains a single voter (the dictator) who can choose the winner. A simple example of
a voting method that uses randomisation to be simultaneously free from strategic voting
and non-dictatorial while not preventing any candidate from winning, is the random bal-
lot. In a random ballot election, one ballot is randomly selected and the candidate ranked
first on that ballot is the winner. While this voting system becomes dictatorial after the
random choice is made, it does not need to define a set dictator in advance. It also means
that the probability of a candidate winning is directly proportional to the number of vot-
ers who most support that candidate, which is untrue of dictatorial systems. There has
been some recent work on randomisation in computational social choice [Alon et al., 2011;
Procaccia, 2010], and it is an area with many interesting open problems.
In this work we examine different techniques using randomisation and approximation
in computational social choice problems. There are several classes of problems in compu-
tational social choice, and the primary focus of this study is on problems from multiagent
resource allocation and fair division. These problems deal with the assignment of finite,
indivisible goods to a group of agents, where each agent has his or her own preferences
over bundles of goods. Solutions are evaluated on notions of collective utility, efficiency
(Pareto optimality), and fairness [Chevaleyre et al., 2006]. We focus on mechanisms that
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are truthful, so agents have no incentive to misreport their true preferences. The problems
we consider have a strong budget balance constraint, where any payments made by agents,
due to rules of the mechanism, must sum to zero. This means that we allow payments
between agents, but there is no external party (residual claimant) to fund or collect surplus
payments from the group of agents participating in the social choice problem. If there is
no party to collect any surplus revenue, this surplus must somehow be discarded. While
a payment surplus has been dealt with in previous work by “money burning” [Hartline
and Roughgarden, 2008] for example, this may not always be possible. Laws or rules on
the unit of currency may prohibit its destruction, or if the units are resources such as
gold or time, the destruction may be physically impossible. Also, for currencies with small
money supply, such as shares in an asset, money burning can affect a currency’s value and
have a non-negligible effect on agents’ utilities, harming truthfulness. In settings where
a mechanism is performed iteratively on a set of agents, even a small budget imbalance
could result in completely draining the agents of their money supply, given enough itera-
tions. The combination of truthfulness and strong budget balance can be quite restricting,
however, as shown by the Green-Laffont impossibility theorem [Green and Laffont, 1979]
(see Subsection 3.2.2).
The first problem we consider is the allocation of heterogeneous items to agents with
unit demand (see Section 2.1). In particular, performing such allocations under a strong
budget balance constraint. Consider the following two scenarios. First, a group of friends
has won tickets to various events at an international sporting event. While each person
would like to see any one event, they each have different preferences over the events and
the seat locations. The group decides that the tickets should be given so that, if possible,
each person gets to attend their most preferred event and that no one should get more
than one ticket. The group decides to run an auction for the tickets amongst themselves,
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but since there is no outside auctioneer, all payments must be made between themselves.
In the second scenario, a department has recently been allocated new office space and the
employees have to decide amongst themselves how the offices will be allocated. They decide
to run an auction, with each employee “paying” by offering to personally deliver a cup of
gourmet coffee for a certain number of mornings. Those stuck with their lower preferences
for offices will be compensated by having hot beverages hand delivered by those in the
more desirable offices.
In both of these scenarios, we have a problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods,
resources or tasks to a group of agents, such that each individual receives at most one
item. Every agent may not get an item (e.g. there are not enough tickets) or there may
be goods left unassigned (e.g. there are extra offices). This unit demand setting makes
sense, for example, when individual agents have a need for only one item, such as tickets
to an event or time slots in a schedule. It also serves as a simplification when agents have
near-zero marginal utility for a bundle of items over the highest-valued item in that bundle.
For example, an advertiser may have a higher utility for an advertisement placed on the
top two positions of a website compared to just the top position, but the difference in
utility is likely to be a small fraction of the agent’s overall utility. In this way, an agent’s
preferences can be expressed simply as its value for each individual item, rather than values
for all combinations of items, which greatly simplifies the amount of information needed
to capture preferences. The two scenarios above require strong budget balance. Since
there is no auctioneer for the tickets, any payments made must be distributed back to the
participants. In the office setting, for every cup of coffee that one person must deliver,
there must be someone set to receive a coffee (the receiver delivers a negative number of
cups).
Related to heterogeneous item allocation is the room assignment–rent division problem
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[Su, 1999] (see Section 2.2), which is a classic problem in multiagent resource allocation
and fair division. Consider a group of friends who will rent a house together. They must
decide both who gets which room, and what share of the rent each person will pay. Each
friend will want to be allocated just one room and there should be no surplus or deficit
when meeting the total rent. Each individual has his or her own preferences on which room
is best, such as preferring the largest room, or the room with the best view. The goal is to
assign individuals to rooms and divide the rent in such a way that no one prefers another
room. More generally, this is a problem of allocating a set of indivisible, heterogeneous
items (i.e. the rooms) along with a share of a divisible resource (i.e. the rent), such that
all items are allocated and each agent gets exactly one indivisible item. The resources can
provide positive or negative utility to the agents. In these settings, we are interested in
more than just the total utility of agents, but also some notion of fairness. In this work
we focus on envy and envy-freeness as measures of fairness. An agent is envious if it views
another agent’s bundle item and payment as strictly better than its own and an envy-free
mechanism provides an allocation where no agent is envious. As well as fairness, envy-
freeness gives a form of stability to an allocation. Under an envy-free allocation, no agent
will want to force another agent to swap bundles.
Finally, we examine the public good (or public project) problem (see Section 2.3). A
common example for this problem is a community deciding on whether or not to collectively
purchase a resource that can be used by all, such as a new bridge. Based on how much they
anticipate using this bridge, each community member has some private value for how much
it is worth. The bridge should only be built if the total benefit it provides outweighs the
total cost, which the community must pay. Furthermore, if the bridge is built, we should
not expect any individuals to have to pay more than their value for the bridge. Agents in
this setting are single-parameter, in that their preferences are captured by a single value:
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the value for the public good.
In all these problems, the agents’ preferences are private information, which the decision
maker cannot assume will be reported honestly. Since agents can misreport their true
preferences, or may have limited information about other agents’ preferences, we focus
our attention on truthful mechanisms, where an agent maximises its utility by reporting
truthfully, regardless of the behaviour of other agents. This prevents individual agents
from misreporting their preferences in order to increase their utility, at the expense of
other agents. It also means agents also do not need to invest effort in determining an
optimal strategy or predicting other agents’ types, since the optimal strategy is always
truthful reporting.
We examine existing solutions to these three problems, using deterministic and stochas-
tic mechanisms. Due to impossibility results, these mechanisms must sacrifice some desir-
able property such as truthfulness or budget balance. Our work continues on from previous
work (e.g. Roberts [1979] and Bikhchandani et al. [2006]) by further examining the space
of mechanisms for these problems.
The focus of this work is on truthful mechanisms that have no surplus or deficit in
total payments. We restrict our attention to affine-maximising mechanisms, but one of
our contributions is a characterisation that shows truthful mechanisms for the heteroge-
neous item allocation problem, with an independence constraint must be affine-maximising.
This is initially just for deterministic mechanisms, but we extend this to cover stochastic
mechanisms. These new results are an important contribution to the multiagent systems
literature, since they assist future work on similar problems to determine the space of
possible mechanisms, and determine optimality within this space. We use these character-
isations as part of a foundation for our investigation of truthful mechanisms for the room
assignment–rent division problem.
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As a result of these characterisations, we observe that truthfulness and strong budget
balance for affine-maximising mechanisms can (and typically must) be achieved using tech-
niques of either ignoring some agents, or partitioning agents into groups that each solve
a sub-problem of the overall decision making process. We then apply these techniques to
develop mechanisms, deterministic and randomised, for our three social choice problems.
For problems where randomisation has been seldom or never used, a comparison based
on existing performance measures and desiderata is not always suitable, and this work
demonstrates the limitations of these measures. A contribution of this work is the defini-
tion and discussion of appropriate comparison measures that appropriately capture the be-
haviour of randomised mechanisms. Using our characterisations, we provide upper bounds
on what is achievable for truthful mechanisms given our constraints. We also present mech-
anisms that have worst-case bounds matching these upper bounds and are thus optimal
according to these measures. The improved performance we demonstrate in randomised
mechanisms encourages the use of these techniques in future work in multiagent systems
research.
Communication and computational complexity are two other important concerns of
computational social choice. While the techniques of ignoring agents and partitioning
were motivated by the goal of improving social welfare measures, we examine the efficacy
of these techniques on improving complexity issues. In particular, we show that both
techniques offer a flexible trade-off between low complexity of the mechanism, and high
overall utility of the agents.
The majority of our results are based on optimising worst-case performance, since this
provides guarantees on how a mechanism will perform, regardless of the agents that use it.
To complement these results, we perform empirical, average-case analyses on our mecha-
nisms. These empirical results provide insight into the rarity of value profiles that lead to
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worst-case results from a mechanism. Worst-case bounds on their own make no distinction
between a mechanism where all value profiles lead to the same level of performance, and a
mechanism with only a single poor-performing value profile.
Finally, while strong budget balance is a constraint in our social choice problems, we
show that this can improve the overall utility of agents. We empirically compare mecha-
nisms that enforce a utility-maximising assignment with those that enforce strong budget
balance. These results show that a budget imbalance can lower the utility of the group of
agents by more than the loss of utility due to non-utility-maximising assignment.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce general notation and
concepts required for our investigation of computational social choice problems. We then
provide a description of our three social choice settings in Sections 2.1 to 2.3.
Next, in Chapter 3 we cover both existing and new deterministic solutions to our
social choice problems, as well as related problems. In Section 3.1 we cover measures
used to assess the quality of deterministic solutions followed by relevant characterisations
in Section 3.2. This includes our novel characterisation of truthful and strongly budget
balanced heterogeneous item allocation mechanisms, under an independence constraint, in
Subsections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. We then present existing and new deterministic mechanisms in
Sections 3.3 to 3.5. Along with mechanisms, we provide upper bounds on the performance
of deterministic mechanisms that motivate the examination of stochastic mechanisms.
In Chapter 4 we examine stochastic mechanisms for our three social choice settings.
We introduce and discuss our measures for examining such mechanisms in Section 4.1, and
Section 4.2 covers related work on the use of randomisation in other social choice problems.
Sections 4.3 to 4.5 examine our randomisation techniques applied to our different settings,
examining the worst-case performance of these mechanisms.
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We look at average case results and complexity of the mechanisms in Chapter 5. In
Section 5.1 we show the results of empirical tests on the average case performance of
our stochastic mechanisms. Section 5.2 shows the trade off between enforcing efficient
outcomes and enforcing strong budget balance. Next, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we show the
flexible trade off between high solution quality and low communication or computational
complexity of our stochastic mechanisms. Finally, in Chapter 6 we present our conclusions
and directions for future work.
11
Chapter 2
Problems in Computational Social
Choice
The field of computational social choice covers a wide range of problems from social choice
theory [Chevaleyre et al., 2007; Brandt et al., 2012]. Social choice problems involve multiple
agents in a collective decision making process, the outcome of which affects all agents. In
this chapter, we formally define each of the problems that we examine in this study, along
with required definitions. We focus on a selection of problems from multiagent resource
allocation [Chevaleyre et al., 2006]. These problems deal with multiple autonomous entities
called agents. These agents can represent, for example, people, autonomous software
programs, computer systems, companies, robots, network links or a mix of these. In each
of the problems we examine, we have a set of n agents, N, where each agent i ∈ N has
a type θi ∈ Θi that captures all the relevant information about the agent. The type
space of an agent, Θi, determines all the possible preferences that agent can hold, while
Θ = Θ1 × · · · × Θn denotes all possible sets of agents. We assume that an agent’s type is
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private information, known only to that agent. However, as we explain in the rest of this
section, we can design mechanisms where a rational, self-interested agent will truthfully
reveal its private information.
Each agent i ∈ N has a utility function ui : Θi × X → R that captures an agent’s
preferences over the set of all possible outcomes X, given its type. For any two outcomes
X1, X2 ∈ X, if ui(θi, X1) > ui(θiX2) then agent i of type θi prefers outcome X1 to X2
(denoted X1 θi X2), while if ui(θi, X1) = ui(θi, X2) then the agent is indifferent between
the two (denoted X1 ∼θi X2). Note that while agent’ types are private, the utility functions
are known for all agents. Since we consider settings where agents may make or receive
payments, we model agents with quasi-linear utilities. That is, an agent’s utility is
linear in the payment it receives. For simplicity, the unit of the payment commodity forms
the numeraire for all utility functions.
We assume agents act rationally, in the way described by Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [1953]. Thus, where an agent i’s actions can influence the outcome, it is assumed to
act such as to maximise the (expected) value of its utility ui. In stochastic settings, where
agents use an expected utility, we assume risk neutrality. Suppose an agent is given the
choice between a guaranteed payment of $10, or a lottery giving $20 with a 50% chance
and $0 otherwise. Both give an expected payment of $10, so a risk-neutral agent would
be indifferent between the two choices. Alternatively, a risk-averse agent would prefer the
guaranteed $10 while a risk-seeking agent would prefer the lottery.
Several of these agents as we described are making their collective decision according
to some previously agreed upon rules. We capture this decision making process as a
mechanism, which determines an outcome X ∈ X, from some space of possible outcomes,
X, given a set of agents Θ. In this work, we focus our attention on direct-revelation
mechanisms [Myerson, 1981]. Unless otherwise specified, we use the term mechanism to
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refer to a (deterministic) direct-revelation mechanism.
Definition 2.1 (Direct-revelation mechanism). A direct-revelation mechanism M =
(f, t), is a decision making process that restricts the actions of the agents to each make
a single (confidential) report of their private type. The social choice function (SCF)1
f : Θ → X then determines an outcome X ∈ X, based on the (reported) types of agents,
while the payment function t : Θ → Rn determines the payments received2 by each
agent.
The payment function can be equivalently expressed as n payment functions, denoted
t = (t1, . . . , tn), where ti : Θ→ R is the payment made to agent i.
In these mechanisms, agents report their private types θ to the mechanism. While
mechanisms may request alternative information from the agents, the Revelation Prin-
ciple [Gibbard, 1973; Green and Laffont, 1977; Myerson, 1979; Myerson, 1981] states that
if these mechanisms implement a SCF in a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, there is a direct-
revelation mechanism that implements the same SCF in a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
Thus, it is sufficient to assume the mechanism requests an agent reveal its type rather
than some other information. A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that proposes
an equilibrium set of strategies for a set of rational agents. In our settings, an agent’s
strategy is simply the type it chooses to report. If all agents are acting according to a
Nash equilibrium, then no single agent can increase its utility by changing its strategy
(i.e. misreporting). A mechanism implementing an SCF in a Nash equilibrium means that
1Also called a decision function
2In this work, all payment functions define the amount the mechanism pays to each agent, while in
related work, it is also common for the payment function to represent the amount paid by each agent to
the mechanism.
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all agents reporting truthfully is a Nash equilibrium, where all agents know each other’s
reported types.
In this work, we examine both deterministic and stochastic mechanisms.
Definition 2.2 (Stochastic mechanism). We represent a stochastic mechanism (or
randomised mechanism) ∆M̂ as a random distribution over a set of deterministic
mechanisms (or sets of social choice functions and payment functions) M̂. Let pk denote
the probability of selecting deterministic mechanism Mk = (fk, tk) ∈ M̂. We also use
k ∈ M̂ to denote a set of indices of these deterministic mechanisms. A valid mechanism
must have
∑
k∈M̂ pk = 1, and pk ∈ [0, 1], ∀k ∈ M̂.
A random process first selects the mechanism k to use, then the deterministic social
choice and payment functions, (fk, tk) are applied to the agents’ reported types. Since
the random process is performed independently of agent types, each of the deterministic
mechanisms that the process can select from (i.e. the support of the stochastic mechanism)
must have the same type space Θ and outcome space X.
The agents’ types (which capture their values for the outcomes) are private information,
which the mechanism cannot assume will be reported honestly. In fact, we assume an
agent will misreport if it is in its own best interest. Since agents can misreport their
true preferences, or may have limited information about other agents’ preferences, we
focus our attention on mechanisms that are dominant strategy incentive compatible. A
mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)3 guarantees that
any agent will maximise its own utility when reporting its type truthfully, regardless of
the behaviour of all other agents. That is, for all agents i ∈ N , and for all other agents’
3Also called strategy-proof
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strategies θ−i ∈ Θ−i, the agent’s true type θi satisfies:
θi ∈ {θ̂i ∈ Θi : ui(θi, f(θ̂i, θ−i)) + t(θ̂i, θ−i) ≥ ui(θi, f(θ̂i
′






Under a DSIC mechanism, all agents acting truthfully is a Nash equilibrium, but is a
stronger solution concept since it does not require any agent to know the other agents’
actions.
A stochastic mechanism is DSIC (in the universal sense) if and only if it is a ran-
domisation over deterministic DSIC mechanisms. Thus, even if an agent is aware of the
random choice, truthful reporting remains as its dominant strategy. This is in contrast
to the weaker requirement of truthfulness in expectation (TIE), where an agent’s ex-
pected utility is maximised when reporting truthfully. All DSIC mechanisms are TIE, but
a TIE mechanism may not be DSIC. If the random choice is known in advance to one
or more of the agents, then a TIE mechanism will not necessarily have truth-telling as
its dominant strategy. If, for some reason, an auction had to be re-run (e.g. an agent
noticed a mistake in its submitted bid), a DSIC mechanism remains truthful if the same
random choice is kept, but a TIE mechanism must make a new random choice to remain
truthful. Since a DSIC mechanism is truthful in dominant strategies, information acquired
before the auction is re-run will not cause individual agents to misreport (unless there
is collusion). Firstly, truthfulness is desirable since this prevents individual agents from
misreporting their preferences in order to increase their utility, at the expense of other
agents. Truthfulness also means that agents do not need to invest effort in determining
an optimal strategy or predicting other agents’ types, since the optimal strategy is always
truthful reporting.
Individual rationality (also known as voluntary participation) is a common con-
straint in auctions, resource allocation and other mechanism design problems. It ensures
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that a rational agent would always choose to participate in the mechanism, regardless of
other agents participating.
Definition 2.3 (Individual Rationality (IR)). A mechanism is individually rational
if no agent is worse off after participating in the mechanism. That is, all agents are
guaranteed to have non-negative utility. So, for any θ ∈ Θ:
ui(θi, f(θ)) + ti(θ) ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ N (2.2)
A weaker notion is IR in expectation, where an agent’s expected utility is guaranteed
to be non-negative.
In the rest of this chapter each of the following sections describes one of our social
choice settings in detail.
2.1 Unit Demand Heterogeneous Item Allocation
Heterogeneous item allocation is a well studied problem in multiagent resource allocation
[Ausubel, 2006; Bansal and Garg, 2000; Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Cavallo, 2006; Garg
and Mishra, 2002; Gershkov and Moldovanu, 2009; Gujar and Yadati, 2011; Guo, 2012;
Jain and Varaiya, 2005; Kojima, 2009]. Heterogeneous item allocation deals with a group
of individuals deciding who should get which items, from a set of different, indivisible
items.
In this work, we focus on agents who have unit-demand, where each agent desires
at most one item at a time, or is unable to receive multiple items at once4. If agents are
graduate students being assigned desks in offices, for example, each student only needs one
4This unit-demand form of item allocation is also known as the assignment problem.
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desk and department regulations may only permit them to have at most one. Svensson
[1983] argues that an agent requiring exactly one item is natural in settings where the
indivisible items come at some large cost relative to the agent’s total resources, such as a
full-time job [Leonard, 1983] or house. In these cases, the agent’s utility for two items would
be significantly lower than the sum of utilities for the items individually. The following
example illustrates this problem.
Example 2.1. Four colleagues, Alex, Lou, Sam and Vic, are deciding who should borrow
which company car over the upcoming long weekend. Available to them are a luxury sedan, a
small hatchback, two vans and an SUV. They all have different requirements and preferences
for the vehicles. Alex, for example will be buying large items for a renovation, so needs the
space of the SUV or van, while Lou is going on a family trip, so would like the space of
the SUV or comfort of the sedan. They each work out their preferences, as summarised in
Table 2.1, and then must decide who gets which vehicle.
Sedan Hatch Van 1 Van 2 SUV
Alex $30 $10 $60 $50 $130
Lou $90 $20 $40 $35 $100
Sam $90 $50 $10 $10 $40
Vic $85 $40 $15 $10 $70
Table 2.1: Item allocation example agents. Values agents receive for hiring each of the
five vehicles.
Formally, we have a set of n agents, N, and a set of m heterogeneous, indivisible items,
M. Each agent i has a value for each item j, denoted vi(j). The values for all agents is
captured in a value profile v ∈ V . The outcomes that the SCF f : V → A can choose
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from is the space of all possible allocations of items to agents, A. Since agents have unit
demand, and can only receive at most one item, each allocation a ∈ A is a function
a : N→M∪{0}. Thus, a(i) is the item agent i receives, or 0 if the agent receives no item
(if n > m). Since two different agents cannot receive the same item, we require a(i) 6= a(j)
if i 6= j, unless a(i) = a(j) = 0.
Each agent i ∈ N has a value associated with being assigned item j ∈M. This value
is independent of other items and agents, and is private information to the agent. An
agent’s type θi ∈ Θi captures its value for each of the m items. Additionally, these values
are non-negative since we assume free disposal, where agents can freely discard items
that would otherwise provide negative utility. Since agents do not care about externalities,
which is a reasonable assumption whenever agents are primarily focussed on their own
resources, these item values are the only information needed to describe an agent’s type,
thus Θi = Rm≥0. To simplify notation, we use vi(j) to denote the value agent i receives on
being assigned item j, and denote vi(a) = vi(a(i)). The values for all agents excluding i is
denoted v−i, and so v = (vi, v−i).
The set of all possible value profiles is V = Rn×m≥0 , where v = (v1, . . . , vn), for v ∈ V ,
vi ∈ Vi. Agents report their item values v̂i (which are not necessarily truthful) to the
allocation mechanism, which determines the item each agent receives, along with agents’
payments. Since agents are risk-neutral with quasi-linear utilities, the utility of agent
i ∈ N, given mechanism M = (f, t) when agents report values v ∈ V is:
ui = vi(a(i)) + ti(v) (2.3)
where a = f(v). When we talk about the value of an allocation a, this is the total of all
agents’ values for that allocation
∑
i∈N vi(a).
We study DSIC mechanisms while imposing a strong budget balance (SBB) constraint
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on the payment function.
Definition 2.4 (Strong Budget Balance (SBB)). A mechanism M = (f, t) is strongly
budget balanced if all payments always sum to zero. So, for all v ∈ V ,
∑
i∈N ti(v) = 0.
A mechanism designer may have SBB as a desirable property since it prevents one po-
tential loss of utility for the group of agents. Alternatively, it may be an explicit constraint,
since budget imbalance requires either an external funding source, or some way to dispose
of a surplus in a neutral way, which may not be possible. Donating a surplus to charity, for
example, alters agents’ utility functions, and may give some agents incentive to misreport
in order to increase the donation. Destroying the surplus through money burning, if it
is even possible, also alters agents’ utility functions as it changes the value of remaining
money. A virtual currency for a specific situation, for example, can have very small money
supply, amplifying the effect of money burning. Finally, if a mechanism allocates resources
in an iterated scenario, a budget imbalance could soon drain all money from the group of
agents.
While an ideal property in some settings, achieving SBB adds constraints to valid pay-
ment functions that, when combined with requirements for truthfulness, can preclude prop-
erties such as efficiency [Green and Laffont, 1979] (see Subsection 3.2.2). Since truthfulness
and efficiency are often hard constraints of the mechanism designer, the SBB constraint is
typically relaxed to weak budget balance.
Definition 2.5 (Weak Budget Balance5 (WBB)). A mechanism M = (f, t) is weakly
budget balanced if the sum of all payments received by agents is always non-positive. So,
for all v ∈ V ,
∑
i∈N ti(v) ≤ 0.
5Also known as no subsidy since the mechanism will not need to subsidise the agents in order to carry
out the resource assignment.
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While strong (or weak) budget balance and DSIC are constraints for our problem,
when we compare mechanisms, we evaluate by efficiency and social surplus ratio. We
cover these measures in detail in Section 3.1 before we introduce deterministic solutions to
this problem.
2.1.1 Task Imposition
A congruent problem to the allocation of heterogeneous items to unit demand agents is that
of task imposition [Leonard, 1983; Demange et al., 1986] (or job assignment). Instead
of M containing a set of desirable resources, it contains items for which the agents receive
negative utility and have no free disposal. This may be the assignment of computational
tasks to a set of processors, chores to housemates, or waste-disposal sites to communities.
Our model remains the same, except agents’ values, V = Rn×m≤0 , are non-positive rather
than non-negative. The free disposal assumption does not apply in this setting; otherwise,
the problem would be trivial. Unless some (possibly fixed) external subsidy is allowed,
mechanisms for this problem cannot be individually rational. All agents receive negative
utility for the tasks they are assigned, so to ensure each agent has positive utility overall,
all agents must receive some positive payment.
2.2 Room Assignment–Rent Division
The Room Assignment–Rent Division (RARD) problem has a setting that is closely
related to heterogeneous item allocation, with much previous work in the literature [Svens-
son, 1983; Maskin, 1986; Alkan et al., 1991; Tadenuma and Thomson, 1991; Tadenuma and
Thomson, 1995; Su, 1999; Meertens et al., 2002; Willson, 2003; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2004;
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Room 2Room 1 Room 3
Figure 2.1: Partial floor plan showing the three bedrooms for the room assignment–rent
division example.
Sakai, 2007; Kojima, 2009; Yenmez, 2012]. We illustrate this problem with the following
example.
Example 2.2. Consider a group of students, Morgan, Sasha, and Taylor, who are renting
a house together (illustrated in Figure 2.1). They must decide among themselves who should
get which room, given that they each have independent preferences over the rooms. Morgan
likes rooms with plenty of space, such as room 1, while Taylor likes windows with a good
view, like room 3. The renters must also decide how to divide the $1000 monthly rent.
To avoid tension amongst the roommates, rather than only optimising total utility, we try
to avoid cases were one renter is envious of another renter’s room and rent. Consider
the agents’ with values for each room as summarised in Table 2.2 (e.g. Morgan would be
prepared to pay $500 per month for room 1). If we set the rent for the three rooms as $400,
$200 and $400, with Morgan in room 1, Sasha in room 2, and Taylor in Room 3, the three
renters have utilities for each room as summarised in Table 2.3. Since everyone’s utility
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for their own assigned rooms (in bold) is the maximum of the three rooms, they all believe
they are in the best room for the current prices. This room assignment and rent division
is said to be envy-free (see Section 3.1).
Room 1 Room 2 Room 3
Morgan $500 $200 $400
Sasha $400 $350 $400
Taylor $350 $300 $500
Table 2.2: RARD example agents. Amounts that agents would be willing to pay as
monthly rent for rooms in the example house.
Room 1 ($400) Room 2 ($400) Room 3 ($200)
Morgan $100 $0 $0
Sasha $0 $150 $0
Taylor -$50 $100 $100
Table 2.3: RARD example agents. Agents’ utilities for each of the three rooms, with the
specified rent on each room. With agents in their assigned rooms (in bold) the assignment
and division is envy-free.
While room assignment is the classic and easy to explain example for this model, it
has much more general applicability and is a well studied problem. In a task imposition
problem (see Subsection 2.1.1), this model is appropriate for a fair division of both labour
and compensation. Instead of a rent to be paid, there is compensation for the workers on
task completion. The role of tasks and workers can be reversed, for example, with agents
each owning tasks to be assigned to a heterogeneous set of equipment. Other scenarios
23
from the literature include land distribution, inheritance division, corporate partnership
dissolution and the assignment of parking spaces to employees.
As with the heterogeneous item allocation problem, in RARD we assign a set of indi-
visible, heterogeneous items (e.g. rooms in a shared house), M, to a set of agents, N such
that all agents receive exactly one item. However, there are no surplus or deficit items, so
|N| = |M|. Additionally, there is also some total payment T of a divisible resource (e.g.
rent) to be completely divided among the agents. This allocation and division is performed
simultaneously. Each agent i ∈ N has a value for each item j ∈M, denoted as vi(j) with
the unit of the divisible resource as the numeraire. Note that T may be negative, as in
the case where it represents rent, or it may be positive, in which case there is some total
payment that the agents have received as a group that must be divided.
A mechanism for this problem, M = (f, t), determines a room assignment through
f : V → A, and a rent division through t : V → Rn. As before, we assume agents’ types
are private, so an RARD mechanism receives reported agent values v ∈ V and produces
an allocation, a = f(v), where a : N→M, and a rent division t(v). A valid allocation, a,
must be bijective so every agent receives one item, every item is assigned to one agent. To
ensure agents don’t misreport, we focus on DSIC mechanisms. Similar to SBB, we require∑
i∈N ti(v) = T , ∀v ∈ V , since agents cannot be short on rent, and any surplus would have
to be destroyed. Agents have quasi-linear utilities, so an agent’s utility is calculated the
same as in Equation (2.3), that is:
ui = vi(a) + ti(v) (2.4)
where vi(a) = vi(a(i)).
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2.2.1 Multi-house Room Assignment–Rent Division
The RARD model involves the division of exactly 1 divisible resource, such that there is
no surplus of deficit. The model can be extended to allow multiple divisible resources. A
similar extension was done in fair division, where Cloutier et al. [2010] generalised the
cake-cutting problem to one that fairly divides multiple cakes instead of just one.
The multi-house room assignment–rent division scenario is an extension to RARD,
where each agent is allocated a room from one of two or more houses, as well as a share
of the rent for the particular house they occupy. Only the agents in house A contribute
to the rent of house A, while those in house B contribute to the rent of house B. Other
applications include allocation of tasks to workers, where each task belongs to a department
with its own funding; or the allocation of computational jobs to a set of heterogeneous
devices where the movement of jobs between devices carries a high cost.
As before, we have agents N with preferences over rooms M and a mechanism M =
(f, t) determines the room assignment and rent division. However, we now have additional
constraints on t to ensure the total rent for each house is met. Given k > 1 houses, each
house j has a total amount of divisible resource Tj. We also partition the rooms M into k
disjoint, non-empty sets M1 . . .Mk, where each set represents a house. For each house j
under allocation a ∈ A , we require
∑
i∈Nj(a) ti(v) = Tj, where Nj(a) = {i ∈ N : a(i) ∈Mj}
(i.e. the set of agents assigned to house j under allocation a).
As with the single house setting, it is desirable to find an allocation rule such that no
agent is envious of another agent’s room and rent (see Section 3.1).
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2.3 Public Good
The public good (or public project) problem [Foley, 1967; Chen, 2008; Apt et al., 2008;
Apt and Estévez-Fernández, 2009] is a setting where a group of agents decide whether or
not to purchase some resource or undertake some project. If the project goes ahead, all
agents benefit to varying degrees, but they must collectively fund it. A common example
is a decision made by a community on whether or not to build a bridge. Some members of
the community are more likely to use the bridge than others, so would be willing to pay
more to fund the project. The community should only go ahead with construction of the
bridge if the total reported benefit of the bridge exceeds the total cost.
Example 2.3. Three graduate students, Simina, John and Lachlan, share an office together
and see an ad for a $50 refrigerator. While they agree it will make a good addition to the
office, they must decide whether the price makes the purchase worthwhile. Simina typically
brings lunch from home while John and Lachlan usually buy from the cafeteria, so their
individual valuations are $25, $10 and $5, respectively. In this case, it would not make
sense to purchase, since the collective benefit is less than the total cost.
If, instead, Lachlan started taking lunch every day, so saw a $30 benefit to having the
fridge, the total benefit, $65, outweighs the cost, so the fridge should be purchased.
Again, we have a set of agents, N, but the possible outcomes X = {X0, X1} are to
either acquire the public good (X1) or to forego it (X0). The public good comes at a
price of T , which is to be paid by all n agents. Note that in our model of the public
good problem, agents receive T
n
when the good is not purchased. This implies that the
funding for the good has already been procured, and is refunded to the agents should the
mechanism decide not to purchase. An agent i ∈ N of type θi has a private value for the
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good, denoted vi. An agent’s utility (excluding additional payments from the mechanism)





ui(θi, X1) = vi (2.6)
since the payment for the public good is distributed evenly over all agents. The total utility




A mechanism for this problem, M = (f, t) takes the set of reported agent values, and
f : V → X determines whether or not the good is acquired or project is completed, while
t : V → Rn determines any payment received by the agent. Since the payment of T
n
is
already incorporated into each agent’s utility function, this is not included in the payment
function. Agents may misreport their true value, so we again focus on DSIC mechanisms.
An alternative public good model defines utility functions as:
ui(θi, X0) = 0 (2.8)




This model implies agents are charged equally T
n
only when the good is to be purchased.
This simply shifts all agents’ utilities or payment functions by a constant amount, so will
not affect the space of mechanisms. In this work, however, we define utilities as described
in Equations (2.5) and (2.6), since this ensures all agents have positive utilities, which
simplifies equations in later chapters.
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The version of the public good problem we examine is single-parameter, as there is
only one good to choose from. A recently studied extension to this is the combinatorial
public project problem [Papadimitriou et al., 2008; Buchfuhrer et al., 2010], where there
are multiple public goods, and agents have preferences over subsets of these goods. A
simple example of this is a community deciding whether to build (and pay for) either a




The focus of this work is on examining stochastic solutions to computational social choice
problems, along with techniques appropriate for assessing these measures. In this chap-
ter, we cover existing deterministic solutions and we also introduce some important new
solutions and results. It is these deterministic solutions that that we build upon to get
stochastic solutions in Chapter 4. Before presenting the deterministic mechanisms, we in-
troduce the measures that are used to evaluate these solutions in Section 3.1. This chapter
also includes relevant characterisations on the space of possible mechanisms and impos-
sibility results in order to demonstrate worst-case optimal mechanisms. We present an
important new characterisation of deterministic DSIC mechanisms for heterogeneous item
allocation, with an independence constraint, in Subsection 3.2.4, and extend this to cover
DSIC and SBB mechanisms in Subsection 3.2.5. From this, we focus on affine-maximising
social choice functions.
Before introducing the stochastic mechanisms in Chapter 4 for the problems we de-
scribed in Chapter 2, in this chapter we cover deterministic solutions for these problems
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in Subsections 3.3 to 3.5. In addition to providing and surveying mechanisms, we present
worst-case bounds on the performance of deterministic mechanisms for these problems.
It is the poor worst-case performance and impossibility results when using deterministic
mechanisms that motivates us to examine stochastic solutions in this work.
3.1 Deterministic Measures
For multiagent resource allocation problems where the focus is on maximising the welfare of
the agents receiving the items rather than the profit of the auctioneer, mechanism designers
typically focus on two deterministic properties. These are achieving allocative efficiency
and the worst-case level of social surplus ratio.
Definition 3.1 (Allocative Efficiency). An allocation a ∈ A is allocatively efficient1






′),∀a′ ∈ A (3.1)
That is, allocation a maximises the sum of all agents’ utilities (excluding payments).
An efficient mechanism will always choose an efficient outcome, for any value profile.
We denote the efficient allocation for a value profile v as a∗(v), or simply a∗ where the value
profile is clear from context.





When the focus is on the social choice function, efficiency is a natural requirement and
corresponds to a utilitarian maximisation of the collective social welfare in the chosen
1Sometimes referred to as Pareto efficient.
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outcome. This is also referred to as a utilitarian social choice function. If the outcome
changes from an efficient to a non-efficient outcome, some agents will lose utility while
other agents may gain utility. However, by definition, the total loss of utility outweighs
the total gain.
For the second property, we examine the worst-case ratio of the sum of all agents’
utilities (including payments) in the chosen outcome, to the value of the efficient allocation.
Definition 3.2 (Social Surplus Ratio [Guo and Conitzer, 2009; Moulin, 2009]). The social
surplus ratio is the ratio of the total utility achieved by the mechanism for a value profile









For the purposes of worst case ratio, we exclude the value profile v = 0, where no agent
is interested in any item. Otherwise this would give an undefined ratio. It is possible,
however, for agents to have infinitesimal values for each item, or some agents to have zero
values. The ratio measure is independent of the scale of the units of the agents’ utilities.
It captures a measure of how close the mechanism comes to achieving the maximum pos-
sible total utility for a group of agents. A worst-case ratio of 1, for a WBB mechanism,
represents a mechanism that is always efficient and strongly budget balanced. Any weakly
budget balanced mechanism cannot have a ratio exceeding 1 for any value profile, since this
would require a positive net payment. A loss of total utility, lowering the ratio below 1,
either comes from an inefficient allocation, or from non-budget balanced payments that are
received by some outside entity. A mechanism with a ratio of 0 will have some value profile
where the total payment cancels out the value of the allocation. Finally, an individually
rational mechanism cannot ever have a negative ratio, since a negative ratio implies the
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total value of the outcome is less than the total payments. A non-negative worst-case ratio
does not necessarily imply IR, however.
When we only look at SBB mechanisms, we have
∑
i∈N ti(v) = 0, so the only loss of
social surplus comes from inefficient allocation, f(v) 6= a∗(v). Thus, for SBB mechanisms,
the social surplus ratio is the ratio of the sum of agents’ values for f(v) compared to the
sum of values in the efficient allocation, a∗(v).
Efficiency may be ideal from a collective viewpoint, but may result in an individual
agent seeing a large loss so that a large number of other agents can see a marginal gain.
Thus, in some settings we are interested in not just an efficient allocation, but also some
notion of fairness. In this work we focus on envy and envy-freeness as measures of fairness
for allocation problems. An allocation assigns to each agent a bundle, which contains an
item (or set of items) along with some price or payment. For a particular allocation of
bundles to agents, an agent is envious if it views another agent’s bundle as strictly better
than its own. Envy-freeness was introduced by Foley [1967], and Brams and Taylor [1996]
discuss envy-freeness and other measures of fairness in the setting of fair division.
Definition 3.3 (Envy). Given an outcome consisting of allocation a ∈ A and payments
t(v), agent i ∈ N is envious of agent j ∈ N if
vi(a(i)) + ti(v) < vi(a(j)) + tj(v) (3.4)
Definition 3.4 (Envy-free). An outcome consisting of allocation a ∈ A and payments t(v)
is envy-free if there is no agent than envies another agent. That is:
vi(a(i)) + ti(v) ≥ vi(a(j)) + tj(v) , ∀i, j ∈ N (3.5)
An envy-free mechanism will always produce an envy-free outcome, for all value
profiles v ∈ V . Envy-free outcomes mean that every agent, according to its own utility
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function, finds its current assignment to be the best of all the agents’ assignments. As well
as being fair, an envy-free outcome can also be desirable due to the stability it provides.
No agent, or group of agents, would attempt to deviate from the mechanism’s prescribed
bundles as all agents would be worse off. Consider, the envy-free allocation in Example 2.2
of Section 2.2. While Sasha and Taylor both prefer Room 3 to Room 2, at the current
rent, Sasha would be worse off by forcing Taylor to swap, because, with payments included,
Sasha receives higher overall utility in Room 2.
The results we present next in Section 3.2 focus on efficiency but are directly relevant
to envy-free mechanisms. Envy-freeness is a stronger requirement than efficiency as every
envy-free allocation is also an efficient allocation in our RARD settings [Svensson, 1983;
Alkan et al., 1991]. The requirement of envy-freeness adds constraints on the possible
payments received under the efficient allocation.
3.2 Characterisations
To motivate the use of randomisation, in this section we present some existing and new
characterisations on DSIC mechanisms satisfying efficiency or SBB. We describe Roberts’
well known characterisation of truthful social choice functions where agents have a complete
domain of preferences. We then provide a new characterisation of truthful mechanisms for
heterogeneous item allocation under an additional constraint of independence, then refine
this further to cover SBB mechanisms. These characterisations lead to poor worst-case
performance or impossibility results for deterministic mechanisms, which motivate us to
examine randomised approaches in Chapter 4.
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3.2.1 Groves Mechanisms
An important and influential result in mechanism design was the definition of the Gro-
ves class of mechanisms [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973]. This class defines
mechanisms which are efficient and DSIC for agents with quasi-linear utility.
Definition 3.5 (Groves mechanism). A mechanism M = (f, t) belongs to the Groves
class of mechanisms if
• Social choice function f produces the efficient outcome (maximising the sum of all
agents’ utilities):









vj(X) + hi(v−i) , ∀i ∈ N (3.7)
for some additional payment functions {hi(v−i)}i∈N.
Since an agent receives a payment equal to the sum of all other agents’ utilities for the
selected outcome, its total utility including payment matches the sum maximised by the
SCF, plus some additional payment hi(v−i). Thus, if an agent tries to misreport its own
type to change the outcome selected by f , it will only lower its own utility. The rebate
function hi(v−i) can be any function independent of agent i’s reported type, thus making
it a constant payment from agent i’s perspective. Thus, the form of the payment functions
ensures the mechanism is DSIC.
The Groves class of mechanisms are particularly important as they are the only mech-
anisms that are both efficient and DSIC for agents with quasi-linear utilities [Green and
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Laffont, 1977]. So when examining DSIC and efficient mechanisms, the only degree of
freedom is to change the additional payment functions. However, this choice can greatly
affect the mechanism on measures such as the social surplus ratio. For example, simply
setting hi(v−i) = 0 leads to a violation of WBB, since all agents are receiving positive
payments from the mechanism.
3.2.1.1 The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanism
Of all the mechanisms in the Groves class, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism (also known as the pivotal mechanism or Clarke mechanism) is perhaps the
most well known. Being from the Groves class, it is DSIC and the SCF chooses the effi-
cient outcome. Agents make payments so as to maximise the total payments made to the
mechanism, while still maintaining individual rationality [Clarke, 1971]. The additional











The outcome X−i is the efficient outcome when excluding agent i. Combined with the
rest of the Groves payment, an agent is paying the total loss in utility the other agents
have experienced due to its participation (i.e. the agent pays its externality). Agents
whose participation does not affect the outcome end up paying nothing. For the VCG
mechanism to be individually rational in our settings, we require every agent i ∈ N to
have vi(X−i) ≥ 0. This mechanism is WBB if there is no agent whose removal can result
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in a net loss for the remaining agents. This condition is known as the no single-agent effect
[Parkes, 2001].
Definition 3.6 (No single-agent effect). A mechanism M = (f, t) has the no single-





vj(X−i) ∀i ∈ N (3.10)
The no single-agent effect holds in all the settings we examine where agents have non-
negative utilities. When allocating items or rooms, for example, removing an agent will
increase the set of available items for the remaining agents, so they are guaranteed to be
at least as well off.
While VCG seems like an ideal mechanism as it is efficient, individually rational and
weakly budget balanced, the potential budget imbalance leads to very poor worst-case
total utility. In the public project setting, VCG gives a worst-case social surplus ratio of
1
n
[Guo et al., 2011] (see Section 3.5). Under an item allocation setting, the worst-case
performance is even more dire, with a ratio of 0 (see Section 3.3).
3.2.2 Green-Laffont Impossibility Theorem
While the VCG mechanism is DSIC and always produces an efficient outcome, the loss
of utility from budget imbalance can cancel out the gains from the efficient allocation.
The ideal case is a Groves mechanism that achieves SBB; however, Green and Laffont
[1979] show that this is impossible for quasi-linear agents with a complete domain of
preferences (unrestricted value functions). This result is widely referred to as the Green-
Laffont Impossibility Theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. [Green and Laffont, 1979] There exists no Groves mechanism (i.e. efficient
and DSIC) such that
∑
i∈N ti(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V , where V = Rn×|X|.
This means that, generally, a social surplus ratio of one is not possible for DSIC, WBB
mechanisms, since it cannot be simultaneously efficient and SBB.
3.2.3 Roberts’ Characterisation
The space of Groves mechanisms are the DSIC mechanisms that implement an efficient
social choice function. Such SCFs typically cannot be budget balanced however (due to
Theorem 3.1), and so an inefficient SCF may provide a better overall social surplus ratio.
Roberts [1979] examined the space of social choice functions that can be implemented in a
DSIC mechanism given agents with quasilinear utility functions and a complete domain of
preferences. With a complete domain of preferences, agents’ types assign a separate value
for each possible outcome. This means that Robert’s characterisation does not apply in a
unit demand item allocation setting, for example, since agents are necessarily indifferent
between two outcomes if their own items do not change. Roberts’ characterisation relies
on the property of positive association of differences in the social choice function.
Definition 3.7 (Positive Association of Differences (PAD) [Roberts, 1979]). We say that
f satisfies positive association of differences if, for any two value profiles v, v′ ∈ V
where X = f(v),
v′i(X)− vi(X) > v′i(Y )− vi(Y ) ∀i ∈ N,∀Y ∈ X\{X} (3.11)
implies f(v′) = X.
PAD requires that a social choice function keep the same outcome if all agents increase
their relative value for that outcome compared to all other outcomes. This is the primary
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property that determines whether an SCF can be implemented in a DSIC mechanism. In
particular, these DSIC mechanisms require an affine maximising SCF.
Definition 3.8 (Affine Maximiser [Roberts, 1979]). A social choice function f is an affine
maximiser if, for any v ∈ V :









for some constants (A′, U0, γ), where A′ ⊆ A is the space of possible outcomes, U0 : A→ R
is a set of weights for each outcome, and γ1, . . . , γn ≥ 0 are weights for each agent, where
∃i ∈ N s.t. γi > 0.
Since Equation (3.12) may not specify a unique outcome, we can model this SCF more
precisely as a multi-round affine maximiser. A multi-round affine maximiser can be
considered as a series of affine maximisations, f (1), . . . , f (j) that are performed until there is
a unique outcome selected. Each f (k) is an affine maximiser of the form of Equation (3.12),
defined by (A(k), U (k)0 , γ(k)). An agent will only have a non-zero weight γ
(k)
i in at most
one round. If there are multiple outcomes that satisfy f (k), then affine maximisation
f (k+1) will perform an additional affine maximisation, where A(k+1) is the set of allocations
that maximised f (k)(v). These “tie-breaking” affine maximisations can even be constant
orderings independent of all agents’ types (all agents have zero-weight), or dictatorial
(only a single agent with non-zero weight). For a DSIC mechanism implementing a multi-
round affine-maximising SCF, each round of affine maximisation has payments of the form





































where {h(k)i (v−i)}i∈N are additional payment functions that are independent of an agent’s
own declared value and thus do not affect the mechanism’s truthfulness. Recall that these





i (v). In this work, we typically focus on a single round of affine maximisation
at a time, so for simplicity of notation, we omit the superscript denoting the round when
the round number is unambiguous.
A Groves mechanism is an affine maximiser with the initial maximisation performed
with A′ = A, U0 = 0 and γi = 1, ∀i ∈ N. An extreme example of a multi-round affine
maximiser is the serial dictatorship, where agents one-by-one choose their most preferred
item from the remaining items, according to some fixed agent ordering. This is a series of
affine maximisers on a shrinking set of possible outcomes, where each maximisation has a
single non-zero-weighted agent, until only a single outcome remains.
For agents with γi > 0 in an affine maximising DSIC mechanism, Equations (3.12)













Theorem 3.2. [Roberts, 1979] In an environment with quasilinear agents, a complete
domain of preferences, and at least 3 outcomes:
1. If social choice function f is implementable in a deterministic DSIC mechanism then
f satisfies PAD
2. f satisfies PAD if and only if f is an affine maximiser
Roberts originally asserted that an affine-maximising SCF f also implied that f was
implementable in a DSIC mechanism, but Carbajal et al. [2013] have since shown this to
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be false, unless f is from the more-restricted class of lexicographic (i.e. multi-round) affine
maximisers.
While Theorem 3.2 is a strong result, it doesn’t directly fit in any of the settings we
examine. Under the item allocation and RARD settings, agents’ preferences are not over
the entire space of outcomes, since an agent is necessarily indifferent between two outcomes
where it receives the same item. Under these settings, PAD is not a meaningful measure,
since the inequality in Equation (3.11) can never hold. In a public good setting there are
only two outcomes, so Theorem 3.2 does not apply.
If we allow agents to have full preferences over all allocations, such as in RARD if
roommates could have preferences over their neighbours as well as their own room, then
Theorem 3.2 would apply to that setting. In Subsection 3.2.4, we provide a new charac-
terisation that does apply in a unit demand allocation setting, with similar requirements
on the SCF to Theorem 3.2.
3.2.4 DSIC Unit Demand Allocation Mechanisms
In this work, when looking at DSIC mechanisms, we restrict our attention to affine max-
imisers with tie-breaking (multi-round affine maximisers). As Subsection 3.2.3 shows, this
is an interesting and well-studied class of mechanisms, and includes all mechanisms in the
Groves class. We adapt Roberts’ characterisation [1979] of DSIC mechanisms to show
sufficient conditions under which a DSIC item allocation mechanism must be an affine
maximiser. We introduce some key definitions and previous results before providing a
characterisation of all DSIC and SBB mechanisms. In particular, we will show that DSIC
necessitates weak monotonicity in SCFs, and when there are more than two possible out-
comes, if we additionally require independence, then the SCF must be an affine maximiser.
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Definition 3.9 (Weak Monotonicity (W-MON) [Lavi et al., 2003]). Social choice function
f satisfies W-MON if, for any v ∈ V , i ∈ N, v′i ∈ Vi: if f(v) = a and f(v′i, v−i) = b,
then:
v′i(b)− vi(b) ≥ v′i(a)− vi(a) (3.15)
With a weakly monotonic SCF, for agent i to change the allocation from a to b by
changing its reported value, its value for a cannot increase more than its increase for b.
Definition 3.10 (Independence [Lavi et al., 2003]). Social choice function f satisfies in-
dependence2 if, for any v, v′ ∈ V , if f(v) = a and f(v′) = b 6= a, then ∃i ∈ N s.t.
v′i(a)− v′i(b) 6= vi(a)− vi(b) (3.16)
If an allocation rule satisfies independence, it cannot change the allocation from a to b
if no single agent changes its difference in value (relative preference) between allocation a
and b.
Definition 3.11 (Strong Monotonicity (S-MON)). Social choice function f satisfies S-
MON if and only if f satisfies both W-MON and independence. Equivalently, Equa-
tion (3.15) must hold strictly if a 6= b.
These properties are used in characterisations of which social choice functions can be
implemented in DSIC mechanisms.
Definition 3.12 (Rich Domain [Bikhchandani et al., 2006]). A rich domain for a set
of possible outcomes A has the set of agents’ types as all vi ∈ R|A|+ that are consistent with
some partial order over A.
2Lavi et al. [2003] refer to this as independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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Theorem 3.3. [Bikhchandani et al., 2006] If a mechanism M = (f, t) is DSIC, then the
social choice function f is weakly monotone.
Proof. Consider any v ∈ V , i ∈ N, v′i ∈ Vi such that f(v) = a and f(v′i, v−i) = b. Since
the mechanism is DSIC, utility is maximised with truthful reporting. This means
vi(a)− t(v) ≥ vi(b)− t(v′i, v−i) (3.17)
v′i(a)− t(v) ≤ v′i(b)− t(v′i, v−i) (3.18)
⇒vi(a)− vi(b) ≥ t(v)− t(v′i, v−i) ≥ v′i(a)− v′i(b) (3.19)
⇒v′i(b)− vi(b) ≥ v′i(a)− vi(a) (3.20)
Valid payments only exist if Equation (3.20) always holds, and if this always holds, then
f is W-MON by definition.
Theorem 3.4. [Bikhchandani et al., 2006] A mechanism implementing a social choice
function f on a rich domain is DSIC if and only if f is weakly monotone.
In our unit demand allocation setting we have a rich domain, as the only restriction on
agent types is to force equality on outcomes where the agent receives the same item.
We show which social choice functions must be affine maximisers, then show that, with
the additional requirement of independence, this includes all SCFs that can be implemented
in a DSIC mechanism. Roberts’ [1979] result (see Subsection 3.2.3) provided a proof for an
unrestricted domain, showing under which conditions an SCF must be an affine maximiser
and relying on positive association of differences (PAD). It also requires value profiles
with strict inequalities between two outcomes for all agents, which does not make sense
in the unit demand allocation setting, as agents must necessarily have the same value for
allocations where they do not change items. We can formulate a slightly different theorem
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that requires agents have the same value for outcomes where they receive the same item
and uses a property similar to PAD, which we present in Lemma 3.1.
For Lemma 3.1 to fit closely with Roberts’ proof, in this subsection we alter our notation
slightly, and define V = R|N|×|A′| as a set of agents’ values over all possible allocations
A′ ⊆ A (instead of values over all items). Thus, for any x, y ∈ A, we need to explicitly
enforce vi(x) = vi(y) whenever xi = yi. The vector v(x) holds the values of each agent
for their allocated item in x ∈ A. We define the relationship v(x)xy v(y) (and similarly
xy) between two vectors (where v ∈ V ) to denote vi(x) < vi(y) when xi 6= yi (i.e., agent
i changes item), while the two values are necessarily equal when xi = yi. This holds for
all i ∈ N. Note that v(x) xy v(y) ≡ v(x) yx v(y), since x and y define agents whose
values must be equal in this comparison.
Lemma 3.1. If f(v) = y and v′(y) − v′(x) xy v(y) − v(x), ∀x ∈ A′, x 6= y, for two
distinct value profiles v, v′ ∈ V , v 6= v′, and f satisfies S-MON, then f(v′) = y.
That is, if agents are allocated according to y for value profile v, and no agent’s relative
preference for an alternative item increases, then the allocation should stay as y.
Proof. Consider changing the values of agents, one by one, from vi to v
′
i. We start with
f(v) = y, and at every step S-MON forces us to keep allocation y. Create a series of value
profiles vj = (v1, v2, . . . , vj, v
′
j+1, . . . , v
′
n) for j ∈ [0, n], so v = vn, v′ = v0. First, we have
f(vn) = y, then change agent n’s value so we have vn−1. Let f(vn−1) = z, so by W-MON
we have:
v′n(z)− v′n(y) ≥ vn(z)− vn(y) (3.21)
But given our conditions for this lemma, this can only be satisfied at equality, where agent
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n keeps the same item, i.e., yn = zn. However, as all other agents keep the same value
profile, no other agent can change items without violating independence, so y = z.
The procedure is continued, changing the value profile for each agent one by one,
using vn−1, . . . v0. In each case, the allocation cannot change without violating W-MON
or independence. After each agent has changed its value, the value profile is v′ and the
allocation remains at y, and so f(v′) = f(v) = y.
Theorem 3.5. If allocation function f for allocating heterogeneous items to unit demand
agents satisfies S-MON, and there are at least 3 possible allocations (|A′| ≥ 3) then f is
an affine maximiser.
The proof of this theorem, which is provided in Appendix A, closely follows the proof
of Theorem A in [Roberts, 1979], but with many adjustments due to our restrictions on
agent types.
Theorem 3.6. If a heterogeneous item allocation mechanism for unit demand agents is
DSIC, and SCF f , with |A′| ≥ 3 satisfies independence, then f is an affine maximiser.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4, f satisfies W-MON and since we require independence, by def-
inition it also satisfies S-MON. Since f satisfies S-MON, by Theorem 3.5, f is an affine
maximiser.
Since Theorem 3.6 only requires DSIC mechanisms implement affine maximisation if
there are at least 3 outcomes (as was also the case with Roberts’ theorem [1979]), there
will be other DSIC mechanisms that restrict the outcome space to two possibilities. Even
with only two outcomes, a DSIC mechanism’s SCF must still satisfy weak monotonicity,
due to Theorem 3.4 and we discuss these SCFs later in Subsection 3.2.5.4. There also exist
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truthful mechanisms that violate independence, and thus are not required to be affine
maximisers. However, for this work we focus on affine-maximising SCFs, and conjecture
that, for our goals of efficiency and envy-freeness, these mechanisms are optimal among all
truthful mechanisms.
3.2.5 Strongly Budget Balanced Mechanisms
We will now extend the results of Theorem 3.6 to show that when the SBB constraint is
added to DSIC and independence, it places restrictions on the set of possible allocations,
A′ ⊆ A, and the set of agents N′ = {i ∈ N : γi > 0}, whose reported values affect the
affine maximisation. We focus on affine-maximising SCFs, and we now show that whether
an affine maximising SCF of the form in Equation (3.12) can be implemented in a DSIC
and SBB mechanism depends only on A′ and N′.
We let a∗ = f(v) be the “optimal” allocation3 according to the maximisation in Equa-
tion (3.12). Because payments take the form of Equation (3.13), by strong budget balance,
we require
∑





















When we have multiple rounds of affine maximisations, due to tie-breaking (i.e. lexi-
cographic affine maximisers), it will be sufficient to consider a SBB mechanism as a series
of SBB rounds. Every round involves additional payments hi(v−i) for all agents i ∈ N
that “cancel out” payments required for DSIC. If we conceptualise the overall mechanism
as a series of these rounds, we can move these additional payments between rounds, such
3Where there is no unique maximum, there is some (affine maximising) tie-breaking procedure (SCF is
a multi-round affine-maximiser).
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that they only cancel out payments for that round. By definition, an agent will only have
a non-zero weight in a single round, so its reported value will only be used in the DSIC
payments (see Equation (3.13)) in a single round.
For the purposes of SBB mechanisms, we can consider a smaller class of mechanisms.
The mechanisms we look at for this problem are affine maximisers with payments in the
form of Equation (3.13). However, when searching for possible affine-maximising SBB
mechanisms, it is sufficient to consider those with U0 = 0. Then, DSIC and SBB mecha-
nisms with non-zero U0 can be produced from these mechanisms by adding a constant to
agents’ reported v.
Lemma 3.2. If we have a DSIC and SBB mechanism with SCF f for some A′, U0, γ, then
its payment functions, t, can be used to give SBB payments, t′, for a DSIC mechanism
with SCF f ′ defined by A′, U ′0, γ.
Proof. Equation (A.106) in the proof of Theorem 3.5 sets the structure of U0 in S-MON







γi(vi(y)− δi(y)) , ∀y ∈ A′ (3.23)
This result shows that the constants U0, U
′











for some constants δ, δ′.
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From this we can define SCF f ′ in terms of f :









γi(vi(a)− δ′i(a) + δi(a)− δi(a)) (3.27)
= f(v − δ′ + δ) (3.28)
Both mechanisms have payments of the form Equation (3.13), and the payments for

























































So we get an SBB and DSIC mechanism for SCF f ′ using additional payments of
hi(v−i − δ′−i + δ−i) for all agents i ∈ N, with agents i ∈ N′ also receiving the additional
payment (δ′i(a
′)− δi(a′)).






Lemma 3.3. A DSIC and SBB mechanism (f, t) with an affine maximising SCF defined
by A′, U0 = 0, γ and additional payments {hi(v−i)}i∈N is equivalent to a mechanism (f ′, t′)




Proof. Since U0 = 0, this positive constant scalar has no effect on the affine maximisation
in Equation (3.12). Similarly, the scalar has no effect on any individual payment defined
by Equation (3.13). Thus, both the allocation and payment functions are identical.
If we have U0 = 0 and
∑
i∈N(γi)





(γi − 1) vi (a∗) (3.33)
Finally, if we change γ in the SCF for a DSIC and SBB mechanism, we can construct
SBB payments for this new SCF, provided the set of agents with non-zero γi, N
′, does not
change.
Lemma 3.4. If there exists a DSIC and SBB mechanism with affine-maximising SCF f
for some A′, U0 = 0, γ, where
∑
i∈N(γi)
−1 = 1. Then there exist SBB payments, t′ for a





−1 = 1, and γi = 0 if
and only if γ′i = 0.
Proof. From mechanism (f, t), we have additional payments {hi(v−i)}i∈N that satisfy Equa-





(γi − 1) vi (f(v)) (3.34)





(γ′i − 1) vi (f ′(v)) (3.35)
48
Where f ′ : N′ → A′. There exist modifications to the individual payment functions hi(v−i),
that can calculate f ′(v) = f(γ
′
γ
v), since both functions use the same set of agents, N′. The
use of any agent values in individual hi(v−i) functions can be scaled by constant values
γ′i−1
γi−1 , to construct payments that satisfy Equation (3.35). Since these modifications to any
hi(v−i) will not change the set of agents required, as values are scaled by constants, these
new h′i(v−i) still only depend on v−i. Thus, there exist SBB payments t
′ for f ′.
Combining Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we get the following result:
Theorem 3.7. If we have a set of SBB and DSIC payments for an affine maximising SCF
f defined by A′, U0, γ, then there exist SBB payments for a DSIC mechanism with affine
maximising SCF f ′ defined by A′, Û0, γ̂, where γi = 0 if and only if γ̂i = 0,∀i ∈ N. That
is, the two mechanisms have the same A′ and N′.
Due to Theorem 3.7, for the purposes of finding SBB, DSIC mechanisms we only need
to consider the different possibilities for N′ and A′. It is the sets N′ and A′ that determine
whether SBB payments exist for the affine maximising SCF. For simplicity, let all non-zero
γi be equal to |N′| (so reciprocals of weights sum to one), which makes payments for a
SBB, DSIC mechanism take the form:∑
i∈N





Payments that satisfy Equation (3.36) for some A′ and N′ can be used to find payments
to achieve SBB for any DSIC allocation mechanism with the same A′ and N′. In Section 3.3
we examine the possible ways to achieve strong budget balance with affine maximisers.
The right-hand side of Equation (3.36) depends on the maximisation a∗, which is af-
fected by the values of all agents in N′. We refer to this right hand side as the surplus,
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that is generated in order to achieve DSIC and must be absorbed by rebate functions h
to achieve SBB. Each individual hi(v−i), however, cannot depend on all agents’ reported
values. To achieve strong budget balance with affine maximisers, there are several pos-
sibilities, examined in the rest of this section. First, by ignoring a subset of agents (i.e.
N′ 6= N), these agents with γi = 0 can absorb any budget surplus since the right hand
side of Equation (3.36) is independent of their reported values. Achieving strong budget
balance by excluding a subset of agents was examined for general social choice functions
by Faltings [2005]. Alternatively, if A′ is partitionable, the maximisation to achieve a∗ can
be performed from a series of maximisations on different subsets of agents (see Subsec-
tion 3.2.5.2). Budget balance is achieved by each subset’s surplus being absorbed by all
other subsets. A partitioning approach was used for the allocation of identical (homoge-
neous) items by Guo and Conitzer [2008]. If N′ = N and A′ is non-partitionable, then the
mechanism cannot be strongly budget balanced (see Subsection 3.2.5.3). The exception is
if |A′| ≤ 2, since Theorem 3.6 only applies if there are at least 3 alternatives.
3.2.5.1 Ignore Agents
If N′ 6= N then there are agents i /∈ N′ with γi = 0, whose reported values have no effect
on the affine maximisation to choose allocation a∗. Their values may, however, be involved
in tie-breaking if the affine maximisation does not choose a unique allocation (i.e. when
m > |N′| + 1). These agents’ values are independent of the RHS of Equation (3.36) so
they can absorb any budget surplus without harming DSIC.









∗) ∀x ∈ NX (3.37)
hi(v−i) = 0 ∀i ∈ N′ (3.38)
This is not a unique solution and the mechanism can have an additional set of payments
ĥi(v−i), such that
∑
i∈N ĥi(v−i) = 0, applied to payment functions without harming SBB
or DSIC. This will have no effect on the social surplus, but can be used to make payments
meet additional requirements, such as individual rationality or fairness.
3.2.5.2 Partition Agents
The alternative to having a∗ completely independent of some agents’ types (by having
N′ ( N) is to limit A′ such that the maximisation in Equation (3.12) is performed on a
series of sub-problems (partitions), where each partition depends only on a strict subset
of N. This allows the right-hand side of Equation (3.36) to be broken up into parts that
depend on only a subset of agents. Instead of budget surpluses being absorbed by ignored
agents, each partition’s surplus can be absorbed by any agents outside that partition. A
partitioning approach was used for the allocation of identical items in [Guo and Conitzer,
2008].
We say that A′ is partitionable if the agents and items (N and M) can be partitioned
into k ≥ 2 disjoint subsets, N1, . . .Nk, M1, . . .Mk, where for any allocation a ∈ A′, if
a(i) = j for i ∈ Nq, then j ∈ Mq. That is, agents in partition Nq can only receive items
from Mq. Every agent and item is in exactly one partition. The optimal allocation is
then calculated from separate affine maximisations on each partition (with tie-breaking on
agents in Nq, if necessary), finding the optimal assignment of agents Nq to Mq
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To achieve SBB, the surplus of each partition must be absorbed using the payment
functions from agents in other partitions. If we let aq be the optimal assignment in partition
q, then dividing the right hand side of Equation (3.36), we have:∑
i∈N




















Where the surplus from each partition:





So now it is possible to achieve SBB using payments hi that use Tq from partitions where
i /∈ Nq (since Tq is calculated only from values of agents in Nq). One approach is to have
an agent absorb a share of the surplus from all partitions to which it does not belong. Let
µ̄(i) be the set of partitions an agent does not belong to, i.e. µ̄(i) = {q ∈ [1, k] : i /∈ Nq}.







For each partition q there will be n − |Nq| agents receiving T
q(vNq )
n−|Nq | as part of their
payments, and so the sum of all payments will be zero. It is possible to divide a partition’s
surplus unevenly among other agents, or to use additional payments ĥi(v−i) as with the
ignore-agents mechanisms. Provided the additional payments themselves are SBB, the
mechanism will remain DSIC and SBB.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of non-partitionable agents. Adjacently-labelled agents (circles) can
take the same item (rectangles) in different allocations, so must be in the same partition.
3.2.5.3 Single Partition and No Ignored Agents
If N′ = N, A′ is non-partitionable and |A′| > 2 then the agents’ payments cannot be
SBB for DSIC mechanisms. Recall that partitionable allocation mechanisms have disjoint
subsets of agents and items such that agents can only be allocated items from their own
subset. If no such partition exists, then the mechanism is non-partitionable. For example,
if every agent can get any item, then every agent and item must belong to the one subset.
If A′ is non-partitionable, then for some ordering of agent labels, A′ contains n−1 pairs
of allocations (a1, b1), . . . , (an−1, bn−1) such that:
a1(1) = b1(2) 6= 0 (3.44)
a2(2) = b2(3) 6= 0 (3.45)
...
an−1(n− 1) = bn−1(n) 6= 0 (3.46)
Note that not all allocations above are necessarily unique. Each pair shows adjacently
labelled agents can take the same item, so must necessarily be in the same partition (see
53
Figure 3.1). For example, Equation (3.45) means there is some item (not the “nothing”
item 0) that agent 2 receives in allocation a2 and agent 3 receives in allocation b2 (this is
illustrated as the second item in Figure 3.1). This is the pair of allocations that places
agents 2 and 3 in the same partition. From all n− 1 pairs of allocations, all agents are in
the same partition. If such a chain of pairings for at least one permutation of agent labels
did not exist, then the “break” in the chain would signify a partition.
In order to calculate a∗, the affine maximisation calculation must compare the values
vi(a
i(i)) to vi+1(a
i(i)), for all i < n. Thus, the maximisation makes a comparison between
all agents’ value profiles, and so the maximisation cannot be broken up into sub-problems
with sub-agents. Additional payment functions must calculate the allocation that depends
on all agents’ values, but using a strict subset of these values. Omitting any single agent
while attempting to calculate the affine-maximising allocation will be unable to determine
the actual allocation, since the omitted agent’s value profile will be able to change the
affine-maximising allocation. Since N′ = N, the RHS of Equation (3.36) cannot be broken
into parts that depends on a subset of N and thus no valid payment functions will be able
to achieve strong budget balance.
3.2.5.4 Non-affine Maximisers
In order to have a DSIC mechanism, the requirement of an affine maximiser from Theo-
rem 3.6 only applies if the SCF satisfies independence and there are more than 2 outcomes.
In this work, we will focus on affine-maximising heterogeneous item allocation mechanisms
with at least 3 outcomes, as has been done in previous work [Roberts, 1979].
Even with the independence requirement, there are additional DSIC mechanisms that
are not affine maximisers but have only two outcomes. A simple example of this is a
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mechanism, where A′ = {a1, a2}, and a2 is chosen if and only if all agents prefer a2 to a1,
with no payments made by any agent. No single agent can benefit by misreporting, and
the mechanism is also trivially SBB, yet it does not correspond to any affine maximiser.
Since any agent can decide the outcome in situations where all agents unanimously prefer
a2, this would imply a non-zero agent weight in an affine maximiser. But, if any other
agent prefers a1, no agent can change the outcome, regardless of reported type, which
would imply a zero weight for these agents. In Subsection 3.3.2, we show that mechanisms
restricted to two outcomes do not outperform affine maximising SCFs in the worst case.
Finally, restricting A′ to a single possible outcome can be characterised as an extreme case
of affine maximisation.
3.3 Strongly Budget Balanced, Unit Demand, Het-
erogeneous Allocation
Unit demand allocation mechanisms have been studied in the literature; however, the
addition of the strong budget balance constraint greatly limits what can be achieved with
deterministic mechanisms. In this section we discuss previous work on heterogeneous
allocation under a unit demand setting. We also discuss metrics used to assess these
mechanisms and worst-case results.
We then use our results from Subsection 3.2.5 to present mechanisms that achieve the
optimal worst case performance for affine-maximising mechanisms when the SBB constraint
is added. The poor worst-case result in Theorem 3.8 motivates examining a randomised
solution to this problem.
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3.3.1 Related Work
A good starting point for mechanisms for this problem is the VCG mechanism (see Subsec-
tion 3.2.1.1). While not SBB, it is guaranteed to be efficient and WBB for heterogeneous
item allocation. However, its weakness due to budget imbalance is quickly exposed by
examining its worst-case social surplus ratio. Under VCG payment rules, agents pay their
externality or social burden. In the worst case, this payment exactly matches the utility
gained by the allocation itself, giving an overall ratio of zero, as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 3.1. There is a single painting to be allocated to one of 3 agents. The agents
value this painting at $300, $300 and $200 respectively. The efficient allocation is to give
the painting to either agent 1 or 2, and this is decided through some tie-breaking procedure
to be agent 1. If either agent 2 or 3 are removed from the allocation, the allocation remains
the same, so these two agents pay nothing. The presence of Agent 1, however, prevents
agent 2 from receiving $300 of utility, since agent 2 would receive the painting in agent 1’s




Previous work has sought to improve this ratio through redistribution of the total VCG
payments. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the budget imbalance, while maintaining







∗ is the efficient allocation for all agents, and a∗−i is the efficient
allocation for agents excluding agent i. We denote the sum of all payments made to agents
in a VCG mechanism, with value profile v as:















This will be a negative value, since VCG is WBB. We similarly define T V CG(v−i) as the
sum of VCG payments under a mechanism that only includes agents N\{i}.
Bailey [1997] and Cavallo [2006] developed mechanisms to redistribute part of the total
VCG payment collected by the mechanism back to the agents. In this item allocation
setting, these two mechanisms coincide and is known as the Bailey/Cavallo mechanism,
which is also similar to a mechanism developed independently by Porter et al. [2004].
Under the Bailey/Cavallo mechanism, the agents run a VCG mechanism, then each agent
i receives a discount that is an estimate of the average VCG payment. This estimate
is made by calculating the total payment had the remaining n − 1 agents run a VCG

















T V CG(v−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bailey/Cavallo
(3.48)
The surplus payment produced by the Bailey/Cavallo mechanism is reduced to




T V CG(v−i) (3.49)
Considering the agents in Example 3.1, under Bailey/Cavallo, the agents’ received
payments are instead:



















When maximising the social surplus ratio, the Bailey/Cavallo mechanism, as with all
VCG redistribution mechanisms is limited to cases where n > m+1. In settings where n ≤
m+ 1, no redistribution mechanism can provide a positive ratio [Gujar and Yadati, 2011;
Guo, 2012], so VCG is the optimal choice. The Bailey/Cavallo mechanism, however,




The surplus left over from the Bailey/Cavallo mechanism can also be estimated, by
calculating VCG payments on (n − 2)-sized subsets of agents, and redistributed back to
further increase the worst-case ratio. This can also be repeated iteratively, considering
VCG payments in smaller subsets of agents [Dufton et al., 2012]. Continuing this process
gives the HETERO [Gujar and Yadati, 2011] mechanism, which Guo [2012] proves to be
individually rational, weakly budget balanced and providing the optimal worst case ratio.

















Here T V CGk (v) is the average sum of VCG payments taken over all subsets of agents in v,
with k agents removed. The α terms are values that depend only on n and m, and are





































This ratio matches the worst-case ratio for the allocation of homogeneous/identical
items, developed independently by Guo and Conitzer [2009] and Moulin [2009]. The mech-
anism achieving this optimal ratio for identical items is called the Worst Case Optimal
(WCO) mechanism. Since heterogeneous mechanisms can be used with homogeneous
items, they cannot exceed the ratio of WCO, in fact, when HETERO is used on identi-
cal objects, the payments match that of the WCO mechanism. Also, when m = n− 2 the
HETERO mechanism is equivalent to Bailey/Cavallo.
Redistribution of VCG payments reduces the loss of overall utility while still maintain-
ing an efficient allocation. However, redistribution mechanisms are inapplicable in settings
where strong budget balance is a strict constraint. Since simultaneously ensuring efficiency
and SBB is typically incompatible with DSIC (see Subsection 3.2.2), an SBB mechanism
must sacrifice either efficiency or DSIC.
Removing DSIC altogether means an efficient allocation can always be found without
the need for any payments, since we can assume agents’ true types are known. DSIC is
a strong requirement, and it may be reasonable to assume truthful reports from agents
in a non-DSIC mechanism if we assume those agents have computational limitations on
calculating a misreport, or have limited information about the true types of the other
agents. Work by Parkes et al. [2001] examines mechanisms that are SBB but allow agents
to make small misreports of their true values. These mechanisms are for a combinatorial
exchange, where agents represent multiple buyers and sellers and the mechanism determines
the trades of items along with payments made or received by each agent. Kothari et al.
[2003] later applied this technique to the multi-unit auction, where a seller has a set of
identical items, and buyers have non-unit demand.
An efficient allocation maximises the sum of agents’ utilities for that allocation. How-
ever, given the loss of utility from budget imbalance, an inefficient allocation with budget
59
balanced payments may actually give a greater worst case ratio. Sakurai et al. [2009]
propose partitioning (similar to Subsection 3.2.5.2) as a technique for achieving SBB at
the expense of efficiency. The technique described is for general item allocation problems
so is applicable to unit demand allocation. The authors provide empirical results with
average case behaviour for social surplus, but no analysis on worst-case performance or
the optimal arrangement of agent partitions. Previous work has also covered mechanisms
that can “destroy” items in order to achieve higher overall social surplus in the allocation
of identical items [Guo and Conitzer, 2008; de Clippel et al., 2009].
3.3.2 Worst-case Optimal SBB Mechanisms
From our result in Theorem 3.6, we examine the space of DSIC, SBB mechanisms for het-
erogeneous item allocation, focussing on affine maximisers, to find the optimal worst-case
performance in this class. We examine the worst-case behaviour in a deterministic setting,
focussing specifically on the social surplus ratio, which is simply the level of efficiency of
the selected outcome given the hard constraint of strong budget balance, as defined in
Equation (3.3). Since either N′ or A′ are restricted, an efficient mechanism is not possible,
and this agrees with the Green-Laffont impossibility theorem [Green and Laffont, 1979]
(see Subsection 3.2.2).
Theorem 3.8. The worst-case social surplus ratio for a deterministic, SBB, DSIC mech-
anism, satisfying independence, for the allocation of heterogeneous items to agents of unit
demand, with more than two possible allocations (i.e. n > 2 or m > 2) is zero.
Proof. We work through the different mechanisms described in the characterisation of
Subsection 3.2.5.
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Firstly, consider the Ignore Agent approach. Let x be an ignored agent and let y be some
non-ignored agent. Now let item z = fy(0, vx), the item agent y receives when all agents,
except x report 0 (vx will not change the allocation since it is ignored). If vx(z) = 1, and
all other agents’ values are zero, then
∑
i∈N vi(a
∗(v)) = 1 but
∑
i∈N vi(f(v)) = 0, giving a
ratio of zero.
Alternatively, we can use partitions to achieve SBB. Each partition has a set of agents
and items. Pick an agent x ∈ N1 and an item z ∈M2 from different partitions and let the




∗(v)) = 1 while
∑
i∈N vi(f(v)) = 0, giving a ratio of zero.
A mechanism that combines ignoring with partitioning can be shown to have a zero
ratio using either of the two previous examples.
Finally, we can use non-affine maximising SCFs if we limit A′ to two possible allocations.
However, if n > 2 or m > 2, any selection of two allocations will leave at least one agent-
item pairing impossible. If this agent’s value for this item is the only non-zero value,
then the mechanism cannot give an allocation with non-zero total utility, thus the ratio is
zero.
This poor performance leads us to examine randomised solutions in Chapter 4. These
randomised solutions are based on two mechanism classes of interest, which we extract
from the characterisation in Subsection 3.2.5. These are the IgnoreAgents mechanisms
and PartitionAgents mechanisms. Individual rationality is easily achieved in both these
mechanisms by using payments from the VCG mechanism. These additional VCG pay-
ments do not affect the total utility of the agents and so they can be added without affecting
the ratio, SBB or DSIC.
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3.3.2.1 IgnoreAgents
Under an IgnoreAgents mechanism, there is a fixed non-empty set of agents NX ⊆ N,
who are the ignored agents, while the remaining agents are denoted N′. The mechanism
proceeds as follows:
1. Allocate agents N′ efficiently: a′ = arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N′ vi(a).
2. While there are remaining items and agents in NX left unallocated
• Allocate first unallocated agent in NX (according to some predetermined fixed
ordering) its most preferred item left unallocated
3. The agents in N′ make regular VCG payments without including the ignored agents






















 ∀i ∈ NX (3.58)
where a′−i is the efficient allocation for agents N
′\{i}.
The payments made by agents in NX exactly balance out the payments made by agents
in N′, so this mechanism is SBB and DSIC. VCG payments are weakly-budget balanced
and individually rational (see Subsection 3.2.1.1), so agents in N′ will be IR, while agents
in NX will receive a positive payment along with either no item, or an item for which
they have non-negative utility. Thus all agents have non-negative utility. However, from
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Theorem 3.8 we know the mechanism is inefficient and has a worst-case social surplus ratio
of zero.
3.3.2.2 PartitionAgents
In a PartitionAgents mechanism, the set of agents, N, and set of items, M, are parti-
tioned into k ≥ 2 disjoint subsets, N1, . . .Nk and M1, . . .Mk. The set of possible alloca-
tions within a partition q is denoted Aq. The mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. For each partition q, allocate agents Nq efficiently among items in Mq, to get allo-
cation aq = arg maxa∈Aq
∑
i∈Nq vi(a).
2. Agents make regular VCG payments within their own partition then collect an even



























Agents’ payments within a partition ensure DSIC and IR. Additional inter-partition
payments made to the agents are non-negative since VCG is WBB, so achieves SBB while
maintaining IR. As with IgnoreAgents, Theorem 3.8 implies a worst-case social surplus
ratio of zero.
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3.4 Room Assignment–Rent Division
The new mechanisms we presented for heterogeneous item allocation can be adapted to
the room assignment–rent division problem. In this section, we examine previous work on
RARD, as well as our new impossibility result for multi-house RARD. As has been shown
in previous work [Haake et al., 2002; Su, 1999], no truthful, envy-free mechanism exists
for the RARD problem. An envy-free allocation is an efficient allocation [Svensson, 1983;
Alkan et al., 1991], and the problem requires the sum of payments to be budget balanced
(if T 6= 0, each room/agent can be given an initial, constant charge of T
n
to bring the
budget to zero). As the truthful mechanism cannot guarantee efficiency when ensuring the
divisible resource is entirely allocated (this follows from Theorem 3.8 and Green-Laffont
[Green and Laffont, 1979]), the mechanism cannot provide an envy-free outcome for all
value profiles.
3.4.1 Related Work
While truthful, deterministic solutions do not exist for the room assignment–rent division
problem, there have been a number of previous solutions for finding envy-free outcomes,
while assuming complete knowledge of agent types. Since there are no game theoretic issues
when agents are truthful, these previous solutions deal with other issues. Su [1999] proves
the existence of envy-free outcomes for this setting, along with an interactive algorithm
based on Sperner’s lemma [Sperner, 1928] that uses simple queries to the agents. If the
price of each room is a dimension, valid pricing schemes that total to T will form a (n−1)-
simplex in Rn. This simplex is subdivided into a small mesh of simplices with a barycentric
subdivision, where each vertex represents a possible pricing for the rooms. Each vertex
is assigned to an agent, and that agent is queried as to its most preferred room at that
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pricing. The answers to these queries generates a labelling of these vertices. A simplex
with a different agent on each vertex (which is guaranteed to exist due to Sperner’s lemma)
means the agent assigned to each vertex selected a different room, so a point within this
simplex gives an envy-free pricing. If neither of the vertices of this simplex give an envy-
free pricing, it can be further subdivided until such a pricing is found. This method can be
stopped early to give an “approximately envy-free” result, where agents’ envy is bounded
by the size of the current simplex. Also, the nature of the queries (“Which room do you
most prefer at these prices?”) is beneficial for agents who cannot easily quantify their room
preferences. Su’s method, however, can give negative prices to some rooms.
Brams and Kilgour [2001] developed a method called the Gap Procedure. Each agent
submits bids for all rooms, such that the sum of bids totals to T with an allocation and
pricing chosen to maximise the sum of bids. Prices for each room are then reduced to their
second highest bids and so on, until the sum of prices is equal to T . If a reduction of prices
would lead to a total less than T , the prices are lowered proportionally to the gap between
the current and next-lowest price, such that prices sum to T .
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. [2004] developed an envy-free auction method for determining
the allocation and prices of rooms with any number of agents that also guarantees non-
negative pricing. Rooms are initially priced at T
n
and agents select their most preferred
rooms. All rooms that are over-demanded (i.e. more than 1 agent selected them) have
their prices simultaneously increased while discounting other rooms. This continues until
no rooms are over-demanded, at which point all agents are envy-free. This technique
requires continuous price updates, and the authors present an equivalent auction that uses
discrete price updates. A more general procedure, developed by Haake et al. [2002], finds
an envy-free allocation without the restrictions that the number of objects must equal the
number of agents and each agent must receive exactly one object.
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For the room assignment–rent division problem, an envy-free solution relies on truth-
ful preferences of the agents. While no deterministic RARD mechanism exists that is
both envy-free and non-manipulable, such mechanisms have been developed for related
problems. Sun and Yang [2003] achieved a strategy-proof and envy-free mechanism for
a similar allocation problem, but has different restrictions on the allocation of the divisi-
ble resource. Instead of dividing a single quantity of some resource, each indivisible item
has its own “compensation limit”, which avoids the complications associated with strong
budget balance. This model and proof was generalised by Andersson and Svensson [2008],
and Andersson [2009] for greater flexibility on the indivisible objects, and a proof of coali-
tional strategy-proofness. However, the use of an item-based compensation limit instead
of a single budget of divisible resource that must be entirely allocated mean that these
mechanisms are incompatible with the room assignment–rent division model.
3.4.2 Multi-house Room Assignment–Rent Division
Under single-house RARD, an envy-free solution always exists, but this requires that the
mechanism knows all agents’ types (i.e. agents are honest). The extension to multiple
houses, however, can no longer guarantee the existence of such a solution. This is true
even if all agents report their type truthfully.
Theorem 3.9. Under multihouse RARD, in any setting with at least 2 houses, there exist
value profiles with no envy-free solution.
Proof. Since the total rent Tj for house j must be paid for by agents with rooms in j, a
house with low cost and high room value will be envied by agents in a house with high cost
and low room value. For any multi-house problem, there will be at least 2 houses, with
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total rent T1 and T2, chosen such that T1 ≥ T2. Let M1 and M2 be the sets of rooms in








+ 1 ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M2 (3.62)
At least one room in house 1, denoted room x, has a rent of at least T1|M1| , giving a total
utility of at most 0 for any agent occupying that room. On the other hand, at least one
room in house 2, denoted room y, has a rent at most T2|M2| , giving the total utility of at
least 1 for the agent occupying that room. Thus, whichever agent is in room x will envy
the agent in room y, regardless of payments.
Because of this result, in this problem envy-freeness cannot be achieved and randomisa-
tion will not help. A randomised mechanism can allow truthfulness, but cannot overcome
the non-existence of any envy-free outcome. If this problem is relaxed to allow the rent
from each house to be paid by all agents, this simply changes the problem to the single-
house case. Due to the result of Theorem 3.9, we only examine single-house mechanisms
for the remainder of this work.
3.5 Public Good
Mechanisms for the public good problem deal with a simpler domain. Agents’ preferences
are represented by a single value, and the outcome space is binary. However, as with
item allocation, a truthful mechanism cannot be efficient and strongly budget balanced
[Moulin and Shenker, 2001]. This result follows from general impossibility results [Green
and Laffont, 1979; Roberts, 1979]. Thus, deterministic mechanisms for this problem are
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either manipulable, inefficient or have a budget imbalance. Generally, past work on this
problem looks at either efficient mechanisms (i.e. Groves) that use redistribution, or, to a
lesser extent, inefficient SBB mechanisms.
3.5.1 Related Work
As with the item allocation problem, there has been much previous work on mechanisms for
the public project problem that achieve efficiency and DSIC through a VCG mechanism,
then reduce the budget imbalance through payment redistribution [Moulin, 1986; Deb
and Seo, 1998; Cavallo, 2006; Guo and Conitzer, 2009; Moulin, 2009]. While redistribution
mechanisms for heterogeneous item allocation have a tight upper bound on worst case ratio,
such a bound is currently unknown for public goods. An upper bound that is conjectured
to be tight was found by [Naroditskiy et al., 2012], and this upper bound approaches 1 as n
increases. The ratio for VCG, on the other hand, is 1
n
, which approaches 0 with additional
agents.
Apt et al. [2008] examine the public good problem under a measure they propose of
welfare dominance. This establishes a partial ordering over mechanisms, where one mech-
anism welfare dominates another if it produces a smaller sum of payments for all value
profiles (strictly smaller for at least one value profile). Under the public good setting we
examine, no feasible, efficient and DSIC mechanism welfare dominates the VCG mecha-
nism. Apt and Estévez-Fernández [2009] achieve a better redistribution of payments and
welfare dominance of VCG by performing a sequential version of the public good prob-
lem, where agents publicly declare their bids one by one. Agents’ truthfulness is not in
dominant strategies, but rather in a Nash equilibrium. Since there may be multiple Nash
equilibria, the sequential bid elicitation ensures all agents end up behaving according to
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the same Nash equilibrium.
A less-often examined solution to improving social surplus, and one that we require since
we enforce SBB, is inefficiency. In this problem, this means the public good may not be
acquired, even though there is enough collective benefit to outweigh its cost. Alternatively,
an inefficient outcome could mean the public good is acquired where the cost outweighs
its benefit, and the agents would have been better off to keep the cost of the project.
While such mechanisms have been developed for other problems [Guo and Conitzer, 2008;
de Clippel et al., 2009], for the public project problem, recent work by Guo et al. [2011] used
randomisation and inefficiency to achieve SBB mechanisms for the public good problem.
We examine these approaches and similar mechanisms in more detail in Chapter 4.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented deterministic solutions for the social choice problems we de-
scribed in Chapter 2. We surveyed existing solutions from the literature for these problems
and related settings. We also presented the measures that are used to assess and compare
these mechanisms. These are measures for overall agent utility, measured by efficiency
and social surplus ratio, and the property of envy-freeness. Our first major technical
contribution in this chapter is the characterisation of deterministic DSIC mechanisms for
heterogeneous item allocation when we add the constraint of independence, which we then
extended to cover mechanisms that are both DSIC and SBB. Due to this result, we focus
on affine-maximising social choice functions. Using these characterisations we developed
mechanisms for this item allocation problem, and found a worst-case upper bound of zero
for the social surplus for deterministic affine-maximising mechanisms (see Theorem 3.8).
Our characterisation describes mechanisms for the RARD problem too, but without con-
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cern for envy-freeness, which past work shows is impossible for deterministic, truthful
mechanisms. In addition to surveying past work on the item allocation, RARD and public
good problems, we presented an impossibility result for the multi-house variant of RARD,
which applies to both deterministic and stochastic mechanisms. Our results from this





The constraints of our problems resulted in poor worst-case performance in determinis-
tic, truthful mechanisms. This motivates us to examine stochastic solutions for our social
choice problems. In Chapter 3, we covered deterministic solutions that achieved good
performance by relaxing constraints such as strong budget balance or truthfulness. Ran-
domised mechanisms allow these constraints to be kept, while not causing the mechanism
to be vulnerable to particular sets of value profiles.
Randomised mechanisms, which we present in this chapter cannot be adequately as-
sessed or compared using the deterministic measures presented in Section 3.1. Before pre-
senting randomised mechanisms, we discuss measures appropriate for assessing the quality
and optimality of these solutions, based on deterministic measures. These measures also
directly correspond with existing deterministic measures when applied to deterministic
mechanisms, which facilitates the comparison between existing and new mechanisms. We
require this property of the new measures, since otherwise the new measures could be
constructed to deliberately punish existing mechanisms while benefiting new mechanisms.
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Using these new measures, we present and assess randomised solutions to our different
problems to demonstrate the potential gain of randomisation. For heterogeneous item
allocation, we provide a tight upper bound on efficiency with a randomised, strongly budget
balanced mechanism. Thus, to exceed this level of performance, a mechanism designer
must be able to either relax some problem constraints, or gather information about the
distribution of agents’ types. We also provide similar bounds on envy-freeness in the
room assignment–rent division problem. Due to poor performance in stochastic DSIC
mechanisms for RARD, we also examine mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. It
is only knowledge of the actual random choice that can break truthfulness guarantees in a
truthful in expectation mechanism. If we assume this knowledge is not available to agents
prior to their reporting their types, then it is reasonable to relax our requirements to this
weaker notion of truthfulness. Finally we look at the single-parameter domain of the public
good problem, where the aim is again to maximise the agents’ total utility.
In this section, we evaluate stochastic mechanisms ∆M̂ which are distributions over
a set of social choice functions and payment functions M̂. This is defined formally in
Definition 2.2 of Chapter 2.
4.1 Measures
When examining a stochastic mechanism, which can produce many outcomes from a single
value profile, it is beneficial to consider measures designed for stochastic mechanisms.
To equip deterministic properties for use with stochastic mechanisms, we consider the
probability of an outcome, and the expected value of the quality of the outcome. If there is
no prior information about the distribution of agents’ types, it is possible that a mechanism
repeatedly receives “bad” value profiles. To provide guarantees on the performance of the
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mechanism, we look at the worst-case behaviour, which gives the lowest performance out
of any possible value profile.
In order to assess the allocative efficiency of our proposed stochastic mechanisms, we
present two measures that are analogous to the deterministic properties of efficiency and
social surplus (see Section 3.1 for definitions of these deterministic properties). Under
strong budget balance, an efficient outcome is the optimal solution, but when that isn’t
achieved, the social surplus ratio shows how close we are to the optimal outcome. Where
budget imbalance is allowed, the ratio captures the loss of utility from both inefficient
allocation and budget surplus.
Definition 4.1 (Probability of efficiency). The probability of efficiency, denoted pEF ,
is the probability that a mechanism will produce an (allocatively) efficient outcome, for any
possible value profile.
Formally, given a stochastic mechanism ∆M̂, which chooses a deterministic mechanism





















is a binary function evaluating to 1 if the
value of the allocation produced by fk is the same as the value of the efficient allocation
a∗, and evaluates to 0 otherwise.
We typically consider the worst-case pEF , which is the minimum for all possible value
profiles. Under deterministic mechanisms, the property of allocative efficiency was boolean,
in that a mechanism always produced an efficient outcome or there existed some value
profile that would be allocated inefficiently. This measure is a natural extension of the
deterministic measure and worst-case pEF retains the information provided by measuring
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for efficiency. An efficient, deterministic mechanism will have a worst-case pEF of one, or
zero otherwise. A randomised mechanism will have pEF = 1 if and only if it is an efficient
mechanism (in the deterministic sense).
If efficiency is desirable but not an absolute requirement, then this measure allows
a mechanism that is almost-always efficient in the worst case to be distinguished from
one that is (almost) never efficient, whereas otherwise both mechanisms would have been
labelled as inefficient.
However, this measure only considers the probability of the very best outcomes, where
the sum of agents’ utilities are maximised, and all other outcomes are counted as equally
valueless. Where we are interested in maximising the quality of the non-optimal outcomes
as well, it is appropriate to consider the expected level of efficiency for a set of agents, and
this prompts an extension to the social surplus ratio.
Definition 4.2 (Worst-case expected ratio). The worst-case expected ratio, denoted
rWCE, is the probability-weighted sum of the social surplus ratio (Equation (3.3)) for each
outcome of the mechanism, in the worst-case.

















Since this is a probability-weighted sum, the worst-case expected ratio for a determinis-
tic mechanism will be calculated over a single outcome and will simply be the social surplus
ratio of Equation (3.3).
These two efficiency measures look at worst-case behaviour, so for any set of agents,
a mechanism is guaranteed to produce an efficient outcome with probability at least the
worst-case pEF , and have an expected social surplus ratio at least rWCE. An alternative
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worst-case measure is to consider the performance of the worst possible outcome for any
combination of random choice and value profile. However, this stronger measure obscures
the benefits of randomisation, since the analysis forces the mechanism to deterministically
make the worst random choice. This reduces all randomised mechanisms to deterministic
mechanisms. This also reduces both randomised measures back to their deterministic
counterparts and worst-case results from Chapter 3, such as Theorem 3.8, would still
apply.
We similarly extend envy-freeness to apply more appropriately to stochastic mecha-
nisms. Envy-free mechanisms always produce an outcome such that no agent is envious.
As with efficiency, we can create measures that examine each of the possible outcomes
separately, along with their probabilities of occurring to produce a measurement. This
measures agent envy after the randomisation process. In a randomised mechanism, agent
envy can also be measured before the randomisation process. A simple extension of mea-
suring envy to a randomised mechanism is to compare each agent’s lottery1 of allocations,
prior to the mechanism performing its random selection.
Definition 4.3 (Ex ante envy-free). A mechanism satisfying ex ante envy-freeness,
has no agent strictly preferring another agent’s lottery over final outcomes for any v ∈ V .
That is, for an ex ante envy-free mechanism ∆M̂, ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀v ∈ V :∑
k∈M̂
pk[vi(a




k(j)) + tkj (v)] (4.3)
where allocation ak = fk(v).
A mechanism that is deterministically envy-free is also ex ante envy-free, since lotteries
1A lottery is a discrete distribution over possible states or outcomes. In this setting, an agent’s outcome
is an item and payment.
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are over a single outcome for each agent. For the RARD problem, however, ex ante envy-
freeness is trivial to achieve in truthful stochastic mechanisms.
Example 4.1 (Simple ex ante envy-free mechanism). Consider a mechanism that sim-
ply randomises over all possible allocations with equal probability and gives each agent a
constant share of T
n
from the divisible resource. For item allocation, we can set all pay-
ments to zero to achieve SBB. This gives each agent an identical lottery, so agents have
the same utility compared to any other agent’s lottery resulting in ex ante envy-freeness.
Since agents cannot influence the outcome, it is trivially truthful.
The mechanism in Example 4.1 will generally provide poor final outcomes, however,
with most or all agents envious in all outcomes. A randomised mechanism satisfying ex
ante envy-freeness has no guarantee of satisfying envy-freeness in the deterministic sense.
Because ex ante envy-freeness is a weak requirement with few guarantees about fi-
nal outcomes, we propose looking at measures of envy-freeness after the mechanism has
performed the random selection. One natural measure is to look at which of these final
outcomes are envy-free in the deterministic sense, and the minimum probability that the
mechanism produces such an outcome.
Definition 4.4 (Probability of envy-freeness). The probability of envy-freeness, pNF ,
is the (worst-case) probability that a mechanism will produce an envy-free outcome, for any







where EnvyFree(v, fk, tk) is 1 if (fk, tk) gives an envy-free outcome for v, that is, given
ak = fk(v)
vi(a
k(i)) + tki (v) ≥ vi(ak(j)) + tkj (v) , ∀i, j ∈ N (4.5)
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Otherwise EnvyFree(·) is zero.
The ex ante envy-free mechanism in Example 4.1 has a pNF of zero. That is, for some
sets of agents, it will never produce an envy-free outcome.
Example 4.2. Consider two people splitting the $10 cost for a package that includes both
a large steak and a small steak. They both prefer the larger steak, and the mechanism of
Example 4.1 will price both steaks at $5 and assign them randomly. Whoever pays $5 for
the small steak is envious of the other person, who paid the same price for the large steak.
As with pEF , there is a strong correspondence between pNF and deterministic envy-
freeness. Any deterministic mechanism will have a pNF = 1 if it is envy-free and zero
otherwise, while a stochastic mechanism will have a pNF = 1 if and only if it is an envy-
free mechanism (in the deterministic sense).
A limitation of pNF is that it only considers outcomes where all agents are envy-free,
with all other outcomes counted as equally valueless. To distinguish between different,
non-envy-free outcomes, we examine the level of envy in each of the possible outcomes.
We measure this as the number of agents who are envious of at least one other agent. This
is one of multiple ways of extending the concept of envy-freeness beyond a binary property.
While we consider agents to be either envious or not, one could also consider the number
of other agents each agent envies (degree of envy), or the amount by which an agent is
envious of another agent (magnitude of envy) [Chevaleyre et al., 2009].
Definition 4.5 (Expected envy-freeness). An envy-free agent is one who does not value
another agent’s bundle higher than its own in a particular allocation. The expected envy-
freeness, ENF , is the expected fraction of envy-free agents. This is the probability-weighted
sum of the fraction of envy-free agents in each outcome of the mechanism for a particular
input.
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where E(v, fk, tk) is the set of envy-free agents under the outcome produced by (fk, tk).
That is, given ak = fk(v)
E(v, fk, tk) = {i ∈ N : vi(ak(i)) + tki (v) ≥ vi(ak(j)) + tkj (v) , ∀j ∈ N} (4.7)
In Example 4.2, the basic mechanism gives ENF =
1
2
for these agents, since the person
with the large steak is envy-free but the person with the small steak is envious.
An envy-free mechanism will always have all agents envy-free, so this gives ENF = 1,
while a mechanism that results in all agents being envious has ENF = 0. If this measure
is applied to a deterministic mechanism, it will give the worst-case fraction of envy-free
agents.
4.2 Related work
Previous work on social choice problems has made use of randomisation for both compu-
tational and game theoretic benefits. Before we cover mechanisms for our specific social
choice problems, we examine some related work in other settings, and general social choice
settings.
Randomisation has been used in voting problems to overcome impossibility results
regarding manipulation by voters. Voting rules, although widely used for a range of
very important decisions, fall victim to two important theorems: Arrow’s impossibility
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theorem [Arrow, 1950] and the related Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gibbard, 1973;
Satterthwaite, 1975]. Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that a social welfare function
with three or more alternatives that is both Pareto efficient and independent of irrelevant
alternatives must be dictatorial. Instead of looking at systems that give a complete pref-
erence ordering, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that systems that find a single
winner that are both strategy-proof and allow any alternative to be elected, must be dicta-
torial. If a voting method allows tactical voting, then a voter may achieve a more desirable
outcome by stating preferences other than his or her true preferences. A dictatorial voting
system contains a single voter (the dictator) who can choose the winner.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaithe theorem means that reasonable voting rules are subject to
manipulation. Gibbard [1977] presented a family of voting rules that used randomisation
to create strategy-proof voting rules. Any strategy-proof randomised voting scheme will
be a randomisation over procedures that are either dictatorial or duple (only allow two
candidates to win). A simple example of a voting method that uses randomisation to
be free from strategic voting, is non-dictatorial and does not prevent any candidate from
winning is the random ballot. In a random ballot election, one ballot is randomly selected
and the candidate ranked first on that ballot is the winner. If ballots are drawn with
uniform probability, the probability of a candidate winning is equal to the fraction of votes
cast for that candidate. An alternative is to randomly select two candidates, and select the
most preferred of these two candidates. In either of these cases, no agent has incentive to
misreport, and neither is duple or dictatorial. However, after the random choice is made,
a strategy proof voting scheme will have one of these undesirable properties.
Recently, Procaccia [2010], motivated by results of Conitzer and Sandholm [2006], used
randomisation and approximation to create strategy-proof, randomised voting rules. These
voting rules were randomised versions of the score-based voting rules of Plurality, Borda,
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Copeland and Maximin. An issue discussed in this work is how to assess these randomised
procedures when existing desiderata are inadequate. The approximation ratio of these
randomised voting rules is defined in terms of scores given to candidates compared to their
deterministic, non-SP versions. The results of Procaccia [2010] suggest the answer to the
titular question “Can randomization circumvent Gibbard-Satterwaithe?” may be yes, but
it is as yet unquantified just how well it can circumvent.
Other recent work on randomisation in social choice has involved the problem of “self-
selection”, which has n agents that must select the k < n best agents from within the
group. While each agent approves of a subset of other agents, the agent only cares about
whether he or she is selected. Alon et al. [2011] first provide an impossibility result,
showing that this problem has no deterministic, truthful mechanism. An agent voting to
approve another agent can only lower its own chance of being selected. The authors then
develop a randomised mechanism that is strategy-proof and approximately optimal. This
works by partitioning agents such that each partition has a fixed number of places in the
final k selected agents. Each agent can then only declare its approval for agents outside its
own partition, thus its own preferences cannot affect its chance of being selected. As we
show later in this section, random partitioning of agents is a useful technique for achieving
strategy proof and strongly budget balanced mechanisms.
Faltings [2005] presented a widely applicable approach for randomised mechanisms in
strongly budget balanced, social choice settings. The procedure proposed selects a subset
of agents whose preferences are to be ignored while determining the optimal outcome.
These agents can then absorb any surplus payments collected by the remaining agents,
who run a VCG mechanism to determine the outcome. This sacrifices Pareto efficiency
in order to achieve strong budget balance. Faltings performs an average-case empirical
analysis to show that on randomly generated social choice problems, the total utility of
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the agents increases when using a budget balanced, inefficient mechanism over the efficient
VCG mechanism, which can produce a very large surplus. This motivates relaxing the
efficiency requirement when seeking to maximise the total utility of agents. We use this
approach of randomly ignoring agents to achieve strong budget balance but examine how
it performs compared to optimal worst-case behaviour.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2000; 2001], and later Kojima [2009] examined a randomised
mechanism for a problem similar to our unit demand item allocation problem. The goal
is envy-free allocation in a setting without monetary transfers (which is trivially SBB).
However, these settings use ordinal, rather than cardinal, preferences for items. One setting
even further restricts agents to the same ordinal ranking, where individual preferences
are distinguished by a private “acceptance threshold” [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2000],
below which an agent would rather have no item. These randomised mechanisms, which
are random serial dictatorships, were shown to be efficient, envy-free and strategy proof.
Although the form of preferences are quite limiting and can’t be used directly for the
problems we examine, the papers discuss methods of evaluating randomised allocation
procedures particularly with ordinal preferences.
Randomised auctions have been discussed for commodities such as digital goods,
which have an unlimited supply with no marginal cost. These auctions are desired to be
truthful, competitive and envy-free. Goldberg and Hartline [2003] showed that for these
goods, no deterministic auction exists that is truthful, envy-free and constant-competitive2.
The authors also describe auctions that become constant-competitive at the expense of ei-
ther some probability of non-envy-freeness or non-truthfulness. Mehta and Vazirani [2004]
provide an equivalence result for randomised auctions of digital goods. They show that
2Constant-competitive auctions always produce profit (to the mechanism/auctioneer) that is within
some constant factor of the optimal profit for a single item auction.
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a truthful in expectation randomised auction can be expressed as a mechanism that ran-
domly selects from a set of truthful, deterministic auctions. This equivalence result is not
applicable in general allocation problems, since it relies on independence between indi-
vidual agents’ possible allocations. That is, if one agent is allocated a digital good from
an unlimited supply, it will not affect whether or not any other particular agent can be
allocated.
The other main use of randomisation in computational social choice is to allay compu-
tational or communication inefficiency. Dobzinski et al. [2006], for example, developed a
randomised combinatorial auction that is dominant strategy incentive compatible. Their
work looks at combinatorial auctions that are truthful and have low computational com-
plexity and whose result is bounded by some approximation ratio. We cover communication
complexity in Section 5.3 and computational complexity in Section 5.4.
4.3 Strongly Budget Balanced, Unit Demand, Het-
erogeneous Allocation
Other than the general techniques described in Section 4.2, there has not been previous
work on randomised mechanisms for allocating heterogeneous items under our constraints.
Using the results from Subsection 3.2.5, we have the space of affine-maximising DSIC and
SBB mechanisms for this problem. We use these deterministic mechanisms as the basis for
stochastic mechanisms that are optimal, under our constraints, according to pEF or rWCE.
With the aim of maximising the worst case performance on both pEF and rWCE, we
begin by presenting two mechanisms along with bounds on their worst-case performance.
The first, presented in Subsection 4.3.1, is a randomised version of the IgnoreAgents mech-
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anism of Subsection 3.3.2.1, named RandomAuctioneer, while the second mechanism, in
Subsection 4.3.2 randomises over mechanisms that partition agents from Subsection 3.3.2.2.
In both these cases, these mechanisms randomise over extreme versions of the deterministic
mechanisms. Only a single agent is ignored or, when agents are partitioned, there are only
two partitions, one of which contains a single agent.
In Subsection 4.3.4, we show the performance achieved by these mechanisms to be
a tight upper bound for the problem of heterogeneous item allocation with an affine-
maximising SCF. Ignoring additional agents, or creating additional or more balanced par-
titions does not improve worst-case performance on pEF or rWCE.
4.3.1 Random Auctioneer (Ignore One Agent)
We use a mechanism that randomly ignores a single agent, while maximising efficiency
among non-ignored agents. First, a mechanism ignoring more than one agent can do no
better in terms of efficiency than ignoring only a single agent, since there is strictly less
information for the affine maximisation to optimise over. Further, after ignoring an agent,
since we are able to maximise efficiency among the non-ignored agents and our objective
is to maximise pEF or rWCE, it does not make sense to allocate with suboptimal efficiency.
Since the mechanism is always SBB, Equation (4.2) reduces to the ratio of the expected
total value of the allocation compared to the total value of the efficient allocation. We use
VCG payments for non-ignored agents so that the mechanism is IR, since this has no effect
on DSIC, SBB or efficiency. This ignored agent can be considered the auctioneer, since it
collects any surplus payments and can choose from any leftover item, thus we name this
mechanism RandomAuctioneer .
In cases where there are fewer agents than items (n < m), any allocation of the surplus
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items to the auctioneer agent will be tied according to the affine maximisation. We can
solve this using a dictatorial tie-breaking procedure, where the auctioneer agent chooses
its most preferred item from those left unallocated. Any other ties, such as those when
n ≥ m will have the same total utility regardless of which is chosen, so we simply break
these ties randomly. These tie breaking procedures are trivially SBB and DSIC.
The RandomAuctioneer mechanism runs as follows:
1. Randomly choose agent x ∈ N to ignore, with uniform probability.
2. Find all allocations that allocate agents N′ = N\{x} efficiently:








3. Agent x selects its most preferred allocation a′ from A′, with ties broken arbitrarily.
If n < m, this means x picks its more preferred item from the surplus items.
4. Agents receive payments as described in Equation (3.58) from Subsection 3.3.2.1,
where payments depend on the random choice of x. Since a single agent is ignored,




















To demonstrate this mechanism we apply it to the situation described in Example 2.1,
which we repeat here for readability.
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Example 4.3. Four colleagues, Alex, Lou, Sam and Vic, are deciding who should borrow
which company car over the upcoming long weekend. Available to them are a luxury sedan, a
small hatchback, two vans and an SUV. They all have different requirements and preferences
for the vehicles. Alex, for example will be buying large items for a renovation, so needs the
space of the SUV or van, while Lou is going on a family trip, so would like the space of
the SUV or comfort of the sedan. They each work out their preferences, as summarised in
Table 4.1, and then must decide who gets which vehicle.
Sedan Hatch Van 1 Van 2 SUV
Alex $30 $10 $60 $50 $130
Lou $90 $20 $40 $35 $100
Sam $90 $50 $10 $10 $40
Vic $85 $40 $15 $10 $70
Table 4.1: Item allocation example. Value agents receive for hiring each of the five
vehicles.
They use the RandomAuctioneer mechanism with VCG payments as described above.
In the first step, Alex is randomly selected as the ignored participant/auctioneer, and the
efficient allocation among the remaining people gives Lou the SUV, Sam the hatchback and
Vic the Sedan (this is not the overall efficient allocation). Alex is then left to pick the first
van. Payments received are calculated as:
tLou = (50 + 85)− (90 + 70) = −25 (4.10)
tSam = (100 + 85)− (100 + 85) = 0 (4.11)
tV ic = (100 + 50)− (100 + 90) = −40 (4.12)
tAlex = 25 + 40 = 65 (4.13)
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This gives a total agent utility of $295, while the efficient allocation, where Alex and Lou
swap vehicles has a total utility of $305, giving a social surplus ratio of 0.967.
To get a lower bound on what is possible, we assess the worst case behaviour of this
mechanism according to pEF and rWCE, defined in Section 4.1.
4.3.1.1 Probability of an Efficient Allocation
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where vi(j) = 0,∀i 6= j, and 1 otherwise. The single efficient allocation assigns agent i to
item i.
If n > m, then in the efficient allocation there are (n−m) agents who are left unallocated
in a∗ (those agents with a label i > m). If any of these agents are excluded when calculating
the efficient allocation, the mechanism will still produce an efficient allocation. Regardless
of value profile, there will always be (n−m) such agents. If any of the m agents who are
allocated items in a∗ are excluded from consideration, then they will not receive an item (as
there are no surplus items) and the outcome will not be efficient. Each individual agent is
excluded with probability 1
n





If n ≤ m, there will be (m−n+1) surplus items for the excluded agent to choose from.
For every value profile, there will always be one agent whose exclusion will not prevent the
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efficient allocation of the remaining agents. If removing each agent caused the allocation
of the remaining agents to improve, then this would mean every agent is “pivotal”, and its
participation causes a net-loss to the utility of all other agents.
In the item allocation setting, each time an agent is removed, another agent takes its
item, and so each agent holds an item that at least one other agent prefers to its own.
Suppose when agent i is removed, agent j takes i’s item. When agent j is removed, agent
k takes j’s item. We can continue this, and eventually we will find a cycle (since no agent
retains its item), where, for example, agent k takes agent i’s item. This cycle indicates
that agents will exchange items to gain an overall increase in utility, meaning the original,
efficient allocation could be improved, and thus not actually efficient.
In the worst case, there will only be one agent whose removal does not change the
allocation. This occurs, for example, when all agents have the same preference ordering
over all items, as in the value profile
v =

7 5 3 1 0
6 5 3 1 0
5 4 3 1 0
4 3 2 1 0
 (4.15)
In this value profile, ignoring agent (row) 1, 2 or 3 will result in the non-ignored agents each
taking a higher-valued item, while the allocation remains the same if agent 4 is ignored.
There is a 1
n
probability the mechanism removes this single agent. The ignored agent will
then choose the item it values most from the surplus (m − n + 1) items resulting in an




To summarise, the worst-case probability of an efficient allocation of heterogeneous
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, if n ≤ m
(n−m)
n
, if n > m
(4.16)
4.3.1.2 Worst-case Expected Ratio
We can scale agent values so that the value of the efficient allocation is 1, thus the worst-
case expected ratio is equivalent to the worst-case expected value of the allocation for
scaled value profiles.
For n > m, there is a potential loss of efficiency whenever one of the m agents given an
item in the efficient allocation is ignored and so does not receive any item in the allocation.
In the worst case, the agent that replaces these excluded efficient-allocation agents has no
utility for the item it receives, while the remaining m − 1 agents must do at least as well
(in total utility) as they did in the efficient allocation. But in the worst-case they will not
get any increase in utility. The worst-case expected loss in efficiency is thus the value each
agent has in the efficient allocation, weighted by the probability it is excluded. Only the
exclusion of the m efficiently-allocated agents will cause a loss of efficiency. As all agents
are ignored with equal probability ( 1
n
), and the m allocated agents have a combined utility








. This gives an overall




For n ≤ m, there is a potential loss of efficiency when ignoring any single agent, except
for one. If an ignored agent’s favoured item is not one of the surplus items, then the
other agents must have changed allocation (compared to the efficient allocation) for some





0.4 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0
0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

(4.17)
Any excluded agent gets no utility for any of the surplus items. The loss of efficiency is the
value each agent has in the efficient allocation weighted by the probability it is excluded.
At least one agent will still be able to get its efficient item, but in the worst case, this agent
will have zero utility for all items. So the expected loss of efficiency is still 1
n
.





4.3.2 Randomly Partition Agents
Next we examine a mechanism that randomly partitions agents. Our lower-bound mecha-
nism for the Random Partition approach consists of dividing the agents into two partitions,
one with a single “solo” agent. If n ≤ m, a single item is randomly assigned to the solo
agent’s partition, otherwise it is left unallocated. This solo agent is effectively ignored,
since its reported type has no effect on the allocation. Note that this is distinct from
ignoring one agent only when n ≤ m, since the solo agent has a fixed item assigned to
it, while an ignored agent is able to choose an item from the surplus items. When we
consider the upper bound for this approach in Subsection 4.3.4, we consider more general
partitioning, but show that this partitioning achieves the best efficiency within the class
of partitioning mechanisms.
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When n ≤ m, the mechanism works as follows:
1. Randomly choose agent x ∈ N to place in the solo partition, along with item y.
Agent x is assigned item y.
2. Allocate agents N′ = N\{x} efficiently: a′ = arg maxa∈A′
∑
i∈N\{x} vi(a), where
A′ = {a ∈ A : a(x) = y}.
3. Agents receive payments as described in Subsection 3.3.2.2. Since the solo agent is
effectively ignored, payment functions match those in Equations (4.8) and (4.9).
When n > m, the mechanism is identical to RandomAuctioneer.
4.3.2.1 Probability of an Efficient Allocation
When n ≤ m, the solo agent receives a randomly selected item. In the worst case, each
agent favours exactly one item, and no two agents favour the same item, as in Equa-
tion (4.14). For any choice of solo agent, there is a 1
m
probability it receives its desired
item. If the solo agent receives its item from the efficient allocation, since the remaining
items are allocated efficiently, the overall allocation is efficient. Otherwise, the solo agent




In the case of n > m, this mechanism is the same as the RandomAuctioneer mechanism,
as the solo agent is always left unallocated. Thus, the probability of efficiency remains the
same, at pEF =
(n−m)
n
. That is, in the worst case, the mechanism will produce an inefficient
allocation whenever any of the m agents allocated in the efficient allocation are placed in
the solo partition.
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To summarise, the worst-case probability of an efficient allocation for heterogeneous





, if n ≤ m
(n−m)
n
, if n > m
(4.19)
4.3.2.2 Worst-case Expected Ratio
Now we examine the worst-case ratio for this partitioning approach. In settings where
n ≤ m, a loss of efficiency will only occur when the solo agent is partitioned with the
“wrong” item. In the worst case, each agent only has non-zero utility for one item, so
unless the solo agent receives its favoured item, there is a loss of utility equal to the value
of this item it receives in the efficient allocation. Also, the item it receives instead could
be one of the (n − 1) items that are given to one of the remaining agents, in the efficient
allocation. For a particular assignment of agents to partitions, the solo agent, x’s expected
utility from the allocation is 1
m
vx(a
∗), since it gets nothing from the other (m− 1) items.
A non-solo agent, i, has expected utility of m−1
m
vi(a
∗). Again, we normalise agents’ utilities
such the value of the efficient allocation
∑
i∈N vi(a
∗) = 1. Thus, for a particular assignment





























Recall that agents have non-negative values, and the values are normalised, so the above




. Since each agent is the solo
agent x ∈ N with equal probability of 1
n
, the overall expected value of the allocation, and
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As with pEF , since this mechanism is equivalent to ignoring an agent when n > m, the
worst-case expected ratio stays at rWCE =
n−1
n







, if n ≤ m
(n− 1)
n
, if n > m
(4.25)
4.3.3 Randomly Partition and Ignore Agents
Partitioning and ignoring an agent will have a performance at most that of a mechanism
that simply ignores an agent. When just ignoring an agent, the mechanism will maximise
over the set of all possible allocations, under limited agent information. Combining the
procedures will maximise over a strict subset of possible allocations with the same restric-
tions on observable agent values. From the perspective of efficiency, a mechanism that
ignores an agent will compare the total utility of non-ignored agents for all allocations
tested by the ignoring-and-partitioning mechanism, but can also consider other allocations
that are precluded by partitioning. If multiple rounds of affine-maximisers are used (to
break ties), then these use any previously-ignored agents (agents with zero-weight). Com-
bining ignoring with partitioning does not expand possible tie-breaking mechanisms over
simply ignoring agents, since the same set of agent have zero-weight.
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Benefits to using partitioning in tandem with ignoring agents may be seen in terms of
computational and communication complexity (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4 for the complexity
benefits of partitioning), or with alternative objectives besides efficiency. In the prob-
lems that we examine in this work, however, the combination of partitioning and ignoring
provides no useful benefit.
4.3.4 Upper Bounds
To find an upper bound on what worst-case pEF and rWCE is achievable under DSIC, SBB
stochastic mechanisms that satisfy independence (affine maximisers), we must consider
more general cases of DSIC and SBB mechanisms, rather than the specific instances we
covered above. The RandomAuctioneer mechanism ignores a single agent, and this agent
is chosen from all agents with uniform probability. To find an upper bound on what is
achievable for mechanisms that ignore agents, we must consider mechanisms that can ignore
any number of agents, with the probability of ignoring an agent chosen non-uniformly. We
examine upper bounds for such mechanisms in Subsection 4.3.4.1.
Our approach of partitioning agents presented in Subsection 4.3.2 is an extreme case
that closely resembles ignoring an agent. To find upper bounds on the performance of
partitioning mechanisms, in Subsection 4.3.4.2 we examine mechanisms with any number
of partitions, and with partitions of varying size. We also consider non-uniform assignment
of agents and items to partitions.
Finally we can avoid the requirement of ignoring or partitioning if the mechanism is
limited to only two possible outcomes. However, in Subsection 4.3.4.3 we show that limiting
a mechanism to only two allocations does not improve worst-case performance.
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4.3.4.1 Randomly Ignore Agents
In the Randomly Ignore Agents mechanism, ignoring more than one agent will never in-
crease the worst-case pEF or rWCE. With less information about agent types, the allocation
mechanism cannot find a more efficient allocation than a mechanism that ignores only a
single agent. Consider the deterministic mechanisms that these mechanisms randomise
over. For any affine maximisation f that ignores two or more agents, NX , we can simply
create a mechanism that ignores only one of these agents i ∈ NX . This new mechanism can
calculate f(v), but can also maximise with additional agent information, so will perform
at least as well.
Note here that the random serial dictatorship mechanism is an extreme case of randomly
ignoring agents (with multiple tie-breaking round), where all but one agent is ignored. The
first dictator, d1 ∈ N chooses its most preferred item, equivalently to an IgnoreAgents
mechanism with N′ = {d1}, which optimises the allocation only considering agent d1.

















vd1 = 0 i ∈ NX
(4.26)
Since the dictator only chooses its own item, tie-breaking between allocations is per-
formed by iteratively running the same mechanism on the remaining agents and items.
The second, randomly-chosen dictator d2 ∈ N runs an IgnoreAgents mechanism with
N′ = {d2}, however this time the space of allocations is reduced to only include those
where agent d1 gets the item it selected.
Using an alternative tie-breaking procedure in the RandomAuctioneer mechanism is
a variation that must be considered for finding optimal worst-case performance. Since
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only one agent is unallocated, the tie-breaking procedure must determine the item for this
agent. Since this agent selects the item it most prefers, this is the outcome with the highest
total utility of all the tied outcomes, so no other tie-breaking procedure can outperform it.
While we also break ties among allocations for the agents in N′, in the worst-case there is
a unique maximum, so this choice does not affect worst-case performance.
The remaining variations are the probabilities that different agents are ignored. When
n > m, if there is one agent, i, whose probability of being ignored is greater than 1
n
,
then any value profile with a unique efficient allocation, such that this agent is allocated
will have pEF <
(n−m)
n
, since the agent is more likely to be left unallocated. This will
also lower rWCE, since this agent i may be the only agent with a non-zero item value.
Similarly, when n < m, any non-uniform probabilities for ignoring agents will lead to lower
worst-case behaviour. Using the example value profiles from Subsection 4.3.1, such as
v =

0.4 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0
0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

(4.27)
we permute agents such that an agent with higher probability of being ignored is given
the highest values for items that other agents desire. For example, suppose agent i has a
probability of being ignored of 1
n
+ ε for some ε > 0, with all other agents being ignored
with equal probability ( 1
n
− ε
n−1). We can permute the rows in Equation (4.27) such that
agent i has the value profile (0.4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). The expected loss of social surplus ratio is
value each agent has in the efficient allocation weighted by the probability it is ignored.
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Since the loss is higher that 1
n
, the expected social surplus ratio is below the worst-case
upper bound of n−1
n
Thus the bounds on the mechanism in Subsection 4.3.1 are a tight upper bound for
mechanisms that ignore agents.
4.3.4.2 Randomly Partitioning Agents
For any partitioning approach, a problematic family of value profiles are those where
vi(i) = 1 and vi(j) = 0 for all i 6= j (see Equation (4.14)), along with all permutations
of agent or item labels. That is, there is exactly 1 efficient allocation. If a mechanism
favours placing a particular agent i with item j, this must come at the expense of at
least one other pairing, (k, l). In this case, a lower probability of efficiency would happen
with a value profile that had an optimal allocation a∗ such that a∗(i) = l, a∗(k) = j,
than if all pairings occurred with equal probability. So for the upper bound on worst-case
performance, we are left to find the optimal number and sizes of partitions. The agents
and items are partitioned into k ≥ 2 disjoint subsets, N1, . . .Nk, and M1, . . .Mk. The
sizes of these subsets is denoted as nq = |Nq|, and mq = |Mq|. If n > m, there can be
partitions with no items (agents who are never allocated items), while if n < m there can
be partitions with no agents (items that are never allocated). The sizes of the partitions,
and the probabilities items have of being in each partition defines a particular partitioning.
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The stochastic mechanism then randomly populates each partition with items and agents
according to these probabilities.
For n ≤ m, consider one particular permutation of agents in partitions, then add
the n items in the efficient allocation one-by-one. There are m!
(m−n)! ways to place these
n items (ordered) into partitions (the remaining (m − n) items can go anywhere, since
we can assume these are worthless in the worst case). Since order within a partition does
not matter (as items can be allocated efficiently) the number of correct orderings for a


















This expression is maximised when k = 2 and one partition has a single item and agent.
In this case the above reduces to 1
m
, which agrees with Equation (4.19).










Again, this is maximised when k = 2, but since we can now have a partition with no




, which also agrees with Equation (4.19), thus this is a tight bound for
partition mechanisms.
For rWCE, consider the family of value profiles where va(b) = 1 and vi(j) = 0 for all
i 6= a or j 6= b. There is one agent-item pair that must end up in the same partition;
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otherwise, it is impossible to get non-zero efficiency. Since this could be any agent-item
pair, not known in advance, an upper bound on rWCE is the lowest probability any specific
agent will be paired with a specific item. The sum of agent utilities will be zero if this
agent isn’t paired to its item, and 1 if it is. If agents and items don’t have exactly equal
probability of being paired to each other, then select the pair with the lowest probability
to find the worst-case behaviour. To maximise this minimum probability, all pairings must
be equal. In this case, the probability agent a and item b end up in the same partition,














This is maximised when k = 2 and one partition has only a single agent. If n ≤ m, this
solo agent must have a single item, which gives
rWCE =








If n > m, we can increase the ratio by giving the solo agent no item, so:
rWCE =






These bounds agree with Equation (4.25), thus they are tight for partition mechanisms.
4.3.4.3 Two Allocations
The requirement of an affine-maximising SCF (due to Theorem 3.6) only holds if there are
at least 3 possible outcomes, so an additional class of DSIC, SBB mechanisms we consider
first limit A′ to 2 outcomes then select according to some weakly monotonic SCF. We can
show that the upper bounds for this class on pEF and rWCE do not exceed those for the
other two classes of mechanisms.
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For pEF , consider the value profile described above in Equation (4.14), with only a
single efficient allocation. For the efficient allocation to be chosen, it must be one of the
two randomly selected, which occurs with probability 2(m−n)!
n!
if n ≤ m, or 2(n−m)!
n!
if n ≥ m.
This only exceeds pEF for the RandomAuctioneer mechanism where |A| = 2 (that is n = 2
and m = 1 or 2) and only if the mechanism is able to choose the efficient allocation from
the 2 selected allocations.
Next, for rWCE, consider value profiles where va,b = 1 and vi,j = 0 for all i 6= a or j 6= b.
The expected ratio is thus the expected probability the mechanism randomly selects an
allocation that assigns item b to agent a. The minimum number of allocations to have every




This only exceeds the bounds for RandomAuctioneer when n = 2 and 1 ≤ m ≤ 3, and
again, only if the mechanism chooses the efficient allocation from the 2 selected.
To exceed the bounds of the RandomAuctioneer mechanism for n = 2, this mechanism
must perform an affine maximisation on the two allocations randomly selected in order to
find the efficient allocation. However, with payments of the form in Equation (3.13), with
two agents and γ1 = γ2 = 1, this cannot be SBB.
4.3.4.4 Overall Tight Upper Bound
We have covered all options for stochastic DSIC, SBB mechanisms that satisfy indepen-
dence for the problem of allocating heterogeneous items to unit demand agents. This
covers all truthful, SBB, affine-maximising mechanisms. The bounds presented above (see
Table 4.2 for a summary) are tight within this class, and the mechanisms are optimal
according to the metrics of pEF and rWCE. We conjecture these bounds to be tight for
all DSIC, SBB mechanisms. When n > m, the mechanisms in Subsection 4.3.1 and Sub-
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Probability of efficiency Expected surplus ratio
pEF rWCE








Table 4.2: The tight bounds on the worst-case performance of the two efficiency measures
for heterogeneous item allocation. These bounds are achieved by the RandomAuctioneer
(Ignore One Agent) mechanism, which is equivalent to the Partition Agents mechanism
when n > m.
section 4.3.2 are equivalent, but when n ≤ m, the optimal mechanism, according to these
metrics, is RandomAuctioneer, which randomly ignores one agent.
Guo et al. [2011] provided a lower bound on rWCE in general domains for Faltings’
mechanism [Faltings, 2005], which involves ignoring an agent. This lower bound corre-
sponds to our upper bound on rWCE, which proves Faltings’ mechanism to be optimal
within the affine-maximising class of mechanisms when allocating heterogeneous items to
unit demand agents.
Compare this worst case ratio to the deterministic HETERO mechanism of Gujar and
Narahari [2011], which is efficient, individually rational, but weakly budget balanced (as
proven by Guo [2012]). If n ≤ m + 1, the optimal ratio is 0, but for n > m + 1, the tight











This is the optimal ratio for weak-budget-balanced and efficient mechanisms, and is the
same worst-case optimal ratio for allocation of homogeneous items [Guo and Conitzer, 2009;
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Moulin, 2009]. While the expected ratio in Equation (4.18) is clearly higher than the 0
ratio that the deterministic worst-case-optimal mechanism gives when n ≤ m + 1, it also













This holds when n ≤ 2(m+ 1) but does not hold when n ≥ 3(m+ 1).
4.4 Room Assignment–Rent Division
The room assignment–rent division problem can be considered a more constrained variant
of heterogeneous item allocation, since it requires a specific payment structure for indi-
vidual agents as well as the aggregate property of SBB. In Section 3.4 we showed that no
deterministic, DSIC mechanism is envy-free for RARD, and unfortunately randomisation
does not provide any gain on worst-case performance of affine-maximising DSIC mecha-
nisms, as we cover in Subsection 4.4.1. While DSIC is the stronger truthfulness constraint
in stochastic mechanisms, if the random signal used by the mechanism can be reasonably
assumed to be unknown to the agents, DSIC can be relaxed to truthfulness in expectation.
This still assumes agents act truthfully in dominant strategies, regardless of other agents’
types, but instead the agents act to maximise their expected utilities, given the random
distribution of the mechanism. If agents know the random outcome prior to reporting their
types, the mechanism potentially loses its guarantee of truthfulness, as it is not necessarily
a distribution over deterministic, DSIC mechanisms.
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4.4.1 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
As we showed in Example 4.1 it is trivial to achieve ex ante envy-freeness in DSIC mech-
anisms. Thus, we focus on other measures of envy-freeness. For an envy-free outcome
in RARD we require both efficiency (as a requirement of envy-freeness for RARD) and
SBB (as a constraint of the RARD problem), so an initial mechanism to investigate is the
RandomAuctioneer mechanism of Subsection 4.3.1, since this has the optimal pEF (and
when n = m, it is equivalent to the partitioning approach). Any mechanism must have
pNF ≤ pEF , so this sets the initial upper bound on the worst-case pNF .
The non-ignored agents operate under a VCG mechanism, and such payments are
known to be envy-free when agents only receive one item [Leonard, 1983; Cohen et al.,
2010]. This means the non-ignored agents will always be envy-free among themselves.
However, the payment received by the ignored agent is the surplus from the VCG mecha-
nism, which can be as much as the value of the efficient allocation among the non-ignored
agents. This situation occurs when every agent is paying the exact value of its own item, so
ends up with a net utility of zero, while the ignored agent receives a positive payment that
all other agents will be envious of. Thus, this mechanism has a worst-case pNF = 0, which
is, in fact, the only achievable for DSIC, affine-maximising mechanisms, deterministic or
stochastic.
Theorem 4.1. A DSIC, affine-maximising mechanism for the room assignment–rent di-
vision problem has a worst-case pNF ≤ ε for some ε ≈ 0.
Proof. There are value profiles for which only a single set of payments gives an envy-free
allocation, such as when all agents have the same value profile. Consider, for example, a
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set of agents with the following value profile and some total payment T .
v =

c1 c2 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
c1 c2 c3 0 . . . 0 0 0









0 0 0 0 . . . cn−2 cn−1 cn
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 cn−1 cn

(4.39)
This has a number of efficient allocations with equivalent value, such as the assignment
down the main diagonal. However, to ensure envy-freeness, through comparing adjacently
labelled agents, we require:
c1 + t1 ≥ c2 + t2 (4.40)
c2 + t2 ≥ c1 + t1 (4.41)
c2 + t2 ≥ c3 + t3 (4.42)
c3 + t3 ≥ c2 + t2 (4.43)
. . .
Which leads to
ci + ti = cj + tj ∀i, j ∈ N (4.44)∑
i∈N
ti = T (4.45)
This is a system of n linear equations, with n variables, for which there is a unique solution
dependent on all ci.
Consider an affine-maximising DSIC mechanism for the RARD problem. From the
results in Subsection 3.2.5, this mechanism randomises over deterministic mechanisms that
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either ignore agents or partition agents. In either case, the payment function for each
agent depends on the values of a strict subset of all agents. In the case of ignoring a
single agent, for example, a payment function will be able to determine n − 1 equations
from the above system of equations, but will still have one degree of freedom in calculating
an envy-free payment (disregarding additional constraints on these payments to maintain
DSIC). A stochastic mechanism could randomise over all possible values that this final
degree of freedom permits. But since the space of agents’ values is continuous, there is an
infinitesimal probability the correct value is chosen where the value profile is of the form
above. That is pEF ≤ 1|V | =
1
∞ ≈ 0.
Since, in the worst case, a DSIC mechanism from the class of affine-maximisers will




. The RandomAuctioneer mechanism, however, has a worst-case ENF ≤ 1n .
Consider agents with the same value profile of
vi = (1, 2, . . . , n) (4.46)
That is, every agent has value for item j of vi(j) = j. Under VCG payments for the
non-ignored agents, an agent receiving item j will have to pay a value of j − 1, since its
presence has prevented j − 1 agents of acquiring an item of value 1 higher than what they
currently hold. Under this profile, the utility provided by each of the top n−1 items using
VCG pricing is 1. However, since all these VCG payments are transferred to the ignored
agent, receiving item 1, this ignored agent has a utility of 1 +
∑n−1
i=1 i, of which all other
agents will be envious. This happens regardless of the choice of ignored agents, so there is
always only a single envious agent and the ENF =
1
n
for this value profile.
Randomised DSIC mechanisms do not offer an improvement over deterministic mech-
anisms for envy-freeness in this setting. The envy-freeness constraints that clash with
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dominant strategy incentive compatibility remain in each of the deterministic mechanisms
that we randomise over. However, truthfulness in expectation (TIE), the alternative gen-
eralisation of truthfulness to a randomised setting, allows us to develop mechanisms with
improved envy-freeness while agents still act truthfully in dominant strategies.
4.4.2 Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms
Since DSIC stochastic mechanisms offer no improvement on envy-free final outcomes, we
now examine RARD mechanisms that satisfy a weaker notion of truthfulness: truthful
in expectation. Recall that a mechanism is truthful in expectation if, irrespective of the
actions of other agents, an agent’s expected utility cannot be increased by misreporting its
type.
We begin with a simple sufficiency condition for truthfulness in expectation in stochastic
mechanisms for the RARD problem.
Lemma 4.1. An RARD mechanism is truthful in expectation if each agent’s expected
share of the divisible resource, and probability of being assigned to each indivisible item is
constant (independent of reported types).
Proof. Let pi,j(v) denote the probability agent i ∈ N is assigned item/room j ∈ M, and
t̄i(v) = E(ti(v)) be agent i’s expected share of the divisible resource. The expected utility
of agent i ∈ N is calculated as: E(ui) =
∑
j∈M pi,j(v)vi(j) + t̄i(v). As all pi,j and t̄i(v)
are constant with respect to the agent’s bid/reported type, the agent’s expected utility is
constant and cannot be increased by misreporting.
Note that these are not the necessary conditions for a truthful RARD mechanism. That
is, a truthful in expectation mechanism does not necessarily have constant assignment-
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probabilities and expected shares of the divisible resource. We use the conditions in
Lemma 4.1 to define a simple, truthful mechanism as a baseline for comparing other ran-
domised mechanisms.
Example 4.4 (A simple stochastic RARD mechanism). From previous work [Alkan et al.,
1991; Haake et al., 2002], given full knowledge of agents’ types, we can find an envy-free
allocation and division, denoted (a∗, t∗). If the mechanism meets the conditions specified
by Lemma 4.1, then the mechanism will be truthful and we can calculate this envy-free
outcome. Our random mechanism first calculates the envy-free solution, then randomly
selects an integer x ∈ [0, n − 1]. Agent i is given the item and share allocated to agent
(i+ x) (mod n) in the envy-free allocation. Thus, ax(i) = a∗((i+ x) (mod n)).
This can be viewed as a randomisation over n deterministic mechanisms, where mech-
anism x ∈ [0, n− 1] deterministically allocates ax(i) = a∗((i+ x) (mod n)), with payments
txi = t
∗
(i+x) (mod n). Note that none of these deterministic mechanisms are DSIC. However,
each agent has a 1
n
probability of being assigned any particular item, and an agent’s expected















This is constant for each agent, so by Lemma 4.1 the mechanism is truthful in expectation,
allowing the mechanism to correctly calculate (f ∗, t∗).
The mechanism in Example 4.4 is illustrated in Figure 4.1 on a 4-agent/room problem,
with agents’ values presented in Table 4.3 and a total rent of T = $1200. One possible
envy-free assignment and division is to assign Morgan to room 1, Taylor to room 2, Sasha
to room 3 and Alex to room 4, with prices set at $400, $200, $350 and $250, respectively.
Using this mechanism, whenever x = 0 the envy-free outcome is chosen, and this occurs
with probability 1
n
. Apart from special cases, for all other values of x, all agents will be
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Room 1 Room 2 Room 3 Room 4
Morgan $500 $275 $350 $200
Taylor $450 $300 $400 $250
Sasha $350 $300 $450 $300
Alex $300 $250 $300 $350
Table 4.3: Values that agents receive for each of the 4 rooms for an example RARD





























Figure 4.1: Illustration of the simple, stochastic RARD mechanism. An envy-free room
assignment and rent division is calculated (illustrated by matching shading), then all agents
are shifted in the assignment by a random amount.
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envious of their bundle from the envy-free outcome, (a∗, t∗). Thus, for this mechanism
the worst-case pNF =
1
n
, which is an immediate improvement over the bound for DSIC
mechanisms. When x = 0, there are n envy-free agents, while in the worst case, all other
choices of x will have no envy-free agents. This gives a worst-case expected number of
envy-free agents of n · 1
n
+ 0 · n−1
n
= 1 so the worst-case ENF =
1
n
. In this mechanism, all
agents have the same lottery over items and expected payment, so it is ex ante envy-free.
4.4.3 Maximising Probability of Envy-Freeness
A truthful mechanism that guarantees 100% probability of envy-freeness would be optimal
for the three envy-free properties defined in Section 4.1. Unfortunately, this is not possible
for TIE, RARD mechanisms as illustrated in Example 4.5.
Example 4.5. Consider the two agent case and all value profiles such that (v1(1)−v1(2)) >
(v2(1)− v2(2)). In an envy-free outcome agent 1 must always receive item 1, and agent 2
receives item 2, otherwise no envy-free payments exist. In all outcomes, to ensure envy-
freeness, agent 1 requires a payment in the range t1 ∈ [(v2(1) − v2(2)), (v1(1) − v1(2))].
This also means agent 1’s expected payment, t̄1 also lies in this same range. Unless this
expected share is constant, at least one of the two agents can increase its expected utility
by misreporting to reduce this range. However, there is no constant value t1 ∈ [(v2(1) −
v2(2)), (v1(1) − v1(2))], for all cases where (v1(1) − v1(2)) > (v2(1) − v2(2)). Thus, no
truthful in expectation mechanism has pNF = 1 or ENF = 1.
As we saw in Subsection 4.4.1, a non-zero probability of envy-freeness cannot be guaran-
teed for DSIC mechanisms, and we know from Example 4.4, TIE mechanisms can perform
better.
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Conjecture 4.1. A truthful (in expectation) mechanism for the RARD problem with n
agents has a guaranteed probability of envy-freeness of at most 1
n
.
Our belief behind this conjecture is as follows. In our setting with an equal number of
agents and items, an envy-free allocation is an efficient allocation [Alkan et al., 1991]. So,
if a mechanism were capable of envy-freeness with probability p > 1
n
, it would also provide
an efficient allocation with probability at least p.
Using a similar technique to that used by Lavi and Swamy [2011], we can take a truthful
in expectation mechanism and make a deterministic, DSIC “support” mechanism. When
looking at expected utility, we don’t need to consider actual deterministic outcomes, only
the probabilities of being assigned different items and expected payments. Our stochastic
mechanism ∆M̂ has a distribution over allocation functions or, alternatively, a social
choice function that produces a distribution over allocations f̄ : V → ∆A. Similarly,
the expected payments can be captured by an expected payment function t̄ : V → Rn.
Since every deterministic payment function from ∆M̂ is SBB (totalling exactly to T ),
the expected payment function t̄ must also be SBB. So this gives a deterministic, DSIC
and SBB mechanism that chooses outcomes from the space ∆A. An agent’s utility for an
outcome ā ∈ ∆A is the agent’s expected value for that distribution over item assignments.
This expected value is a weighted sum of agents’ values for individual allocations, so this
new value function is an extension to a continuous domain of the original value function,
by interpolating between values for allocations.
Since this support mechanism is DSIC, we know from Theorem 3.3 that f̄ is weakly
monotonic. While this is similar to a social choice function for heterogeneous item alloca-
tion, we cannot immediately apply Theorem 3.5 to show that f̄ must be an affine max-
imiser. However, from our examination of mechanisms for this problem, we conjecture that
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this social choice function must also be an affine maximiser over ∆A (or a distributional
affine maximiser [Dobzinski and Dughmi, 2009] over A). Thus, this support mechanism
is an affine maximiser of the form Equation (3.12) with SBB expected payments as in

















vi (ā∗) + T (4.48)
As discussed in Subsection 3.2.5, achieving SBB through this equality requires the
additional payment functions hi(v−i) to calculate ā∗. This can only be achieved for DSIC
payment functions if ā∗ can be calculated as subproblems on strict subset of agents, i.e.
ignoring or partitioning. While ignoring agents remains the same when the SCF chooses
distributions over allocations, the partitioning approach is slightly different. Optimising
while ignoring a single agent will give a worst-case probability of efficiency of zero, for the
same reasons as Theorem 3.8, since this support mechanism is deterministic and an agent
is ignored deterministically.
In Subsection 3.2.5.2, breaking the allocation up into partitions required that partitions
determine an exact allocation of item to agent. Each subproblem (partition) determined the
allocation of a subset of items and agents, which could then be combined to give a complete
allocation. When calculating ā∗, each partition must operate on a strict subset of agents,
but may only be responsible for a partial allocation of agents’ and items’ probabilities. For
example, one partition may assign agent i to item j with probability 0.2, while a second
partition assigns i to j with probability 0.4. In the final outcome chosen by f̄ , these would
be totalled to give 0.6.
When partitioning, each partition must exclude at least one agent to allow for SBB
payments. Each partition can maximise the probability of choosing the efficient allocation,
110
but excluding all but one agent can cause this partition to miscalculate the efficient alloca-
tion (e.g. value profiles such as Equation (4.15)). Since this single, non-pivotal agent could
be any agent, not known in advance, the probability of efficiency is maximised by having
each agent excluded from a partition with equal probability, requiring at least n partitions.
Items can have their total probabilities divided equally among partitions (that is, each
partition assigns an item with a probability between 0 and 1
n
), as an uneven division will
only harm worst-case behaviour. In the worst case, excluding all but one agent will result
in a new efficient allocation among the remaining agents. In the (n − 1) partitions that
include this single, non-pivotal agent i, this agent will be assigned a different item to the
one it would receive in the efficient allocation. Since each partition assigns probabilities of
each item up to 1
n
, agent i will only get its correct item with probability 1
n
, thus limiting




If this conjecture holds, then this is a tight bound as demonstrated by the simple




some limiting restrictions on what is possible with a strategy-proof mechanism for this
problem. Envy-freeness at a low probability that asymptotically goes to zero means that
most of the time (for worst-case inputs), any truthful mechanism will produce a bad result.
Considering only envy-free outcomes ignores what happens in the remainder of cases. In
the mechanism described above, in the (n− 1) non-envy-free outcomes, every single agent
will be envious. This motivates measuring the quality of each outcome with more detail
than a binary test of envy-freeness.
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4.4.4 Maximising Expected Envy-Freeness
While having all agents envy-free is the ideal outcome, attempting to maximise the prob-
ability of such an outcome can come at the expense of the quality (in terms of level of
envy) of non-envy-free outcomes. For truthful mechanisms, these non-envy-free outcomes
are the most likely, so when comparing mechanisms they should not be ignored.
The above mechanism in Example 4.5, with pNF of
1
n




envy-free agents is 1), as defined in Definition 4.5. This is because there is a 1
n
probability
of n envy-free agents, and 0 envy-free agents otherwise. By this measure alone, this is
equivalent to a mechanism that always has 1 envy-free agent, such as a random (serial)
dictatorship mechanism.
Example 4.6. A random dictatorship mechanism for the RARD mechanism picks an
agent at random and gives that agent its most preferred item along with the maximum
non-negative share of the divisible resource (i.e. max(T, 0)), with the remaining resources
allocated to other agents independently of all agent bids. As the probability of being the
dictator does not depend on reported types, and that dictator gets its most preferred item,
no agent can benefit by misreporting its type. After a dictator is randomly selected, no
agent has an incentive to misreport, so the mechanism is DSIC, while the payments are
ensured to sum to T . The dictator is always envy-free while all other agents will envy the




The maximum expected envy-freeness, ENF , is 1, and this implies that every outcome is
envy-free. However, as shown in Example 4.5, this is not possible for a truthful mechanism.
Conjecture 4.2. A truthful (in expectation) mechanism for the RARD problem with n
agents has an expected envy-freeness of ENF ≤ n−1n +
1
n2
). This happens with an expected




From Conjecture 4.1, the maximum probability of an envy-free outcome is conjectured
to be 1
n
, where there are n envy-free agents. The remaining outcomes, with probability
n−1
n
, can have at most (n−1) envy-free agents (otherwise the outcome would be envy-free).




+ (n− 1)n− 1
n
= n− 1 + 1
n
(4.49)







= 1− n− 1
n2
(4.50)
The pNF was maximised with a fairly simple mechanism, and in the rest of this section
we present mechanisms for maximising the expected number of envy-free agents. The first
is a mechanism that achieves the bound in Conjecture 4.2 for two agents, followed by a
more general mechanism with expected envy-freeness of at least n−1
n
, falling short of the
upper bound by 1
n2
.
4.4.4.1 The 2 Agent Case




can be reached with the following mechanism. Let Ii ∈ Rn denote the point of indiffer-
ence for agent i, which is the division of the divisible resource such that all bundles have
equal value according to agent i. That is, for agent i ∈ N with value profile vi ∈ Vi, the
point of indifference is the solution to the following system of equations:
vi(j) + Ii(j) = vi(k) + Ii(k) ∀j, k ∈M (4.51)∑
j∈M
Ii(j) = T (4.52)
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For two agents, this can be represented as a single value in R, since the divisions must
sum to T , and can be calculated as:




(vi(2)− vi(1) + T )
The RARD mechanism for 2 agents proceeds as follows:
1. Randomly select agent i ∈ N
2. Calculate Ii as in Equation (4.53) and use this to price the two rooms/items (i.e.
price items such that agent i is indifferent)
3. Assign agents to rooms randomly, with equal probability
Independent of reported types, each agent has a 1
2
probability of being assigned each
indivisible resource, and has an constant expected payment:




I1 + (T − I1)
2
+








So, by Lemma 4.1, this mechanism is truthful in expectation. The agent chosen to set
the bundles will be envy-free with either bundle. The other agent will prefer at least one
bundle, so there is a probability of 1
2
this agent will be envious. Thus, with probability
1
2
both agents will be envy-free, and with probability 1
2
one agent (whose value was not






















Thus, based on the conjectured upper bounds for both measures of envy-freeness, the
worst-case behaviour cannot be improved and this mechanism is optimal for n = 2.
A refinement to this mechanism is possible by adding a special condition to improve
non-worst-case behaviour. If both agents each prefer a different item, then both the agents
can be given the items they prefer, with T
2
share of the divisible resource. In this case,
the mechanism will always produce an envy-free outcome. The expected share remains
as T
2
and an agent can only increase its probability of receiving a non-preferred item by
misreporting. Since worst-case behaviour happens when both agents prefer different items,
this refinement does not help worst-case performance.
This mechanism can be compared to the cut-and-choose mechanism from the cake
cutting literature [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brams et al., 2006]. In cake cutting, there
is a single, divisible resource, for which agents can prefer different segments. The cut-
and-choose procedure has one agent divide the cake in such a way that it equally prefers
both slices, then the other agent chooses its most preferred piece. This guarantees envy-
freeness but is not a truthful mechanism. Our RARD mechanism randomly selects an agent
to perform the “cut” that evenly divides the two options from that agent’s perspective.
While cut-and-choose is envy-free, it is not truthful, so the “choose” stage is performed
randomly to ensure truthfulness in the RARD setting.
4.4.4.2 The General Case
For additional agents, we begin with the RandomAuctioneer mechanism of Subsection 4.3.1.
Used as-is, this mechanism can cause a large degree of envy due to the payments trans-
ferred to the ignored agent, as we covered in Subsection 4.4.1. In this section, we add
additional payments that are sufficient to ensure no agent envies the ignored agent, while
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preserving envy-freeness among the non-ignored agents.
The mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. Find the value of the efficient allocation for all agents in N





2. Randomly select agent x ∈ N, with uniform probability over all agents, as the agent
to be ignored
3. Allocate agents N\{x} efficiently ax = arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N\{x} vi(a)
4. Since n = m, there is only a single leftover item, which is then assigned to x
5. Agents make payments according to txi for each agent i 6= x, and txx for agent x, as
















∀i 6= x (4.59)

















The payment for agent x is calculated based on the other agents’ payments to ensure
strong budget balance, i.e. the sum of all payments is equal to T . The payment txi (v)
is made up of three parts. The first two terms (the two summations) in Equation (4.59)
are the VCG payments in an allocation setting with agent x ignored. For this part of the
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payment function, along with the allocation function ax, the mechanism is DSIC so agents
will have no incentive to misreport. Additionally, these VCG mechanisms are known to be
envy-free since agents only receive one item [Leonard, 1983; Cohen et al., 2010], so there
will be no envy between non-ignored agents. The term T
n
is added equally to all agents,
so this will not affect envy or truthfulness. It is added to ensure payments sum to T . The
final term, C̄
n
, is added to ensure no agents are envious of the ignored agent. It is added
equally to all agents, so will not create envy between non-ignored agents.
However, this additional term breaks the incentive-compatibility of the payments, as
C̄ depends on all agents’ reported values. If the choice of x were known prior to reporting
values, all agents (including x) could misreport in order to increase the payment they
receive. When considering expected utility, however, agents have a 1
n
probability of being
the ignored agent and paying (n−1)
n
C̄, while they have an (n−1)
n
probability of receiving C̄
n
.
In expected utility this final term involving C̄ cancels out to zero, meaning the mechanism
remains truthful in expectation. Additionally, if the value of the efficient allocation is at
least T , then all agents will have a non-negative expected utility.
While non-ignored agents are not envious of each other, the pricing must also ensure












Where Cx is the value of the efficient allocation for all agents except x, and Cx−i is the
value of the efficient allocation for all agents except i and x. Agent i is envious of agent x
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if and only if
vi(a
x(i)) + txi (v) < vi(a





















⇒C̄ < vi(ax(x)) + Cx−i +
∑
j∈N\{x}
Cx−j − (n− 1)Cx (4.63)
Since agents have non-negative values for items, we know that Cx ≥ Cx−i. Summing





⇒C̄ ≥ C̄ +
∑
i∈N\{x}
Cx−i − (n− 1)Cx (4.65)
Also, for any agents i, x ∈ N, we have C̄ ≥ Cx ≥ Cx−i + vi(ax(x)). If this did not hold,
then the value of the allocation used for Cx could have been improved by using allocation
ax−i and switching agent i to item a
x(x). Thus we have:
C̄ ≥ vi(ax(x)) + Cx−i +
∑
j∈N\{x}
Cx−j − (n− 1)Cx
This directly contradicts Equation (4.63), so no agent can be envious of the ignored agent,
for any choice of x ∈ N. The non-ignored agents are not envious of each other so there
will be at least (n− 1) envy-free agents in any outcome. This gives a worst-case expected
level of envy-freeness of ENF =
n−1
n
, which falls short of the upper bound by 1
n2
. In the
worst-case, any choice of x leads to x being envious, so pNF = 0.
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Probability of Expected level of
envy-freeness envy-freeness
pNF ENF


























Table 4.4: The bounds on worst-case performance for the RARD problem. The upper
bounds for ENF are not tight, so this shows the range of possible values for the bound. The
2-agent mechanism is optimal on both measures, but does not apply to additional agents.
The non-worst-case inputs can be improved by decreasing the value of C̄ to the smallest
value that always satisfies Equation (4.63). The smallest C̄ that ensures no agent is envious




x(x)) + Cx−i +
∑
j 6=x
Cx−j − (n− 1)Cx (4.66)
However, in the worst-case, the ignored agent x will always be envious, while all other




4.4.5 Overall Upper Bounds
Table 4.4 summarises the worst case bounds for truthful, stochastic mechanisms on the
room assignment–rent division problem. These are according to the measures of proba-
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bility of envy-freeness and expected level of envy-freeness. The upper bounds for ENF
are not tight, so we show the range of possible values for this measure in the worst-case.
While we conjecture that the upper bound on pNF is
1
n
, for TIE mechanisms, this re-
mains as future work to prove this for all TIE mechanisms. The three mechanisms we
present are all truthful in expectation, due to poor performance of DSIC mechanisms we
examined for this problem. The simple RARD mechanism, presented in Example 4.4,
achieves the conjectured worst-case upper bound on pEF , but performs poorly on ENF .
The RandomAuctioneer-based mechanism of Subsection 4.4.4.2 has a much higher ENF ,
but in the worst-case will never produce an envy-free outcome. For the specific setting of
2 agents, we present a mechanism in Subsection 4.4.4.1 that resembles the cut-and-choose
method from cake-cutting, and is optimal according to both measures of envy-freeness.
4.5 Public Good
For the allocation-related settings we examined in this chapter, we saw that achieving the
combination of SBB and DSIC required either ignoring or partitioning agents. We now
examine randomised mechanisms for the single-parameter domain of public goods under
strong budget balance. In the public good setting, the outcome space is binary: either the
public good is purchased, or the agents receive a share of the cost of the project. Because
of this, partitioning doesn’t make sense, since only one partition of agents will be able
to decide the outcome, choosing to purchase or not to purchase. This leaves all other
partitions with no effect on the social choice function and so these agents are effectively
ignored. While it is an open problem whether there exist reasonable mechanisms that are
DSIC and SBB and do not ignore a subset of agents, in this section we focus on mechanisms
that ignore some agents. Recall that the interpretation of the public good problem used in
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this thesis shifts the value function of each agent by T
n
compared to the standard definition,
as has been done in previous work [Guo et al., 2011]. This interpretation ensures that
agents’ have non-negative values and the cost of the public good, T , is exactly covered
when all agents’ payments sum to 0.
4.5.1 Maximising Expected Social Surplus Ratio
Recent work by Guo et al. [2011] characterised a family of SBB, DSIC mechanisms for
the public good problem. This is based on the mechanism developed by Faltings [2005]
and randomly ignores a single agent. The ignored agent, x ∈ N is given a fake bid by
the mechanism. The mechanism acts as though agent x reported this fake bid, and then
has all agents participate in a VCG mechanism to determine whether or not the public
project is undertaken. Since the reported type of agent x was never actually used, any
surplus payment is transferred to agent x, which achieves SBB without harming DSIC.
Mechanisms from this family vary based on how they assign this fake bid, which is denoted
ṽx. The mechanism of Guo et al. [2011], parameterised by c̃ ∈ [0, T ], proceeds as follows:
1. Randomly choose agent x ∈ N to ignore, with uniform probability.
2. Ignore agent x’s reported value, replacing it with ṽx = T − c̃.









4. All agents, including x, make VCG payments for the mechanism with value profile
(ṽx, v−x), with the surplus paid to agent x.
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From the definition of ṽx, the good is purchased if
(T − c̃) +
∑
i∈N\{x}




vi ≥ c̃ (4.69)
Thus, an alternative interpretation of this mechanism is that agent x is ignored, and the
remaining agents participate in a mechanism which has a threshold of c̃.
Setting c̃ = 0 results in a mechanism that always opts to purchase the public good. The
sum of non-ignored agents’ values is always non-negative since all individual values must
be non-negative. It is not necessary to consider mechanisms outside the range c̃ ∈ [0, T ].
Any mechanism with c̃ < 0 will always purchase, so is equivalent to c̃ = 0. If c̃ > T , then
agent x has a negative fake bid. Thus there will be circumstances where the non-ignored
agents’ values (and thus all agents) total more than T , so it is efficient to purchase, but
the fake bid lowers the sum below T and the mechanism does not purchase. A mechanism
with c̃ > T will never choose the efficient outcome when the mechanism with c̃ = T chooses
inefficiently, for any value profile.
Guo et al. [2011] assess mechanisms from this family according to rWCE and find the
optimal mechanism in this family according to this measure.
Theorem 4.2. [Guo et al., 2011]
• Any mechanism from this family with c̃ ∈ [0, n−2




• Any mechanism from this family with c̃ ∈ [n−2




This sets a tight upper bound on rWCE for mechanisms from this family. However the
authors also show that this can be improved by randomising over a set of mechanisms from
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this family. One such randomisation over the parameter x̃, named OPTMIX , they define as
follows:
• With probability 1
n+1
, run mechanism with x̃ = 0 (i.e. always purchase)
• With probability n
n+1
, run mechanism with x̃ = T
This mechanism has rWCE =
n
n+1
, which is the optimal rWCE of all randomisations over
mechanisms of this family. Note that this family does not completely characterise all DSIC,
SBB mechanisms for this problem, so this is not necessarily a tight upper bound on rWCE.
While these mechanisms maximise the expected efficiency, they may not produce the
efficient outcome with the maximum possible probability. We now assess public good
mechanisms according to the alternative measure of efficiency in randomised mechanisms,
pEF . In an iterated scenario, for example, with repeated auctions for different public goods,
we may wish to maximise the expected number of correct purchases, and this is achieved
by maximising pEF .
4.5.2 Maximising Probability of Efficiency
When maximising the probability of an efficient outcome, we are only concerned with the
likelihood that the mechanism makes the right choice – i.e. purchases the public good
when there is sufficient demand, and otherwise returns the cost to the agents. We examine
the family of mechanisms presented in Subsection 4.5.1, which are parameterised by c̃. For
rWCE, there were benefits to randomising over this parameter, and this is also the case
with pEF . We show this by first examining the pEF for mechanisms with a constant c̃.
Theorem 4.3. Any mechanism from this family with c̃ 6= n−1
n
T has a pEF = 0.
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Proof. There are two cases to consider; the first is when c̃ < n−1
n
T . If we have a value




, . . . t
n
), for some value t, the mechanism will choose to purchase
the good when n−1
n
t > c̃. We can set the value t ∈ ( n
n−1 c̃, T ) since
n
n−1 c̃ < T . For this value
profile, the mechanism will always choose to purchase the public good, but since the total
agent value t < T , it is inefficient, so pEF = 0.
The second case is where c̃ < n−1
n





, . . . t
n
) and now the mechanism will choose to not purchase if n−1
n
t < c̃. We can
set the value t ∈ (T, n
n−1 c̃) since
n
n−1 c̃ > T . For this value profile, the mechanism will
never choose to purchase the public good, but since t > T , it is efficient to purchase, so
pEF = 0.
This leaves just one mechanism in this class of mechanisms with a fixed c̃.
Theorem 4.4. The mechanism with c̃ = n−1
n




Proof. First we show that pEF ≥ 1n . Suppose this is not true, which means there exists
some value profile v such that for every choice of ignored agent, it chooses the inefficient
outcome. It cannot have a pEF ∈ (0, 1n) since there are only ever n possible random choices.
Let the total utility for v be t. If t > T then the mechanism should purchase, but it never













⇒t < T (4.72)
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which is a contradiction. Next we suppose t < T , so the mechanism should not purchase,













⇒t > T (4.75)
which is also a contradiction. This means no counterexample exists, so the mechanism
cannot have pEF = 0 and thus must have pEF ≥ 1n .
Now to show pEF ≤ 1n , consider the value profile v = (
n−0.5
n
T, 0, 0, . . . , 0). The total
utility is less than T so the mechanism should never purchase the public good. Unless the
first agent is ignored, which happens with probability 1
n





T so the mechanism will purchase with probability n−1
n
. Thus the




For mechanisms with constant c̃, the optimal pEF of
1
n
is achieved by setting c̃ = n−1
n
T .
By Theorem 4.2, since c̃ > n−2




, among mechanisms with constant c̃. Just as with rWCE, we can improve pEF
by using a random c̃.
We now examine mechanisms that randomise over the parameter c̃, starting with the
OPTMIX mechanism of Guo et al. [2011], which we discussed in Subsection 4.5.1. Of the
family of mechanisms that ignore an agent and assign it a random bid, this mechanism
achieved the optimal rWCE,
Theorem 4.5. OPTMIX has a worst-case pEF ≤ 1n+1 .
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, . . . T
n
), where
0 < ε < T
n
. The total of agents’ values is T + ε, thus it is efficient to purchase the good.
However, for any ignored agent, the total observed utility is at most T n−1
n
+ε < T , meaning
the mechanism with x̃ = T will never purchase. Thus, the mechanism will only purchase
the good when it uses c̃ = 0, which it does with probability 1
n+1
. This gives a pEF =
1
n+1
for this value profile, and thus an upper bound for this mechanism.




, outperforming OPTMIX on this measure. A mechanism simply chooses to purchase
with probability 1
2
without any payment or examining agents’ types. This is trivially DSIC
since no agent can affect the outcome, and since there are no payments it is SBB. Except for
special cases when the total of agents’ values for the public good is precisely T (making both
outcomes efficient), this mechanism will always pick the efficient outcome with probability
1
2
. Unfortunately, it has a sub-optimal rWCE =
1
2
. When it chooses the efficient outcome,
it is guaranteed to achieve a ratio of 1 since payments are budget balanced, so rWCE ≥ 12
for all value profiles. However, if all agents have a value of (near) zero, when the good is







We can improve this non-worst-case performance by modifying OPTMIX to give the
following mechanism, which we name 50-50MIX :
• With probability 1
2
, run mechanism with x̃ = 0 (i.e. always purchase)
• With probability 1
2
, run mechanism with x̃ = T
This still has a worst-case pEF =
1
2
, but it is possible to purchase with probability up to





as well. Any SBB mechanism must have a rWCE ≥ pEF , since an efficient
outcome gives a ratio of 1, and that happens with probability pEF . Thus, 50-50MIX has
rWCE ≥ 12 . However, in this case where all agents’ values are zero for the public good,
then with probability 1
2
, the mechanism will purchase the public good, giving a ratio of 0,




While this pEF =
1
2
of the 50-50MIX mechanism is not necessarily the optimal mech-
anism according to worst-case pEF , the upper bound on worst-case pEF for this family of
mechanisms approaches 1
2
as the number of agents increases.
Theorem 4.6. For the public good problem any mechanism that randomises over the choice
of c̃ has a worst-case pEF ≤ 12 +
1
4n−2 .
Proof. First, we consider the value profile v = (T − ε, 0, 0, . . . , 0), for some infinitesimal
ε > 0. The efficient outcome is not to purchase, however, any mechanism with c̃ < T − ε
will purchase with probability n−1
n
. Thus, for any mechanism that randomises over c̃ we
have:
pEF ≤ Pr(c̃ = T ) +
1
n
Pr(c̃ ∈ (0, T )) (4.76)




, . . . T
n
), where the efficiency outcome is to
purchase the good. However, any mechanism with c̃ > n−1
n
will never purchase. Thus, for
any mechanism that randomises over c̃ we have:




If we let pT = Pr(c̃ = T ), then we have:
pEF ≤ pT +
1
n
(1− pT ) (4.78)
pEF ≤ (1− pT ) (4.79)
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Table 4.5: The bounds on worst-case performance for the two efficiency measures as
achieved by the RandomAuctioneer mechanisms on the public good problem. Mechanisms
within this family are parameterised by c̃, which itself can be selected according to some
distribution.











4.5.3 Summary of Public Good Mechanisms
While we do not explore the full space of DSIC and SBB stochastic mechanisms for the
public good problem, we see that randomisation offers improvements over deterministic
mechanisms for this problem. There exists no deterministic DSIC and SBB mechanism for
the public good problem. By using the family of RandomAuctioneer-based mechanisms
proposed by Guo et al. [2011], we are able to achieve a truthful and strongly budget
balanced public good mechanism. The choice of optimal mechanism from this family
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depends on whether the mechanism designer wishes to maximise the expected social surplus
ratio, rWCE, or the probability of efficiency, pEF , as summarised in Table 4.5.
4.6 Summary
In Chapter 3, we saw that the constraints of our social choice problems introduced in
Chapter 2 led to poor worst-case behaviour. This motivated us to examine mechanisms
in this chapter that use randomisation to improve the worst-case performance of these
mechanisms. The worst-case performance is summarised in Table 4.6.
The measures of efficiency and envy-freeness we used for deterministic mechanisms do
not adequately compare stochastic mechanisms. In Section 4.1 we introduce and discuss
the measures we use to assess the mechanisms in this chapter. These measures are moti-
vated by measures used to evaluate stochastic algorithms. When applied to deterministic
mechanisms, these measures correspond to measures we used to assess purely deterministic
mechanisms. These measures guide the mechanism designer in the selection of the optimal
mechanism, and allow the comparison between deterministic and stochastic solutions.
We present and assess randomised mechanisms for each of our three social choice prob-
lems. These mechanisms are based on techniques of randomly ignoring a subset of agents,
or randomly partitioning agents into disjoint groups. For heterogeneous item allocation,
we use the characterisation of DSIC and SBB mechanisms satisfying independence, in-
troduced in Subsection 3.2.4, to show that these new stochastic mechanisms are optimal
among DSIC and SBB mechanisms in the class of affine maximisers. We conjecture that
relaxing the independence constraint will not improve worst-case performance.
We examined similar mechanisms for the room assignment–rent division problem, with
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the goal of envy-freeness. Since stochastic affine-maximising DSIC mechanisms for RARD
still suffer from poor worst-case performance, we examine mechanisms that are truthful in
expectation. TIE is an alternative generalisation of truthfulness to randomised settings,
and we saw better worst-case performance from these RARD mechanisms. We presented
upper bounds on our randomised envy-freeness measures for truthful mechanisms. The
TIE mechanisms we presented show that this truthfulness constraint can give improved
worst-case performance over DSIC mechanisms.
Finally, we applied the technique of randomly ignoring agents to the public good prob-
lem. We discussed previous work that has provided optimal mechanisms within this family
of stochastic mechanisms according to expected social surplus ratio. Building on this work,
we assessed mechanisms from this family according to the probability of an efficient out-
come. While we did not examine the full space of stochastic, truthful mechanisms for the
public good problem, we demonstrated how stochastic mechanisms, just as in the other
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pEF rWCE









Probability of Expected level of
envy-freeness envy-freeness
pNF ENF





















































Table 4.6: Summary of worst-case bounds for stochastic mechanisms on each of the social
choice problems. Note that RandomAuctioneer achieves the upper bound on both measures
for heterogeneous item allocation.
131
Chapter 5
Empirical Results and Complexity
In this chapter, we provide empirical results to complement the theoretical worst-case
results presented in the previous chapters. Firstly, we measure the average-case perfor-
mance of various mechanisms according to randomly generated value profiles. Although
the mechanism designer may not know the distribution of agents’ types in advance, this
analysis provides insight into the rarity of the worst-case behaviour. A mechanism with
poor worst-case performance may perform well on all but an infinitesimal subset of value
profiles, for example. For these empirical tests we use a uniform distribution over possible
value profiles to obtain a more general result for this rarity of worst-case profiles. With no
prior information about agents’ types, a uniform distribution assumes each value profile is
equally likely, while a non-uniform distribution gives results for some specific domain.
While in previous chapters we specified that strong budget balance was a hard con-
straint for our social choice problems, we also show, empirically, that this constraint can
yield higher overall social welfare than mechanisms that enforce an efficiency constraint
but allow budget imbalance. We argue that, for the goal of maximising utility, strong
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budget balance should be considered even if the setting does not require it.
Next we show the trade-off between efficiency and communication or computational
complexity provided by the budget-balancing techniques of IgnoreAgents, introduced in
Subsection 3.2.5.1, and PartitionAgents, introduced in Subsection 3.2.5.2. While these
techniques were used to enable DSIC under SBB constraints, they reduce the information
required by the mechanism to determine outcomes and payments. Since knowledge of
the random choice does not affect the truthfulness guarantees in DSIC mechanisms, the
mechanism can request less information from the set of agents, or from a subset of agents.
This also reduces the size of the optimisation problem that the mechanism needs to perform
in order to determine outcomes and payments. We show that the partitioning approach
offers a flexible trade-off between efficiency and both communication and computational
complexity.
5.1 Average Case Performance
A question raised by Cavallo [2006] and Gujar and Yadati [2011] asks whether it is worth
considering sophisticated mechanisms with optimal worst-case performance when simple
mechanisms perform well, or even better, in the average case. Worst-case analysis shows
how a single, bad value profile performs, and may not give any indication of how the
mechanism usually behaves. In work such as Faltings [2005], mechanisms are assessed by
their average performance on some distribution of value profiles. An average case analysis
requires some distribution over agents’ types, such as a uniform distribution over some
subset of the space of value profiles. In Chapter 4, where we provide worst-case bounds on
the measures we used to compare randomised mechanisms, we assume such a distribution
is not known in advance. If prior information over the distribution of value profiles is
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not known, worst-case results provide a guarantee that, regardless of the distribution of
agent types, we will achieve at least this level of performance. This guarantee holds even
against adversarially-chosen distributions. For example, a mechanism that performs very
well according to an average case analysis on uniformly distributed value profiles may
perform very poorly on highly correlated value profiles.
Nevertheless, an average case analysis does provide useful information in addition to
worst-case results by showing the “rarity” of value profiles that cause the mechanism to hit
its worst-case bound. Average case results can reveal whether the worst-case performance
occurs with most value profiles, or if it only occurs in some rare, special circumstances.
Further, mechanisms that have optimal worst-case performance may under-perform other
mechanisms for most value profiles. We show an example of this in the RARD problem,
where the worst-case optimal mechanism always achieves its worst-case level of perfor-
mance; however, another mechanism with a lower worst-case guarantee generally performs
much better, even though in some rare cases it has poor performance.
To demonstrate and compare the average case performance of our mechanisms em-
pirically, we generate random value profiles from uniform distributions over a particular
subset and assess the average probability of efficiency and average expected social surplus
ratio (or, for RARD, average pNF and ENF ). Since these results are not for a specific
setting, a uniform distribution is the most appropriate to explore the average behaviour of
a mechanism over the full space of value profiles. To clarify how we aggregate the results of
these empirical tests, for a particular mechanism and problem we generate a set of random
value profiles, drawn uniformly and independently from a subset of V . For each value
profile in this randomly chosen set, we calculate that value profile’s pEF and rWCE (or pNF
and ENF ). After calculating for every value profile in the generated set, we calculate the
average for each of these measures.
134
We should point out that these mechanisms were designed for optimal guaranteed be-
haviour with no prior knowledge over the distribution of agents’ types. If such a distribution
is known, we can leverage this information to improve on these guarantees. For example,
consider the RandomAuctioneer mechanism that randomly ignores a single agent; if we
know in advance that agent i typically has the lowest values for all items, by ignoring i
with a higher probability we get a higher average-case expected social surplus ratio.
5.1.1 Heterogeneous Item Allocation
As shown in Section 4.3, the optimal worst-case performance for both pEF and rWCE under
our constraints was achieved by the RandomAuctioneer mechanism. This randomly selects
a single agent whose reported type is ignored, and this agent receives the surplus generated
by a VCG mechanism conducted by the other agents. We demonstrate in this section the
average case performance for increasing numbers of agents or items, where agents’ types
are drawn from a uniform distribution. In particular, we show that the average case pEF
and rWCE converge to 1. This converges much faster than the worst-case bound, with
the exception of pEF when n ≥ m + 1. This convergence to 1 shows that, for increasing
problem sizes, most value profiles will lead to a near-optimal solution.
For our empirical tests, we have a uniform distribution over all value profiles having
values in the range vi(j) ∈ [0, 1]. All agents’ values for items are generated independently.
Given that we don’t have a unit for agents’ values, limiting all values to the range [0, 1]
is arbitrary, and will give the same average case performance regardless of the (strictly
positive) upper bound on the range.
The results in Figure 5.1 show the average case pEF for various combinations of n and m.














































Figure 5.1: Average case probability of efficiency for the RandomAuctioneer mechanism
for heterogeneous item allocation with an increasing number of agents or items.
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generated value profiles. We observed that when n ≥ m+ 1, the probability of an efficient








for any fixed n or m. This is also the minimum worst-case performance, according to
Equation (4.16). In these settings, where we have no surplus items for the ignored agent,
the worst-case pEF is what is likely to be seen for any set of agents, regardless of the
distribution of agents’ types. Analysing this result, we see that this is unsurprising. To
improve on the worst-case bound when n > m, at least one agent i who is unallocated in
the efficient allocation must have the exact same utility for the item that agent j receives
in the efficient allocation. Otherwise, whenever an agent with an item in the efficient
allocation is ignored, it will be replaced by an agent with a strictly lower value. Since
we generate values from an effectively continuous domain, the probability of such a value
profile is zero.
When we have n ≤ m, on the other hand, the average pEF was much higher than the
bound of 1
n
, approaching 1 as the number of items increases. This is in direct contrast to
the worst-case bound, which is constant as the number of items increases. In every set
of trials with n ≤ m, we observed value profiles that both matched the bound, as well as
those that had pEF = 1. Thus we see that while worst-case value profiles still occur, they
become less likely as the number of items increases. The distribution of agents’ types will
have a much larger influence on average case pEF when n ≤ m compared to when n > m.
Next, in Figure 5.2 we show the average case rWCE for the RandomAuctioneer mech-
anism. These results are from the same set of value profiles used to generate the plots in
Figure 5.1, so again we have 10 million trials for each value of n and m. Here we see that
the average expected social surplus ratio rapidly approaches 1 as the number of agents or

















































Figure 5.2: Average case expected social surplus ratio for the RandomAuctioneer mech-




, as shown in Equation (4.18). However, we only observed value profiles that gave a
rWCE = 1 when n ≤ m. As with pEF , the lowest average rWCE for a fixed n or fixed m
occurs when n = m + 1, but unlike pEF , this increases as n or m increase. From these
results we can see that profiles giving the worst-case performance are uncommon, so the
average case rWCE can be much higher, depending on the distribution of agents’ types.
5.1.2 Room Assignment–Rent Division
For the room assignment–rent division problem, we presented two randomised, truthful
mechanisms that work with any number of agents n ≥ 2. These mechanisms are the pNF
maximising mechanism in Example 4.4 of Subsection 4.4.2, and the RandomAuctioneer-
based mechanism presented in Subsection 4.4.4.2. We tested both these mechanisms em-
pirically to determine the average case pNF and ENF , using value profiles generated with
uniform probability. That is, for any agent i and item j, vi(j) is drawn uniformly from the
range [0, 1].
In Figure 5.3, we look at the pNF for RARD mechanisms. Although the mechanism
based on RandomAuctioneer has a worst-case pNF = 0, we see that the average-case pNF
stays higher than even the optimal worst-case bound of pNF =
1
n
. Both this average-
case and worst-case approach zero as the number of agents increase. Our trials on the
pNF maximising mechanism, which has the optimal worst-case pNF within the class of
mechanisms we explored, had an average-case that matched the worst-case bound (shown




This shows that while the pNF -maximising mechanism has a higher worst-case bound, its
average-case performance matches this bound, so if agents are drawn from a sufficiently























Figure 5.3: Average case pNF for a RandomAuctioneer RARD mechanism, and worst-
case upper bound. Also shown is the probability of deterministic envy-freeness, where value
profile gives an envy-free outcome regardless of the random choice.
will outperform it in the average case.
Also shown in Figure 5.3 is the fraction of value profiles that give deterministic envy-
freeness under RandomAuctioneer. That is, regardless of the random choice that deter-
mines which agent becomes the auctioneer, all agents will be envy-free. We found that
this probability of deterministic envy-freeness for value profiles generated with uniform
probability, while non-zero, rapidly approaches zero with additional agents.
The mechanism described in Subsection 4.4.4.2, which attempts to maximise the worst-
case ENF , does not meet the conjectural upper bound for either ENF
1 or pNF . While (n−1)
























Figure 5.4: Average case ENF for a RandomAuctioneer RARD mechanism, along with
the worst-case performance for this mechanism (lower bound) and the upper bound on ENF .
agents are guaranteed to be envy-free, the ignored agent may be envious for all choices
of ignored agent. We tested both of our stochastic RARD mechanisms using the same




for all value profiles tests, matching its worst-case bound, so it is greatly outper-
formed both in worst- and average-case performance by RandomAuctioneer. In Figure 5.4,
we compare the average-case ENF of RandomAuctioneer to its worst-case bound (lower
bound), and the upper bound on worst-case performance provided by Conjecture 4.2. All
three measures approach one with increased agents, and we see that the average-case per-
























Suboptimal RandomAuctioneer RARD Value Profiles
Figure 5.5: Fraction of randomly generated value profiles that give a pNF (or ENF ) less
than the worst-case upper bound in RandomAuctioneer.
performs sub-optimally in the worst-case, value profiles that lead to the suboptimal be-
haviour may not be common.
Since, for values of n > 2, the RandomAuctioneer mechanism has a worst-case bound
below the conjectured upper bounds for both pNF and ENF , we examined the fraction of








. Since the only agent that can be
envious is the auctioneer agent, the only value profiles that satisfy these conditions (and
thus fall below the upper bound) are those where any random auctioneer will be envious.
When n = 2, all value profiles meet or exceeded the upper bound for both pNF and ENF .
When n > 2, the fraction of randomly generated profiles falling below the upper bound
(having the auctioneer always envious) is consistently below 1
3
, and decreases as n increases,
142
which we show in Figure 5.5. This suggests that the majority of value profiles lead to a
performance that falls within the optimal bound for these two measures. The fraction of
value profiles that do achieve the bound, increases with additional agents. However, there
is still a significant fraction of profiles for which this mechanism falls short of this bound.
Thus, these worst-case profiles are not rare, special cases so there is potential improvement
if the upper bound is tight.
5.1.3 Public Good
In our average-case tests of public good mechanisms, we examined average pEF and rWCE
for mechanisms with fixed c̃ ∈ {0, n−1
n
T, T}, along with the OPTMIX and 50-50MIX mecha-
nisms. We found that while randomising over the value of c̃ helps the worst-case perfor-
mance (see Section 4.5), average case performance is maximised with a constant c̃. For
these tests, we use value profiles drawn from a uniform distribution with one of two possible
ranges. First, the range vi ∈ [0, 2Tn ], which means that with probability 0.5, the efficient
outcome will be to purchase the good2. Next, to sample a set of agents that are more
likely than not to want the public good, we draw agents’ values uniformly from the range
vi ∈ [0, 2Tn−1 ]. Since the mechanisms are independent of the scale of agents’ values, for
simplicity and without loss of generality we set T = 1. For each value of n we generated
10 million random value profiles to calculate the average performance.
When we measure pEF , the only mechanism with a non-zero worst case pEF for con-
stant c̃ has c̃ = n−1
n
T , while the 50-50MIX mechanism had the highest worst-case pEF of
the mechanisms we considered. As shown in Figure 5.6, when looking at average case per-
2The sum of n independent, random values, each with a uniform distribution between 0 and c, follows














































Figure 5.6: Average-case probability of efficiency for the public good problem, with T = 1.
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formance, the mechanisms OPTMIX and 50-50MIX have a performance that lies between the
performance of the two mechanisms they randomise over, namely c̃ = 0 and c̃ = 1. Indeed,
any mechanism that randomises over the value of c̃ will have an average-case performance
that is a probability-weighted sum of the average performance of the underlying constant-c̃
mechanisms. Since the benefits of randomising over c̃ disappear in the average-case, the
best average-case performance comes from a mechanism with constant c̃. Figure 5.6 shows
that this is typically c̃ = n−1
n
T , unless there is a high probability of the efficient outcome
being to purchase. Note that since c̃ = 0 always builds, the pEF for this mechanism reveals
the probability that the particular distribution of agents has an efficient outcome where
the good is purchased.
For average-case rWCE, shown in Figure 5.7, again we see that those mechanisms with
a constant c̃ outperform those that randomise over c̃. The ratio quickly approaches 1 as
the number of agents increases, so with a large enough set of agents, there is a very minor
loss of efficiency due to randomisation. As we show in Section 5.2, this loss of efficiency is
often more than compensated by the lack of budget imbalance.
5.2 Efficiency versus Strong Budget Balance
In this work, we have focussed on mechanisms which have strong budget balance as a
constraint. This constraint may be due to actual restrictions where surplus payments
cannot be collected or destroyed. Alternatively, strong budget balance can be enforced to
prevent utility loss from the set of agents. As we showed in Chapter 3, DSIC mechanisms
cannot be simultaneously efficient and SBB, so a mechanism designer must choose between
these properties. While an efficient allocation maximises the collective utility of the agents






























































Figure 5.7: Average-case expected ratio for the public good problem, with T = 1.
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this collective utility. In this section, we present empirical results comparing the expected
ratio of our SBB mechanisms to the VCG mechanism, which is perhaps the most well
known efficient and DSIC mechanism. For heterogeneous item allocation with n ≤ m+ 1,
VCG provides the optimal worst-case ratio (zero) for DSIC, efficient mechanisms [Gujar
and Yadati, 2011; Guo, 2012], while redistribution mechanisms offer improvements when
n > m+ 1.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the comparison between RandomAuctioneer and VCG on the
heterogeneous item allocation problem with a fixed number of items (m = 4) or fixed
number of agents (n = 4). Since VCG is always efficient (pEF = 1) we compare based on
rWCE. We found that in all settings, RandomAuctioneer provided a higher average rWCE
compared to VCG. When applied to a deterministic mechanism, rWCE is the normal social
surplus ratio. However, this difference becomes much more pronounced as the number of
agents increases relative to the number of items. With additional agents, the payments
made under the VCG approach the value of the allocated items, on average, which lowers
the overall ratio. Under RandomAuctioneer, with additional agents, those agents who
should be allocated in the efficient allocation are less likely to be ignored, and when they
are, it is more likely that the chosen allocation has a close value to the efficient allocation.
We found a similar, but less pronounced result for the public good problem. In the
top plot of Figure 5.9, we use a uniform distribution, as above, and this shows the average
ratio converges to 1 much faster using a randomised SBB mechanism compared to VCG.
While in all other tests we use a uniform distribution of agents’ types, we perform a test
with the public good problem on a non-uniform distribution to demonstrate the higher
worst-case bound of the stochastic mechanisms. If agents’ values come from a distribution
where a single agent tends to have most (in our tests, 95%) of the total utility, then the









































rWCE for Allocation of 4 Items to Uniform Agents
RandomAuctioneer
VCG
Figure 5.8: Comparison of average-case rWCE between the strongly budget balanced, but














































Figure 5.9: Comparison of average-case rWCE between the strongly budget balanced Public
Good mechanism with c̃ = n−1
n
, and the efficient VCG mechanism.
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randomised mechanism with c̃ = n−1
n
has a ratio approaching 1. For these tests, shown in
bottom plot of Figure 5.9, a value profile is generated such that all agents’ values are from
a uniformly distribution as before, then agents’ values are scaled by positive factors such
that 95% of the total utility is attributed to a single agent. The median total utility for
this distribution remains at T .
The results in this section demonstrate that sacrificing a guarantee of allocative effi-
ciency does not go against the goal of maximising overall agent utility. Intuitively, it may
seem that the best way to achieve the highest overall agent utility is to choose a mechanism
that always picks the outcome giving the highest overall agent utility (i.e. a Groves mech-
anism). However, the payments required for both DSIC and allocative efficiency can result
in a large utility loss for the group of agents. Thus, an inefficient mechanism, perhaps
surprisingly, can give a better overall utility than an efficient mechanism.
5.3 Communication Complexity
A potentially beneficial side effect of randomisation is a reduction in the communication
and computational complexity of the mechanism. If an agent is ignored, the mechanism
does not need this agent to report its type in order to determine the allocation. Under item
allocation with surplus items, the ignored agent need only report its value for the remaining
items, which will be strictly less than the m values it would have to report in a Groves
mechanism. Similarly, with a partitioning approach, the mechanism only requires an agent
to report its value for items in its own partition. Agents may be able to determine which
random choice was made (i.e. which agents were ignored or which partitions were chosen)
by observing the queries the mechanism makes. However, since we use DSIC mechanisms,
revealing the random choice will not harm the truthfulness of the mechanism. In this
150
section, to demonstrate this potential benefit, we show the trade-off between high rWCE
and low communication complexity that the partitioning technique facilitates.
Consider a mechanism that allocates m heterogeneous items to n unit-demand agents.
Each agent’s type consists of m values, one for each item. Thus, a Groves or VCG mech-
anism would require nm values be communicated in order to calculate the allocation and
payments. Ignoring k agents can linearly reduce the number of values that need to be
communicated to the centre, since only a subset of the n agents need to report their m
values for each item. If n − k ≥ m, the mechanism only needs (n − k)m values to be
reported, since there are no surplus items left over for the ignored agents to choose from.
Partitioning agents, on the other hand, requires each agent to report its value only
for items within its own partition. For a partitioning mechanism with k ≥ 2 partitions,
where partition q contains nq agents and mq items, the number of values that need to be




Given that a Groves mechanism requires the full value profile, consisting of nm values, the






Observe that this precisely matches the upper bound on rWCE for partitioning mechanisms
presented in Equation (4.34) of Subsection 4.3.4.2. Thus, using partitioning to reduce the
communication complexity by a factor of α places an upper bound on the worst-case rWCE
of α.
If we have n and m both divisible by k, then having k equal-sized partitions means the
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That is, the mechanism requires 1
k
of the complete value profile, as needed by a Groves
mechanism. While the number of values is slightly higher when n or m is not divisible by
k, the difference decreases as n, m or k increase.
From Equations (4.3.4.2) and (5.1) we know that increasing the number of partitions
decrease communication complexity but at the cost of reduced worst-case efficiency. To
demonstrate the trade-off between communication complexity and average-case efficiency,
we performed empirical tests on heterogeneous item allocation under increasing numbers
of partitions. For these tests we examined the case where n = m and partitioned agents





items. By way of comparison, we also generated the average-case rWCE for both the
RandomAuctioneer and VCG mechanisms.
In Figure 5.10 we show the average-case rWCE using between 2 and 5 partitions, com-
pared to the RandomAuctioneer and VCG mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, with additional
partitions, the average-case ratio decreases, but not as dramatically as the worst-case bound
would suggest. Using 4 partitions, for example, does not have half the average ratio as
compared to using 2 partitions. The loss of rWCE with additional partitions also decreases
as the problem size increases, while larger problem sizes would see a larger benefit from
reduced communication complexity. With large enough problem size, the partitioning ap-
proaches even exceed the average performance of the VCG mechanism due to the budget
imbalance of VCG. However, due to the inefficiency of partitioning, it is always outper-
formed by the SBB mechanism RandomAuctioneer. This shows that if communication is



























Figure 5.10: Average-case rWCE for partitioning mechanisms, with different numbers
of partitions, for the heterogeneous item allocation problem. These are compared to the
RandomAuctioneer and VCG mechanisms.
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whereby partitions can lower the communication cost at the expense of social surplus ratio.
Also, if communication is slow or unreliable, a partitioning approach allows a mechanism
to iteratively use fewer and fewer partitions as it receives more values. With many parti-
tions initially, the mechanism does not require many (or any if k = min(m+1, n)) reported
values. This allows a preliminary solution to be generated before the complete value profile
is received. However, as more values are received, the mechanism can use fewer partitions
to achieve a higher rWCE.
This tradeoff is related to work on expressiveness in mechanisms presented by Benisch
et al. [2008] and more recent work [Dütting et al., 2011a; Dütting et al., 2011b; Caragiannis
et al., 2011; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2012]. The expressiveness of a mechanism captures
how well an agent’s reported type can influence the outcome chosen by a mechanism that
seeks to find a efficient outcome. In settings such as combinatorial auctions, an agent’s
type assigns a value for all possible combinations of items. The information requested by
a mechanism that is not fully expressive may prevent an agent from being able to report a
difference in utility between two possible combinations. For example, if our heterogeneous
item allocation mechanisms were used for a combinatorial auction setting, since agents can
only report values for individual items, they are unable to express any synergistic effects of
receiving multiple items. Work on expressiveness defines formal measures of expressiveness
in various settings. Similar to the work we presented in this section, previous work has
shown a tradeoff between the expressiveness of a mechanism and its efficiency. Unlike
(expected) social surplus ratio, this efficiency does not consider payments made by agents,
so loss of efficiency is measured by the loss of utility due to inefficient allocation and
not budget imbalance. Also, we measure the communication requirement in terms of the
number of values requested by the mechanism. As noted by Benisch et al. [2008], this
measurement may not be appropriate for a purely theoretical analysis, since Cantor [1874]
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showed there exists a one-to-one mapping from Rn to R, and so, theoretically, all multi-
dimensional types can be expressed as a single real number. From a practical viewpoint,
our measure captures the number of values that need to be transmitted to the mechanism.
The amount of information transmitted will be directly proportional to the number of
values, and the information used to encode each value.
5.4 Computational Complexity
Just as partitioning can lower communication complexity with an increased number of
partitions (see Section 5.3), the same scheme can be used to flexibly improve the compu-
tational complexity of a mechanism. For the allocation of heterogeneous items, a DSIC
mechanism must, in general, solve an affine maximisation to determine the appropriate
assignment of items to agents. The payment functions may require additional assignment
calculations, such as the VCG mechanism and our stochastic mechanisms. These payment
functions calculate the value of allocations on subsets of agents.
Finding the assignment of m items to n agents can be solved in polynomial time us-
ing algorithms such as the Hungarian method [Kuhn, 1955; Edmonds and Karp, 1972;
Bertsekas, 1981]. The Hungarian method can solve the required affine maximisation to
determine the allocation in O(max(n,m)3). While more efficient techniques may exist, the
complexity will be at least Θ(nm), since this is the number of agents’ values.
By partitioning (or ignoring) agents, we reduce the size of the allocations that need
to be calculated, and thus reduce the overall complexity. We consider the heterogeneous
item allocation setting with n = m, as we examined in Section 5.3. Using the Hungarian
algorithm to find an allocation for this setting has a run-time of O(n3). However, if we














This can potentially reduce the run-time of the allocation to a factor of 1
k2
of the run-time
for finding an efficient allocation. Even if an allocation algorithm had run time of Θ(nm),
the run-time would be reduced to 1
k
of the time required to find an efficient allocation.
While additional partitions result in lower rWCE, the average-case, as illustrated in
Figure 5.10, suffers a smaller loss as the problem size increases. Just as with communication
complexity, if computational complexity is a significant concern to the mechanism designer,
especially for large problem sizes, then partitioning offers a flexible trade-off between high
allocative efficiency and low computational complexity. It also allows for solutions with
lower rWCE to be calculated quickly, before the mechanism finds an allocation with fewer
partitions. This allows a mechanism to produce a DSIC, SBB allocation at any time, but
with improved rWCE the more time it is allowed to run. Such an “anytime mechanism” is
closely related to anytime algorithms [Zilberstein and Russell, 1995; Zilberstein, 1996]
from the algorithm design literature. An anytime algorithm can be stopped at any time
and provide a solution, however the solution improves as the algorithm is allowed more
time to run. This is in contrast to a traditional, contract algorithm, which runs until a
complete solution is found, and may not provide any useful solution if stopped early.
5.5 Summary
We showed, through empirical results, the average case performance of various mecha-
nisms on our three social choice problems. By using a uniform distribution of agents’ value
profiles, we demonstrated the rarity of value profiles that lead to worst-case behaviour.
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Typically, our stochastic mechanisms outperformed their worst-case bounds, with perfor-
mance on all measures approaching the optimal value of one as problem sizes increased.
The main exception was the pEF in heterogeneous item allocation with n ≥ m+1, where the




Our three settings required the mechanism to strongly budget balance all payments.
Our empirical results showed that, even if SBB is optional, a mechanism designer can
potentially achieve higher overall agent utility by enforcing SBB rather than enforcing
allocative efficiency.
Next, we demonstrated that the IgnoreAgents and PartitionAgents techniques can
be used to improve communication and computational complexity of a mechanism. Ran-
domly partitioning provides a flexible trade-off between complexity and outcome quality.
With additional partitions, less information is required from the agents, and the mechanism
can calculate an outcome in less time. This does not harm the DSIC or SBB guarantees
of the mechanism. We showed that increasing the number of partitions greatly lowers the
worst-case bound of the mechanism for rWCE in the heterogeneous item allocation problem,
but found that losses were much lower in the average case. As the problem size increases,
the average-case loss of rWCE due to additional partitions decreases. In these larger prob-





In this work, we examined randomised approaches to the design of mechanisms for prob-
lems in computational social choice in order to overcome game theoretic and computational
issues. In addition to novel mechanisms and characterisations, we discussed measurements
appropriate for randomised mechanisms that facilitate the comparison between such mech-
anisms, and the comparison to deterministic mechanisms. Our techniques were developed
primarily to improve the quality of the outcome produced by the mechanism, but we also
showed how these techniques can flexibly lower the computational and communication
demands of a mechanism. We provided empirical results of average-case performance to
complement our theoretical worst-case analysis.
While computational social choice spans a wide domain of problems from voting on
a single winner, to fair division of a cake [Chevaleyre et al., 2007; Brandt et al., 2012],
the main focus of this work is on problems of multiagent resource allocation. The first
problem is the allocation of heterogeneous items to a group of agents, such that each agent
receives (or desires to receive) at most one item. The goal of this allocation procedure is to
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maximise the aggregate utility of the participants. We also examine the room assignment–
rent division problem, which also deals with allocating heterogeneous resources, but we
are instead concerned with minimising envy between agents. Finally we look at the public
good problem, where agents make a collective decision on whether to pay for some publicly
owned resource, the benefits of which can be enjoyed by all participants.
Since agents can misreport their true preferences to manipulate the outcome of the de-
cision making process, we enforce truthfulness, through either dominant strategy incentive
compatibility, or the weaker requirement of truthfulness in expectation. As these problems
occur without an explicit “auctioneer” or external funding source, the group of agents can-
not expect to receive arbitrary money to participate in the auction, neither do they have
a residual claimant to receive any surplus payments generated by the auction. Thus, the
allocation procedures are required to satisfy strong budget balance.
In this work, we described the set of possible mechanisms that are DSIC for the problem
of allocating heterogeneous items to agents with unit demand, under an independence
constraint. This focussed our attention on (multi-round) affine-maximising social choice
functions. We further characterised mechanisms that are DSIC, strongly budget balanced
and satisfy independence. From these results, we arrived at two techniques to achieve
truthfulness in a strongly budget balanced setting. The first technique is to ignore the
reported types of some subset of agents, having these agents absorb any budget imbalance.
With the ignored agent chosen randomly, we name this the RandomAuctioneer mechanism,
since an ignored agent effectively becomes the auctioneer, collecting payments from the
agents and being given the choice of any left-over item. Alternatively, the agents can be
partitioned into disjoint groups, each solving a sub-problem of the overall social choice
problem. Any surplus generated by a particular partition can be absorbed by one or more
other partitions. We found upper bounds that showed poor worst-case performance of
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these techniques on deterministic mechanisms, which motivated the study of stochastic
solutions. These stochastic mechanisms randomise over the choice of ignored agents or the
choice of partitions.
We demonstrated two measures for comparing stochastic allocation mechanisms that
are DSIC and SBB, namely the probability of efficiency, and the expected social surplus
ratio. Where the mechanism designer’s goals include maximising the overall utility of the
group of agents, mechanisms can be compared based on their expected social surplus.
Alternatively, agents’ utilities may be of secondary importance, and the designer is most
concerned with achieving an efficient allocation, in which case the probability of achieving
such an outcome will appropriately compare mechanisms. While we apply these measures
to the specific problem of allocation under unit demand, these natural extensions to previ-
ous properties for deterministic allocation mechanisms are appropriate in broader settings.
They provide extra detail required to adequately compare stochastic mechanisms, while
maintaining their original, deterministic meaning when applied to deterministic mecha-
nisms.
Using our two measures and looking at worst-case bounds, we found the optimal
stochastic mechanisms for our allocation problem under our constraints. These mecha-
nisms work by either ignoring a single agent’s reported value entirely, or by partitioning
agents and items into separate allocation groups. Our optimal mechanisms are particular
instantiations of the general technique developed by Faltings [2005] but with proof of op-
timality for our particular setting. They are also similar to the partition mechanisms used
to allocate identical (homogeneous) items proposed by Guo and Conitzer [2008].
We applied these strategies to our other social choice problems, with randomised mech-
anisms for achieving envy-freeness in the room assignment–rent division problem. A de-
terministic mechanism is unable to provide an envy-free outcome while ensuring agents
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have no incentive to misreport their preferences. As with heterogeneous item allocation,
we are able to obtain truthful mechanisms for this problem through the use of ignoring or
partitioning. For a randomised mechanism, there are several possible outcomes, so eval-
uating and comparing these mechanisms by purely deterministic measures is not always
suitable. We presented measures of envy-freeness appropriate for comparing randomised
mechanisms.
Calculating envy between agents’ lotteries of outcomes is not an effective measure in
the RARD problem, as we show it is trivial to achieve this in mechanisms, and it does
not consider the quality of final outcomes. Instead we focused on measures related to
those measures we used for efficiency. The probability of envy-freeness shows, in the worst
case, what probability the mechanism will achieve the ideal outcome of envy-freeness in
all agents. We also assessed mechanisms based on the expected fraction of envious agents,
which can give an expected level of quality where the ideal outcome is unlikely.
The nature of the public good problem precludes the use of partitioning, but the
RandomAuctioneer approach allows truthful and strongly budget balanced mechanisms.
Since allocative efficiency is a concern of the public good problem, we use the same mea-
sures we applied to the heterogeneous item allocation problem.
We assessed the theoretical worst-case performance of these new, stochastic mechanisms
on our three problems and showed that they outperform deterministic approaches. For the
item allocation and RARD problems, due to our characterisations we were able to provide
optimal mechanisms, according to our measures of efficiency and envy-freeness.
In addition to assessing the solution quality in terms of collective utility or envy-freeness,
we were also concerned with the communication and computational complexity of these
mechanisms. The RandomAuctioneer and partitioning approaches were used to allow bud-
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get balanced, truthful mechanisms. However, these two techniques also facilitate improve-
ments to the communication and computational requirements of a mechanism. Ignoring or
partitioning agents lowers the amount of information the mechanism needs to collect from
agents, while also reducing the time required to calculate a solution to the social choice
problem. Both techniques over a flexible trade-off between the final solution quality and
the communication and computational demands.
This work included empirical results in addition to our theoretical worst-case analyses.
For our stochastic mechanisms, we performed an average-case analysis using randomly
generated value profiles. These results showed that, especially with larger problem sizes,
the worst-case performance of these mechanisms occurs in a small fraction of possible value
profiles, making the average case typically much higher.
Our three social choice problems required strong budget balance due to constraints of
the problem definition. However, we showed that this constraint can improve the over-
all utility of agents. In our empirical results we compared the VCG mechanism, which
maximises the total utility when choosing an outcome, to our strongly budget balanced
mechanisms. The loss of utility due to budget imbalance in VCG was greater than the loss
due to an inefficient outcome chosen by our stochastic mechanisms. While the budget im-
balance can be reduced in some settings, our results show that inefficient allocation should
be considered when attempting to maximise the overall utility of a set of agents.
When assessing the techniques to improve communication and computational complex-
ity, we also performed empirical average-case tests. The partitioning approach reduces the
complexity of a mechanism as the number of partitions increases, but with increasing losses
to solution quality (e.g. efficiency). We showed that in the item allocation problem, as
the problem size increases, the loss due to additional partitions reduces. This is a promis-
ing result, since it is larger problems that would benefit more from such improvements to
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communication and computational demands. This partitioning approach also allows the
creation of a mechanism that iteratively uses fewer partitions. Much like an anytime algo-
rithm, the mechanism can progressively improve on the allocation as more agent types are
received or as more time is allowed to calculate an allocation, while being able to present
a solution at any time, if stopped early.
In all, randomisation is a powerful tool for the design of mechanisms in computational
social choice. It can improve on game theoretic worst-case bounds of deterministic mech-
anisms as well as communication and computational requirements. Moving to stochastic
solutions, however, necessitates new measures of solution quality, which we discussed in
this thesis.
6.1 Future Work
The techniques we presented in this work can be extended to additional problems. Most
direct would be to agents with non-unit demand, and more general auction settings such as
combinatorial auctions. This use can be to allow strong budget balance and truthfulness,
to improve overall agent utility, or to improve computational demands. Combinatorial
auctions in particular can suffer from large computational problems, so a partitioning
approach may be especially beneficial, along with using iteratively fewer partitions for
“anytime mechanism design”.
The stochastic measures introduced in this work can be directly applied to other settings
examining stochastic mechanisms with the objective of efficiency or envy-freeness. For
example, the work of Feldman and Lai [2012] extended the impossibility results of Cohen
et al. [2010] for truthful, envy-free mechanisms in allocations with bounded capacity (a
generalisation of unit-demand). Our stochastic measures and techniques can be applied to
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find truthful, envy-free stochastic mechanisms in these settings. They can also be adapted
to other settings for properties such as profit maximisation or egalitarian social welfare.
We showed that sacrificing efficiency to achieve strong budget balance can result in
higher overall agent utility compared to mechanisms that enforce efficiency but allow bud-
get imbalance. Using our characterisation of DSIC, item allocation mechanisms, future
work can find a mechanism that enforces neither efficiency nor strong budget balance, yet
provides the optimal worst-case (expected) social surplus ratio.
For the item allocation and public good problems, we focussed on DSIC mechanisms.
If this is relaxed to include mechanisms that are truthful in expectation, then more mech-
anisms are possible, which may improve on the worst-case bounds for item allocation.
However, it may be the case that no improvements are possible with this relaxation, as
Mehta and Vazirani [2004] showed in the digital goods setting.
The stochastic mechanisms presented used uniform randomisations to determine ig-
nored agents or partitions, since no prior distribution is assumed for agent types. If such
prior knowledge existed, then the stochastic mechanisms can be tuned to achieve bet-
ter expected performance. The gains from using this prior knowledge, or from relaxing to
truthfulness in expectation, can be quantified using the measures we present in Section 4.1.
A core assumption in this work is rational agents with full information on other agents’
types and unlimited computing power. If agents do not have complete information, then
DSIC may be a needlessly strong requirement, which can be relaxed to enable additional
mechanisms. Agents may also act irrationally due to computational limitations (bounded
rationality). Alternatively, they may act according to some other behavioural model, as
studied by behavioural game theory and economics. Future work may be required to adapt
the mechanisms we presented to such agents.
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Finally, there has been recent work on “derandomising” stochastic auctions [Aggarwal
et al., 2005; Ben-Zwi et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011], which aim to find a deterministic
auction with approximately the same revenue for a given stochastic auction. The auctions
examined, however, have unlimited supply, and thus the allocation of any two agents is
independent, so such techniques cannot be used in our settings. Future work using the
two randomisation techniques we presented for other social choice problems may be able to
derandomise these mechanisms. Since we used randomisation to gain truthfulness under
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Proof of Theorem 3.5
The proof closely follows the proof of Theorem A by Roberts [Roberts, 1979].
For this section we define V = R|N|×|A′| as a set of agents’ values over all possible
allocations A′ ⊆ A, so we need vi(x) = vi(y) whenever x(i) = y(i). Also, in the following
lemmas and definitions, we use v(x)xy v(y) between two vectors where v ∈ V to denote
vi(x) < vi(y) where x(i) 6= y(i) (i.e., agent i changes item), while the two values are
necessarily equal when x(i) = y(i). This holds for all i ∈ N. The relation xy is defined
similarly. Note that xy≡yx. For simplicity of notation we write  where the two
allocations are clear from the context.
We begin our proof of affine-maximising by redefining the binary relation T (v) between
two allocations x, y ∈ A, defined as follows: xT (v)y if, for some ε ∈ V , εxy 0, L ∈ R, we
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have that, for any v′ ∈ V satisfying
v′(x) v(x)− ε (A.1)
v′(y) v(y) + ε (A.2)
v′i(w) < L , ∀i ∈ N , ∀w 6= x, y (A.3)
then f(v′) = x. This gives a notion of x being a preferred allocation to y under value
profile v. In particular we will use it to show when certain allocations can not be chosen.
The value L ensures other outcomes are valued sufficiently low such that f(v′) 6= w. Note
that when agents have the same item in both x and y, in which case vi(x) = vi(y), the first
two inequalities are satisfied by any εi ≥ 0.
Next, the modification to Lemma A.1 of [Roberts, 1979].
Lemma A.1. ∀x, y, x 6= y : xT (v)y → y 6= f(v).
Proof. Assume this is not true, so we have xT (v)y and y = f(v). From xT (v)y we have
εxy 0 and L. This means f(v′) = x for some v′ that satisfies:
v′(x) = v(x)− ε (A.4)
v′(y) = v(y) + ε (A.5)
v′i(w) ≤ vi(w) , ∀i ∈ N , ∀w 6= x, y, wi 6= yi (A.6)
Where εi = 0 if xi = yi. Values v
′
i(w) are chosen to be sufficiently low to satisfy the above




i(y) = vi(y)+εi = vi(w)+εi.
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This gives us:
v′(y)− v′(x) = v(y)− v(x) + 2ε v(y)− v(x) (A.7)
and
v′i(y)− v′i(w) > vi(y) + ε− vi(w) > vi(y)− vi(w) , ∀w 6= x, y, wi 6= yi (A.8)
v′i(y)− v′i(w) = vi(y)− vi(w) = 0 , ∀w 6= x, y, wi = yi (A.9)
⇒ v′(y)− v′(w) v(y)− v(w) , ∀w 6= x, y (A.10)
By Lemma 3.1 (given f(v) = y) this implies f(v′) = y, but f(v′) = x 6= y, a contradiction.
Next, we can show that T (v) retains transitivity, and a dependence on relative differ-
ences in v by modifying Lemmas A.2 and A.3 of [Roberts, 1979].
Lemma A.2. xT (v)y and yT (v)z → xT (v)z.
Proof. If x, y, z are non-distinct, this is trivial. Let xT (v)y and yT (v)z. From the definition
of xT (v)y we have εxy 0 and L such that:
v′(x) v(x)− ε (A.11)
v′(y) v(y) + ε (A.12)
v′i(w) < L , ∀i ∈ N , ∀w 6= x, y (A.13)
implies x = f(v′). Let V ′ be the set of v′ satisfying the above inequalities. Similarly, from
yT (v)z, we have ε′ yz 0 and L′ such that:
v′′(y) v(y)− ε′ (A.14)
v′′(z) v(z) + ε′ (A.15)
v′′i (w) < L
′ , ∀i ∈ N , ∀w 6= x, y (A.16)
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implies y = f(v′′). Let V ′′ be the set of v′′ satisfying the above inequalities. Now consider
v′′′ defined as:
v′′′(x) = v(x)− ε
2
, xi 6= zi (A.17)
v′′′(y) = v(y) (A.18)
v′′′(z) = v(z) +
ε′
2
, xi 6= zi (A.19)
v′′′i (w) = L
′′ , ∀w s.t. wi 6= xi, yi (A.20)
Where L′′ < min(L,L′). Note that this may not be a valid value profile as it must ensure
vi(a) = vi(b) whenever ai = bi. As v
′′′(y) = v(y) then εi must be zero when xi = yi and ε
′
i
must be zero when zi = yi, this is the case from the definition of T and  above. When
xi = zi, then v
′′′
i (x) = vi(x) = vi(z) = v
′′′
i (z). Where wi = xi (or yi, zi), then v
′′′
i (w) must
necessarily equal v(x) (or v(y), v(z)).
We can now show that f(v′′′) = x by showing that it cannot be w, y, z. First, assume
that f(v′′′) = w, for w 6= x, y, z. But, we can find v′′ ∈ V ′′ such that:
v′′(w)wu v′′′(w) (A.21)
v′′(u)wu v′′′(u) , ∀u 6= w (A.22)
Coupling this with f(v′′′) = w means that, by Lemma 3.1, f(v′′) = w 6= y, which is a
contradiction. A similar v′′ can be found, replacing w with z to show that f(v′′′) = z →
f(v′′) = z 6= y, also a contradiction.
If, instead, we let f(v′′′) = y then we have some v′ ∈ V ′′ such that:
v′(y)yu v′′′(y) (A.23)
v′(u)yu v′′′(u) , ∀u 6= y (A.24)
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Which, from Lemma 3.1 gives us f(v′) = y 6= x, another contradiction. Thus, we must
have f(v′′′) = x. If we then define ε′′i = min(εi, ε
′
i), for xi 6= zi and L′′′ ≤ L′′ then, from









v∗(w) < L′′ , ∀w 6= x, z (A.27)
⇒ v∗(x)− v∗(u) v(x)− v(u) , ∀u 6= x (A.28)
and this implies f(v∗) = x. This, by definition of T , means that xT (v)z.
Lemma A.3. For any pair of value profiles, v, v′ ∈ V , if v(x)− v(y) = v′(x)− v′(y) then:
xT (v)y ↔ xT (v′)y, and (A.29)
yT (v)x↔ yT (v′)x (A.30)
Proof. Due to symmetry, we only need to prove that if
v′(x) =v(x) + α, (A.31)
v′(y) =v(y) + α, and (A.32)
xT (v)y (A.33)
then xT (v′)y. From xT (v)y we have some ε ≥ 0, and L such that
v′′(x) v(x)− ε (A.34)
v′′(y) v(y) + ε (A.35)
v′′i (w) < L , ∀i ∈ N , ∀w 6= x, y (A.36)
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implies x = f(v′′). Pick one such v′′ defined as
v′′(x) = v(x)− ε
2
(A.37)




v′′i (w) = (L− δ) , δ > 0 , ∀w 6= x, y, wi 6= xi, yi (A.39)
Now consider any v′′′ that satisfies
v′′′(x) v′(x)− ε
2
= v′′(x) + α (A.40)
v′′′(y) v′(y) + ε
2
= v′′(y) + α (A.41)
v′′′i (w) < L
′ , ∀w 6= x, y, wi 6= xi, yi (A.42)
where L′ < L− δmini αi. Since we have f(v′′) = x, by Lemma 3.1 we have f(v′′′) = x, and
thus this defines xT (v′)y.
As in the general case, Lemma A.3 shows the relationship T (v) between two allocations
x, y depends only on v(x) − v(y). We can thus define a set P (x, y) that captures all the
relative values between x and y, where x is preferred, given y is normalised to zero. We
must ensure valid value profiles, however. Specifically define
P (x, y) = {α ∈ Rn : xT (v)y, for vi(x) = αi if xi 6= yi, 0 otherwise. vi(y) = 0} (A.43)
We have that if α ∈ P (x, y) and β xy α, then β ∈ P (x, y).
The symmetric set, Q(x, y) is defined as
Q(x, y) = {α ∈ Rn : yT (v)x, for vi(x) = αi if xi 6= yi, 0 otherwise. vi(y) = 0} (A.44)
Due to Lemma 3.1, if f(v) = x, then for any εxy 0, y 6= x, we have (v(x)−v(y)+ ε) ∈
P (x, y), and (v(y) − v(x) − ε) ∈ Q(x, y). Note that zero values for αi when xi = yi are
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necessary, since vi(x) = vi(y) ⇒ vi(x)− vi(y) = 0. Further, for all x, y ∈ A′, both P (x, y)
and Q(x, y) are non-empty.
As with Lemma A.4 in [Roberts, 1979], we have P (x, y), Q(x, y) disjoint.
Lemma A.4. For all x, y such that x 6= y, P (x, y) and Q(x, y) are disjoint.
Proof. Proof by contradiction, so assume there is some α such that α ∈ P (x, y) and Q(x, y).
This means xT (v)y and yT (v)x for v(x)− v(y) = α. As xT (v)y, we have some v′ where
v′(x) v(x) (A.45)
v′(y) v(y) (A.46)
v′(z) < L, ∀z 6= x, y (A.47)
f(v′) = x (A.48)
Similarly, since we also have yT (v)x then there exists some v′′ where
v′′(x) v(x) (A.49)
v′′(y) v(y) (A.50)
v′′i (z) = K , ∀z s.t. zi 6= xi, yi (A.51)
f(v′′) = y (A.52)





i (z) , ∀z 6= x, y , zi 6= xi, yi (A.55)
Which, combined with f(v′′) = y and Lemma 3.1 means that f(v′) = y. But f(v′) = x 6= y,
which is a contradiction.
191
Next we can show that if a value α is not in Q(x, y) then it can be placed in P (x, y)
with any infinitesimal increase (in the values of agents who change items).
Lemma A.5. For all x, y, x 6= y, α /∈ Q(x, y)→ α + ε ∈ P (x, y), ∀εxy 0.
Proof. Assume this is not true, that is, α /∈ Q(x, y) and α+ ε /∈ P (x, y), for some εxy 0.
This means for any v where v(x)−v(y) = α+ ε
2
, then we have α /∈ Q(x, y)→ y 6= f(v) and
α + ε /∈ P (x, y)→ x 6= f(v). As x, y ∈ A′, they come from the set of possible allocations,
and as such ∃v′ such that f(v′) = x. Choose a v that satisfies
v(x)− v(y) = α + ε
2
(A.56)
v(x) ≥ v′(x) (A.57)
v(y) ≥ v′(y) (A.58)
v(w) ≤ v′(w) , ∀w 6= x, y (A.59)
Let z = f(v), since we know that z 6= x, y. We can then choose some v′′ such that
v′(x) ≤ v′′(x) ≤ v(x) (A.60)
v′(z) ≥ v′′(z) ≥ v(z) (A.61)
v(y) ≥ v′(y) ≥ v′′(y) (A.62)
v′(w) ≥ v(w) ≥ v′′(w) , ∀w 6= x, y (A.63)
Since f(v) = z, if we compare v and v′′, by Lemma 3.1 we have f(v′′) = z. Also, since
f(v′) = x, if we compare v′ and v′′, by Lemma 3.1 we have f(v′′) = x. This is a contradic-
tion.
This provides some insight into the boundary between P (x, y) and Q(x, y). By the
definition of T , the sets P (x, y) and Q(x, y) are open, in the space Rn, with P (x, y) bounded
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below and Q(x, y) bounded above. The lower bound
γ(x, y) = inf{α : α ∈ P (x, y)} (A.64)
is not contained in P (x, y). From Lemma A.5, we have α  γ(x, y) → α ∈ P (x, y) and
α γ(x, y)→ α ∈ Q(x, y).
Lemma A.6. For all distinct x, y, z, γ(x, z) =xz γ(x, y) + γ(y, z). Here we use a =xy b to
denote ai = bi when xi 6= yi, with no specific relation otherwise.
Proof. Let γ(x, z) =xz γ(x, y) + γ(y, z)− δ, and define v such that
v(x) =xy −δ
4
+ γ(x, y) (A.65)




− γ(y, z) (A.67)
We need to ensure that v ∈ V . If an agent has a different item in x, y, z then there is no
problem. Also, if xi = zi we have no additional constraints from the above equations. If
xi = yi (similarly if yi = zi) then γ(x, y) = 0 and vi(x) = 0, but this doesn’t force δ = 0
because the first constraint only requires equality when xi 6= yi. If zi = xi 6= yi, then the
above constraints require δi = 0, but since we don’t define δi for xi = zi, this is not a
problem.
Start by assuming δ > 0, so we have:
v(x)− v(y) = −δ
4
+ γ(x, y) γ(x, y)→ yT (v)x (A.68)
v(y)− v(z) = −δ
4
+ γ(y, z) γ(y, z)→ zT (v)y (A.69)
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So, by Lemma A.2 we have zT (v)x, but comparing x and z we have:
v(x)− v(z) = −δ
2
+ γ(x, y) + γ(y, z) (A.70)
= −δ
2
+ γ(x, z) + δ  γ(x, z) (A.71)
→ xT (v)z (A.72)
But this contradicts Lemma A.4. By reversing inequalities, we get a symmetric contradic-
tion when δ < 0. Thus δ = 0.
Next, in order to show that, after normalisation, sets P (x, y) are “equivalent” for all
choices of x, y we choose some “base” allocation, x, to which all allocations are normalised.
Define δ(x) = 0 and, for all y 6= x, δ(y) = −γ(x, y). From this definition, and Lemma A.6,
we have γ(y, z) = δ(y) − δ(z) = −γ(z, y). We then normalise our sets P by defining new
sets R(x, y), defined as:
R(x, y) = {α : α + γ(x, y) ∈ P (x, y)} (A.73)
We can now show that R is equivalent for any pair of allocations, by modifying Lemma
A.7 of [Roberts, 1979]. Note that this equivalence is somewhat different to the equality
in the general setting of [Roberts, 1979]. We require equality only for agents that change
items between the two allocations in both sets. When xi = yi then for all α ∈ R(x, y)
then αi = 0, so when comparing R(x, y) to R(w, z), we only compare in dimensions where
xi 6= yi∧wi 6= zi (agent i changes items in both comparisons) OR xi = yi∧wi = zi (agent i
doesn’t change items, note that this doesn’t require xi = wi). That is, if R(x, y) ≡ R(w, z)
then ∀α ∈ R(x, y), ∃β ∈ R(w, z) such that if xi 6= yi ∧ wi 6= zi OR xi = yi ∧ wi = zi then
αi = βi.
For any α Let αxyi = αi if xi 6= yi and 0 otherwise.
194
Lemma A.7. For all w, x, y, z, R(x, y) ≡ R(w, z) ≡ R.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that R(x, y) ≡ R(w, y), as a symmetric argument will show
that R(x, y) ≡ R(x, z), and thus it immediately follows that R(x, y) ≡ R(w, y) ≡ R(w, z).
To prove by contradiction, we assume R(x, y) 6≡ R(w, y), that is, there is some α such
that αxy ∈ R(x, y), αwy /∈ R(w, y). Due to the openness of P and thus R, we have some
εxw 0 such that:
αxy − εxy + γ(x, y) ∈ P (x, y) (A.74)




+ γ(w, y) ∈ Q(w, y) (A.75)
Define v such that
v(x) = αxy − εxy + γ(x, y) (A.76)
v(y) = 0 (A.77)
v(w) = αwy − ε
wy
2
+ γ(w, y) (A.78)
Again, we need to ensure v ∈ V . If xi = yi then αi = γi(x, y) = 0, also we have εi = 0.
Similarly when yi = wi. Finally, when xi = wi 6= yi, to set v(x) = v(w) we need εi = 0,
regardless of αi, which we have. This value profile gives us xT (v)y and yT (v)w so, by
Lemma A.2, xT (v)w. However, from Lemma A.6 we have:
v(w)− v(x) = ε
2
+ γ(w, y)− γ(x, y) = ε
2
+ γ(w, x) (A.79)
As εxw 0 this means we have xT (v)w, which contradicts Lemma A.4.
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So the structure of f is captured by the structure of R, which, just as in the general
case, remains convex.
Lemma A.8. For all y 6= z, R(y, z) is convex.
Proof. Suppose not, this means we have some α ∈ R(y, z), β ∈ R(y, z), but ω = 1
2
(α+β) /∈
R(y, z). Due to the openness of R, and Lemma A.5 (for the case of ω) we have some ε > 0
such that
αxy − εxy + γ(x, y) ∈ P (x, y) (A.80)
βyz − εyz + γ(y, z) ∈ P (y, z) (A.81)
ωxz − εxz + γ(x, z) ∈ Q(x, z) (A.82)
As δ ∈ Q(x, z)→ −δ ∈ P (z, x) and γ(z, x) = −γ(x, z), we have:
−ωxz + εxz + γ(z, x) ∈ P (z, x) (A.83)
Define v such that
v(x) = αxy − εxy + γ(x, y) (A.84)
v(y) = 0 (A.85)
v(z) =yz v(x)− ωxz + εxz + γ(z, x) (A.86)
This ensures v ∈ V . Whenever xi = yi or zi = yi, then values for these allocations are
forced to 0. When xi = zi 6= yi, then ωxz, εxz, γ(z, x) = 0, so vi(z) = vi(x).
From v we have v(x)−v(y) ∈ P (x, y)→ xT (v)y and v(z)−v(x) = −ωxz+εx,z+γ(z, x) ∈
P (z, x) → zT (v)x (since when xi 6= zi = yi, αi = ωi). By Lemma A.2 we have zT (v)y,
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which means
v(z)− v(y) ∈ P (z, y) (A.87)
⇒v(x)− ω + ε+ γ(z, x) ∈ P (z, y) (A.88)
⇒α− ω + γ(x, y) + γ(z, x) ∈ P (z, y) (A.89)
⇒α− ω + γ(z, y) ∈ P (z, y) by Lemma A.6 (A.90)
⇒1
2
(α− β) + γ(z, y) ∈ P (z, y) (A.91)
⇒1
2
(α− β) ∈ R(y, z) (A.92)








(α− β) + γ(y, z) (A.93)
v′(z) = 0 (A.94)
This is a valid value profile since αi = βi = γi(y, z) = 0 when yi = zi. So we have:
v′(y)− v′(z) = 1
2
(α− β) + γ(y, z) ∈ R(y, z)⇒ yT (v′)z (A.95)
v′(z)− v′(y) = 1
2
(β − α) + γ(z, y) ∈ R(y, z)⇒ zT (v′)y (A.96)
But this contradicts Lemma A.4, so must have ω ∈ R(y, z).
From the definition of R(x, y), if α ∈ R(x, y) then −α /∈ R(x, y), so we have −R(x, y) =
{α : −α ∈ R(x, y)}. These two sets are both disjoint and convex. We also have:
αxy /∈ −R(x, y)⇒ −αxy /∈ R(x, y)⇒ −αxy + γ(x, y) /∈ P (x, t) (A.97)
⇒αxy − γ(x, y) /∈ Q(x, y)⇒ αxy + γ(y, x) /∈ Q(y, x) (A.98)
197
So, by Lemma A.5, αxy /∈ −R(x, y)⇒ αxy + ε ∈ R(x, y), for all εxy 0. Since R(x, y) and
−R(x, y) are both disjoint, convex and non-empty, there is a separating hyperplane, and
thus some constant kxy ∈ Rn, kxy 6= 0 such that
α ∈ R(x, y)⇒ kxyα ≥ 0 (A.99)
α ∈ −R(x, y)⇒ kxyα ≤ 0 (A.100)
Suppose we have α such that kxyα > 0, and some εxy 0 such that kxy(α− ε)0. Then
α− ε /∈ −R(x, y)⇒ α ∈ R(x, y). Thus,
kxyα > 0⇒ αxy ∈ R(x, y) (A.101)
Also, since if εxy 0 then ε ∈ R(x, y), then kxy xy 0.












kiαi > 0⇒ xT (v)y ⇒ y 6= f(v) (A.103)∑
i







ki(vi(y)− δi(y))⇒ y 6= f(v) (A.105)







ki(vi(y)− δi(y)) , ∀y ∈ A′ (A.106)
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Thus, setting U0(a) = −
∑
i kiδi(a), and γi = ki, we have
f(v) = x⇒ U0(x) +
∑
i
γivi(x) ≥ U0(y) +
∑
i
γivi(y) , ∀y ∈ A′ (A.107)
























dominant strategy incentive compatible, 15
DSIC, see dominant strategy incentive com-
patible













independence of irrelevant alternatives, 41
individual rationality, 16
IR, see individual rationality




multi-round affine maximiser, 38
Nash equilibrium, 14
no single-agent effect, 36
no subsidy, see weak budget balance
OPTMIX mechanism, 123
outcome, 13





pivotal mechanism, see Vickrey-Clarke-Gro-
ves mechanism
pNF , 76
point of indifference, 113
positive association of differences, 37
probability of efficiency, 73
probability of envy-freeness, 76
public good, 26
public project, see public good
quasi-linear utility, 13, 19
RandomAuctioneer mechanism, 83
randomised mechanism, see stochastic mech-
anism






Room Assignment–Rent Division, 21
rWCE, 74
S-MON, see strong monotonicity
SBB, see strong budget balance
SCF, see social choice function
social choice function, 14
social surplus ratio, 31
stochastic mechanism, 15
strategy-proof, see dominant strategy incen-
tive compatible




TIE, see truthfulness in expectation





utilitarian social choice function, 31
utility function, 13
value profile, 18
VCG mechanism, see Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, 35
voluntary participation, see individual ratio-
nality
W-MON, see weak monotonicity
WBB, see weak budget balance
weak budget balance, 20
weak monotonicity, 41
worst-case expected ratio, 74
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